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In a healthy social environment, children learn by trial-and-error how to behave according 
to the norms and values of their society. In general, positive and negative feedback from 
caregivers, teachers and peers serve as reinforcers that will eventually distil a behavioural style 
that is considered as socially well-adapted. For example, when hitting one’s brother or sister, 
this will likely result in multiple aversive outcomes: witnessing the pain and sadness of the 
other child, as well as negative responses and disapproval by one’s parents. On the other hand, 
sharing a toy or a piece of chocolate with another child will result in positive outcomes: a happy 
friend as well as parental appraisal. These experiences with positive and negative outcomes 
of behaviour (i.e., feedback) will help to predict the outcomes of future actions. Through 
these mechanisms, socially adaptive behavioural repertoires become internalised, which will 
support these children to function as socially well-adapted individuals in adulthood. Likewise, 
impairments in feedback-based learning and disrupted processing of predictive information 
will increase the likelihood of adult maladaptive or even antisocial behaviour. Antisocial 
behaviour and criminality have an immense impact on both individual lives and society as a 
whole, and, as such, law enforcement is still largely focused on repercussion and punishment, 
despite the high reoffending rates in antisocial individuals, especially those with psychopathy. 
This thesis takes another perspective, focusing on how positive outcomes of behaviour can be 
used to promote adaptive learning and decision making in psychopathic offenders.
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1.1  DISORDERS ASSOCIATED WITH ANTISOCIAL  
BEHAVIOUR
The section above described how cognitive variables, particularly the process-
ing of feedback and predictive information, may lead to the development of 
antisocial behaviour. However, environmental factors such as harsh and incon-
sistent parenting styles, a lack of parental supervision and monitoring, deviant 
peers, and parental antisocial behaviour increase the likelihood that a child is 
exposed to violence, substance abuse and criminality. Hence, children growing 
up in such environments are at risk of failing to internalise the societal norms 
and values that are required to behave appropriately (Fairchild et al., 2019; 
Freeze et al., 2014; McCabe et al., 2005). These cognitive and environmental 
factors in combination with biologically determined temperament and person-
ality characteristics, such as impulsivity and sensation seeking, are risk factors 
for the development of conduct disorder (CD) during childhood and adoles-
cence (Fairchild et al., 2019; Freeze et al., 2014; Loeber et al., 2009; McCabe et 
al., 2005; Raine, 2002). Youth with CD engage in multiple antisocial behaviours 
such as bullying, lying, stealing, vandalism, and physical aggression (Fairchild 
et al., 2019; Moffitt et al., 2008), and it is often regarded as a developmental 
precursor for adult antisocial personality disorder (ASPD). 
Both prospective and retrospective research has shown that between 30 and 
50% of youth with conduct disorder develop adult ASPD, and between 60 
and 90% of adults with ASPD are found to have had CD during adolescence 
(Loeber et al., 2002; Moffitt et al., 2008).  Individuals with ASPD act with a 
disregard for (the rights of) others, engage in violence and criminal activities, 
and consequently often end up in the criminal justice system (Glenn et al., 
2013; Wilson, 2014). In fact, research shows that between 50% and 80% of 
prisoners meet the criteria for a diagnosis of ASPD (Hare, 2003a). Although 
ASPD already is associated with considerable costs for society at large (e.g., 
police time, prison services, (mental) health care, damage to property, emotion-
al and physical harm to victims; see National Collaborating Centre for Mental 
Health, 2010), a subgroup of individuals with ASPD present with more severe 
and versatile antisocial tendencies, and have additional emotional and inter-
personal impairments. This constellation of traits is referred to as psychop-
athy, and is considered to be a reliable risk factor for violent crimes and for 
reoffending after imprisonment (Douglas et al., 2018; Hemphill, Templeman, 
et al., 1998; Leistico et al., 2008). Importantly, the development of psychop-
athy is partly distinct to the development of ASPD; research suggests that 
the personality features that are believed to be at the core of psychopathy 
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(i.e., callousness and unemotionality) are highly heritable and predictive of per-
sistent future antisocial behaviour (Kahn et al., 2013; Viding et al., 2005). 
A number of conceptualisations of psychopathy have been developed over 
the course of years, but there is still debate on the definition of the syndrome. 
The first to describe patients with psychopathic features was Hervey Cleckley 
(1941, 1976). In his classic and seminal book ‘The Mask of Sanity’ (1976), he 
describes a clinical profile including 16 criteria such as pathological lying, super-
ficial charm, a lack of guilt, and a failure to learn from aversive experiences such 
as punishment (see Table 1.1). This work is still considered to be the basis for 
all models and their associated assessment instruments later to be developed, 
in which most of these features are still present. Currently, the most influen-
tial instrument to assess psychopathy in clinical samples is the Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003a).
TABLE 1.1 Cleckley criteria for psychopathy
CATEGORY ITEM
Positive adjustment • Superficial charm and good intelligence
• Absence of delusions and irrational thinking
• Absence of “nervousness”
• Suicide rarely carried out
Emotional-interpersonal deficits • Untruthfulness and insincerity
• Lack of remorse or shame
• General poverty in major affective reactions
• Pathologic egocentricity and incapacity for love
• Specific loss of insight
• Unresponsiveness in general interpersonal relations
Behavioural deviance • Inadequately motivated antisocial behaviour
• Poor judgment and failure to learn by experience
• Unreliability
• Fantastic and uninviting behaviour with drink or some-
times without
• Sex life impersonal, trivial, and poorly integrated
• Failure to follow any life plan
Note. Categories adopted from Patrick (2006).
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1.2 THE PCL-R
The PCL-R (Hare, 1991, 2003a) is a 20-item inventory, which is scored by two 
trained clinicians based on a semi-structured interview as well as file information 
regarding clinical and offence history. Originally, each item (with the exception 
of two more general items) of the PCL-R and its predecessor, the PCL (Hare, 
1980), loads on one of two factors, referred to as Factor 1 and Factor 2 (Hare, 
1991). Items loading on Factor 1 reflect emotional and interpersonal difficulties, 
such as shallow affect, glibness, reduced guilt, and lack of empathy. Factor 2 
contains items reflecting impulsive antisocial behaviour, such as a need for stim-
ulation, poor behavioural control, a parasitic lifestyle, and juvenile delinquency. 
Later research on the PCL-R has shown that each factor can be divided into 
two subfactors (or facets), which led to the second edition of the PCL-R (Hare, 
2003a). In this four-factor model of psychopathy, Factor 1 is subdivided in a 
facet reflecting affective disturbances and a facet representing interpersonal 
traits, and Factor 2 is comprised of a facet capturing lifestyle and impulsivity 
and a facet representing antisocial tendencies (see Table 1.2). Total scores on 
the PCL-R range from 0 to 40, with higher scores reflecting a higher degree of 
psychopathy. Besides this dimensional score, a cut-off score is also used to clas-
sify individuals for clinical, legal and research purposes. However, partly due to 
cultural differences, the cut-off differs between countries; in North America a 
TABLE 1.2 Hare criteria for psychopathy
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2
Interpersonal facet Affective facet Lifestyle facet Antisocial facet
Glibness/superficial 
charm
Lack of remorse  
or guilt
• Need for stimulation  
/ proneness to 
boredom






• Parasitic lifestyle • Early behaviour 
problems 
Pathological lying Callous/lack  
of empathy
• Lack of realistic,  
long-term goals




Failure to accept  




• Revocation of  
conditional  
release
• Criminal  
versatility
Note. The items ‘Many short-term marital relationships’ and ‘Promiscuous sexual behaviour’ are 
not included in the factor structure.
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cut-off of 30 is used, while in most European countries a cut-off score of 26 is 
applied (see Hare et al., 2000). 
One critique on the PCL-R is that it focuses exclusively on maladaptive traits 
and behaviours (Cooke et al., 2005; Patrick, 2006), not taking into account the 
adequate social adjustment and positive psychological functioning as originally 
described by Cleckley (1941, 1976). Furthermore, due to its widespread use to 
identify individuals with psychopathy, criticism has pointed to the risk of con-
flating the PCL-R with psychopathy itself (e.g., Cooke et al., 2005). In addition, 
there are a number of problems regarding the feasibility of PCL-R administra-
tion. First, it is time-consuming and requires extensive training to administer. 
Further, detailed clinical history and criminal records do often not exist or are 
not accessible for non-clinical samples (Lilienfeld & Fowler, 2007). However, dif-
ferent self-report measures have been developed to (also) assess psychopathy 
in non-clinical and sub-clinical samples. One instrument closely related to the 
PCL-R, as it is based on the factor structure of the PCL-R, is the Self-Report 
Psychopathy Scale (SRP-III; Paulhus et al., 2016).
1.3  SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
The original SRP Scale (Hare, 1985) was developed as a self-report version of 
the PCL (Hare, 1980). In the course of years, it has undergone several revisions 
(SRP-II: Hare et al., 1989; SRP-III: Paulhus et al., 2016). The most recent version, 
the 64-item SRP-III (Paulhus et al., 2016) and its abbreviated 29-item SRP-Short 
Form (SRP-SF; Neumann & Pardini, 2014; Paulhus et al., 2016), has a four-factor 
structure and can be applied in both clinical and non-clinical samples (Neumann 
& Pardini, 2014). The factors of the SRP are similar to the four facets of the PCL-R, 
and labelled Interpersonal Manipulation, Callous Affect, Erratic Lifestyle, and 
Criminal Tendencies. 
Another self-report measure is the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
(PPI; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996) and its revised version, the PPI-R (Lilienfeld 
& Widows, 2005). The PPI was originally developed to overcome the depend-
ence on antisocial behaviour in existing psychopathy measures, and instead lay 
greater emphasis on the personality traits inherent to psychopathy. The PPI is a 
154-item self-report questionnaire that defines psychopathy as a construct with 
two main factors, named Fearless Dominance (PPI-I), reflecting affective and 
interpersonal personality traits, and Antisocial Impulsivity (PPI-II). There seems 
correspondence between the PCL-R and the PPI regarding total or global psy-
chopathy score (Copestake et al., 2011), and the two factors of the PPI have been 
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considered to be similar to the PCL-R factors (Benning et al., 2003). However, 
research suggests that the factors of both instruments are not equivalent, 
particularly those reflecting affective and interpersonal features (Copestake et 
al., 2011; Malterer et al., 2010). One important distinction is that the PPI factor 
Fearless Dominance covers adaptive traits regarding affective and interpersonal 
functioning, whereas the PCL-R exclusively focuses on maladaptive features.
A more recently developed instrument is the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure 
(TriPM; Patrick, 2010), a 56-item self-report questionnaire to assess psychopathy 
in both clinical and community samples. The TriPM is an operationalisation of 
the Triarchic Model (Patrick & Drislane, 2015; Patrick et al., 2009), which defines 
psychopathy as a construct that is composed of three main factors: Boldness 
(social dominance and emotional resilience), Meanness (aggressiveness and 
disregard for others), and Disinhibition (impulse control problems and negative 
affect). However, recent findings suggest that the TriPM may have a different 
structure than originally proposed, comprising six or even seven instead of three 
factors (Collison et al., 2020; Roy et al., 2020). Importantly, antisocial individ-
uals without psychopathy, but with ASPD, are believed to have high scores on 
the factor Disinhibition but not on the Boldness and Meanness factors (Patrick 
et al., 2009). This supports the notion that psychopathy is, although there is 
considerable overlap, distinct from ASPD. Moreover, Meanness and Boldness 
are considered to be different expressions of an underlying biological predis-
position towards experiencing low fear, but its phenotypic expression as either 
Boldness or Meanness is believed to be dependent on environmental factors, 
such as parenting style (Kochanska et al., 2002; Patrick et al., 2009).
1.4 INTEGRATION
In general, all the above-mentioned models propose a general tendency to-
wards experiencing low fear and anxiety levels (but see Derefinko, 2015; 
Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016), high impulsivity, and a lack of interpersonal relat-
edness to be central characteristics of having a psychopathic personality. In ad-
dition, individuals with psychopathy, particularly those in offender populations, 
often show high levels of sensation seeking and maladaptive responses to aver-
sive outcomes. Among the well-known consequences of these characteristics 
are impairments in feedback-based learning and decision making. For instance, 
psychopathy is associated with high re-offending rates (Hemphill, Hare, et al., 
1998; Olver & Wong, 2015), suggesting that punishment in the form of, e.g., im-
prisonment does not withhold psychopathic offenders from making the same 
maladaptive choices again. The relation between this maladaptive behaviour 
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and psychopathy was proposed  a long time ago (see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 
2016) and has often been seen to result from reduced learning from negative 
experiences. However, there is still debate about the mechanisms involved in the 
reinforcement learning impairments associated with psychopathy. In the course 
of years, different models and theories have been developed, with a particular 
focus on either attentional or emotional processes. The next section describes 
the most prominent theoretical frameworks regarding reinforcement learning 
deficits in psychopathy.  
1.5  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
1.5.1 Two-factor learning theory
One of the influential models explaining the reinforcement learning deficits in 
psychopathy is, in essence, a more general theory of reward and punishment 
processing. The two-factor learning theory (Gray, 1987) conceptualises reward 
and punishment processing in terms of the behavioural activation system (BAS) 
and the behavioural inhibition system (BIS). The BAS responds to appetitive 
stimuli and serves to initiate goal-directed action in response to reward. The BIS 
is focused on detecting threat cues and serves to inhibit behaviours leading to 
aversive outcomes, such as those associated with punishment. According to the 
two-factor learning theory, decreased inhibition of behaviour leading to punish-
ment (i.e., lower BIS reactivity) is associated with reduced negative arousal in re-
sponse to punishment and with increased ongoing engagement in reward-seek-
ing behaviour in the face of potential punishment. As such, modifications of this 
theory have been used to explain psychophysiological as well as behavioural 
data from studies showing disturbed reward and punishment processing in 
psychopathy (e.g., Fowles, 1980), such as poor aversive conditioning (Lykken, 
1957; Schmauk, 1970) and passive avoidance learning (Lykken, 1957; Newman 
& Kosson, 1986; Newman & Schmitt, 1998; Schmauk, 1970). In these studies, 
psychopathic individuals showed a smaller increase in skin conductance level 
in anticipation of aversive stimuli, and were less able to use punishment cues to 
avoid aversive outcomes. 
Despite the fact that different aspects of the two-factor learning theory have 
been incorporated in psychopathy-specific models of contingency learning 
(e.g., Low Fear hypothesis, Lykken, 1957; Response Modulation hypothesis, 
Patterson & Newman, 1993), the theory itself has been losing traction over time. 
Part of the reason is that the theory lacks specificity and does not account for 
inter-individual differences stemming from variations in the aetiology of psy-
chopathy. Perhaps more important is the fact that anxiety proneness is directly 
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related to BIS sensitivity, but anxiety is also believed to be a key factor con-
tributing to the heterogeneity observed across psychopathic individuals (e.g., 
Newman et al., 2005; Skeem et al., 2007). As such, although attractive and able 
to provide useful theoretical elements, the two-factor learning model is not able 
to explain the complex and heterogeneous nature of psychopathy. However, 
the notion that impaired experience of negative affective states plays a key role 
in understanding learning impairments in psychopathy was a cornerstone for 
other theories of psychopathy as well, such as the low-fear hypothesis (Lykken, 
1957, 1995).
1.6.2 Low-fear hypothesis 
According to the low-fear hypothesis (Lykken, 1957, 1995), the most impor-
tant mechanism underlying the impairments seen in psychopathy is a deficient 
emotional response to aversive events. The main assumption is that a deficit 
in experiencing fear in response to aversive outcomes impedes appropriate 
learning about the events leading to these bad outcomes. The belief is that 
psychopathic individuals already show difficulties in adapting their behaviour 
at an early stage of socialization. During typical (moral) socialization, children 
learn to behave appropriately by their tendency to avoid (parental) punishment, 
but children that are less sensitive to the negative valence of punishment are 
more likely to engage in the same (punished) behaviour again. Moreover, this 
theory assumes that the capacity to consider and act upon the negative conse-
quences of behaviour largely relies on emotional processing. According to the 
low-fear theory, this explains why psychopathic individuals are more prone to 
take risks that non-psychopathic individuals would avoid. Although the avoid-
ance learning deficits (Lykken, 1957; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman & 
Schmitt, 1998; Schmauk, 1970) and reduced electrodermal reactivity to threat 
cues (Hare, 1965; Lykken, 1957; Schmauk, 1970) observed in individuals with 
psychopathy can be regarded as evidence for the low-fear hypothesis, more 
recent advances in cognitive and neuroscientific research has indicated that 
it is likely that the involved mechanisms are far more complex than the low-
fear theory assumes (see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016). In addition, Lykken 
(1995) has utilised constructs from the work of Fowles (1980) and Gray (1987) 
to adapt the original low-fear theory (Lykken, 1957). Indeed, psychopathy has 
been related to low fear, low anxiety, and reduced BIS reactivity (e.g., Baskin-
Sommers et al., 2010; Lykken, 1995; Newman et al., 2005; Skeem et al., 2007). 
However, most of these studies measured BIS sensitivity using the BIS scales 
(Carver & White, 1994), which primarily assesses anxiety instead of fear (see 
Poythress et al., 2008). As anxiety and fear are two distinct constructs (Grillon, 
2008), it seems unlikely that a reduced experience of fear as an emotion, rather 
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than more basal threat processing impairments, is the core mechanism un-
derlying psychopathic behaviour (Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016). In addition, 
given that reinforcement learning requires, among others, memorizing and 
updating affective information, theories explicitly incorporating the involve-
ment of higher-order cognitive processes have gained more ground. One of the 
first cognitive theories that opposed the aetiological explanations provided by 
the low-fear account was the Response Modulation hypothesis developed by 
Newman and colleagues (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980; Newman & Kosson, 
1986; Patterson & Newman, 1993).
1.6.3 Response Modulation hypothesis 
The Response Modulation (RM) hypothesis (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980; 
Newman & Kosson, 1986; Patterson & Newman, 1993) is an attention model 
postulating that psychopathic individuals have a strong preference for reward 
in combination with an early attentional bottleneck (see Figure 1.1). When 
presented with both reward and punishment information, the attentional filter 
prevents peripheral (i.e., punishment) information from being processed as long 
as target (i.e., reward) information is available.
FIGURE 1.1 Schematic outline of the response modulation (RM) hypothesis. The RM hypoth-
esis states that, when engaged in goal-directed behaviour, an attentional bottleneck prevents 
peripheral (i.e., punishment) information from being processed as long as target (i.e., reward) infor-
mation is available, resulting in adaptive learning deficits associated with psychopathy.
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 When certain behaviour (e.g., robbing a bank; pressing a button in an experi-
mental task) is rewarded under some conditions (e.g., getting away with money; 
earning points) and punished under other conditions (e.g., getting caught by the 
police; losing points), the experience of being rewarded will result in a dominant 
response set for exhibiting this behaviour, whereas punishment information will 
not have enough impact to produce avoidance behaviour. This decreased cog-
nitive flexibility of psychopathic individuals, once a dominant response set has 
been established, results in perseveration of behaviour even when it is inappro-
priate (Lykken, 1957; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Schmauk, 1970). 
However, different aspects of the model have been critiqued (see Blair & 
Mitchell, 2009), specifically for a lack of integration with more contemporary 
theories of attention. For instance, general models of top-down attention (e.g., 
Posner & Rothbart, 2007) do not predict the automatic allocation of top-down 
resources to peripheral information in healthy individuals, raising the question 
why this is considered to be an impairment in psychopathic individuals. In ad-
dition, psychopathic individuals perform comparably to healthy individuals in 
attentional set-shifting tasks, in which allocating attention to peripheral infor-
mation is also required (Lapierre et al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 2002). Moreover, 
the model lacked integration with more recent neuroscientific findings about 
dysfunctional emotion circuitry in the brain, suggesting that abnormalities in 
the limbic system are fundamental to the emotional and behavioural dysregu-
lation associated with psychopathy (e.g., Kiehl, 2006). A theory more directly 
incorporating such neuroscientific findings is the Integrated Emotion Systems 
model developed by Blair (2005).
1.6.4 Integrated Emotion Systems model 
The Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model (Blair, 2005) is a neurocognitive 
model that assigns a central role to dysfunctional interactions between the 
amygdala and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). According to the 
IES model, the dysfunction results in impaired reinforcement-based decision 
making in individuals with psychopathy under specific circumstances that are 
reliant on amygdala-vmPFC integration (see Figure 1.2). In healthy individuals, 
the learning of stimulus-outcome associations, both aversive and appetitive, is 
dependent on the amygdala (Everitt et al., 2003; LeDoux, 2007). When an indi-
vidual learns certain behaviours to gain reward or to avoid punishment (i.e., dur-
ing instrumental learning), the amygdala sends the corresponding associations 
and expectancy information to the vmPFC. In turn, the vmPFC signals whether 
the expected reinforcement is present, continuously updating reinforcement 
expectancy representations. However, individuals with psychopathy have been 
| 21
found to be impaired in stimulus-outcome learning, particularly in reversal 
learning (e.g., Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Brazil et al., 2013; Budhani et al., 
2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). 
One explanation for this impairment might be that during reversal learning, 
psychopathic offenders show increased vmPFC signalling when a previously re-
warded response is punished, whereas healthy individuals and non-psychopath-
ic offenders show decreased activation (Gregory et al., 2015). This suggests that 
the updating of expectancy representations may therefore be compromised. 
In addition, psychopathic individuals have also been found to be impaired in 
aversive conditioning (Lykken, 1957; Rothemund et al., 2012; Schmauk, 1970), 
and psychopathy has been associated with reduced amygdala activity during 
aversive conditioning (Birbaumer et al., 2005). Moreover, the transfer of rein-
forcement information from the amygdala to the vmPFC, which is essential for 
instrumental learning, is disrupted in individuals with psychopathy, as indexed 
by both reduced integrity of the white matter tracts and reduced functional 
connectivity between amygdala and vmPFC in psychopathy (Craig et al., 2009; 
Motzkin et al., 2011; Sundram et al., 2012; Vermeij et al., 2018).
FIGURE 1.2  Schematic outline of the Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model. The IES model 
proposes that dysfunctional interactions between the amygdala and the vmPFC underlie the 
deficits in reinforcement-based learning and decision making associated with psychopathy. 
- Impaired representation 
of expected value
- Deficient updating of 
expectancies
Learning of stimulus-





Environmental input Amygdala vmPFC
Disturbed reinforcement-based learning 
and decision making
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1.6.5 Summary of explanatory models
Thus far, I have described four explanatory models of the reinforcement learning 
deficits of psychopaths, and how they place different weights on the affective 
and attentional aspects of emotional information processing. The Two-Factor 
model and the Low-Fear model rely on the idea that impaired processing of aver-
sive events explains the learning difficulties observed in psychopathic individ-
uals. According to the Response Modulation hypothesis, an attentional bottle-
neck prevents (meaningful) peripheral information from being processed during 
ongoing goal-directed behaviour. The Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model 
postulates that dysfunctional interactions between the amygdala and the vmP-
FC result in impaired reinforcement-based decision making. The outline above 
also illustrates how theories of reinforcement learning in psychopathy have been 
influenced by general technical and neuroscientific developments. Importantly, 
these developments also affected the way in which experimental testing is con-
ducted. However, there may be an important shortcoming in the design of studies 
performed thus far, which will be further explained in the next section.
1.7  CONSIDERING ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY AND 
SUBJECTIVITY OF REWARD VALUE
In order to be able to evaluate the findings from earlier experiments it is neces-
sary to understand how these results were obtained and in which way the exper-
imental paradigms evolved through time. This will be dealt with in more detail in 
Chapter 2. Most importantly, experimental studies show deficient responding 
to (predictors of) punishment, especially when facing a competing reward, as 
well as impaired learning and decision making following reward. However, a pos-
sibly crucial limitation of the studies performed until now is that the rewards 
that were used may not have been ecologically valid, and consequently not rele-
vant or motivationally significant for participants with psychopathy, particularly 
for those that were incarcerated. The performance of psychopathic individuals 
in studies that focused on feedback-based learning and risky decision making 
in the lab setting may, therefore, not be fully generalisable to the problems they 
encounter in daily life. Incorporating a variety of ecologically valid rewarding 
stimuli in task design could be a way to overcome this problem, such as food, 
small goods, or pleasant activities. 
However, in this light it should be considered that psychopathic individuals 
might be impaired in neural coding for subjective reward value, which should 
normalise the values of rewards of different natures. Normalising reward values 
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is necessary when, for instance, comparing or choosing between a chocolate bar 
and a movie ticket. More specifically, there is convincing evidence that, in healthy 
individuals, a subarea of the vmPFC/orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) represents the 
subjective value of different reward types in a common neural currency that is 
used to direct decision making in daily life (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). This system, 
representing subject-specific values, has been found to be active across various 
tasks. The suggestion that this system is dysfunctional in individuals with psy-
chopathy is based on findings in neuropsychological studies and in structural 
and functional imaging studies, as outlined next. 
Psychopathy has been associated with impaired performance on neuropsycho-
logical tasks relying on the vmPFC/OFC (Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Brazil et 
al., 2013; Budhani et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). Neuroimaging studies have 
also linked psychopathy to abnormalities in vmPFC/OFC structure and func-
tioning. For instance, on the structural level, reductions in orbitofrontal grey 
matter have been observed in psychopathic individuals compared to non-psy-
chopathic individuals (Boccardi et al., 2011; de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; 
Tiihonen et al., 2008). Moreover, in a sample of individuals with high levels of 
psychopathic traits, grey matter volume and cortical thickness in the OFC was 
reduced in those with self-reported criminal convictions compared to those 
without a criminal record (Yang et al., 2010). This is compatible with the finding 
that cortical thickness in the OFC region is inversely related to response per-
severation (Yang et al., 2011), an impairment in executive functioning typically 
linked to antisocial behaviour as observed in criminal psychopathic individuals 
(Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000; Newman et al., 1987). In addition, although there 
is some evidence for increased activity in the vmPFC/OFC during specific tasks 
(e.g., instructed lying; see Glenn et al., 2017), the majority of functional imaging 
studies focussed on the vmPFC/OFC in psychopathy show reduced activity in 
these areas, using a variety of tasks tapping different underlying mechanisms. 
These findings include reduced medial vmPFC/OFC activity in psychopathic 
individuals during aversive conditioning (Birbaumer et al., 2005), during cooper-
ation choices in the prisoner’s dilemma paradigm (Rilling et al., 2007), as well as 
in adolescents with psychopathic tendencies during reinforcement in a passive 
avoidance task (Finger et al., 2011).
If coding for subjective reward value in the vmPFC/OFC is also compromised 
in psychopathic individuals, this would implicate that their failure to learn from 
negative consequences and their tendency to make suboptimal -sometimes cat-
astrophic- choices in daily life might partly stem from an inability to weigh their 
behavioural options on a common scale. However, we do not know whether, or 
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to what extent, this function of the vmPFC/OFC region is also affected, or that 
psychopathic individuals still have more or less intact coding for subjective value. 
Regarding the lab setting, there is often no evidence on whether psychopathic 
individuals find the rewards as equally attractive as, or at least comparable to, 
the control groups. As such, it seems important to find a way to test this assump-
tion, for instance, by including reward attractiveness as an experimental varia-
ble. One way to achieve this could be to make subjective reward values more 
explicit, or to use tailor-made rewards to ensure their motivational relevance. 
Using this approach, it could be investigated whether psychopathic individuals’ 
deficient responding to (potentially) punishing stimuli, as well as their disturbed 
processing of rewards, would remain visible. The evidence from experimental 
studies that have been performed in this area until now (which will be dealt with 
in the next chapter) suggests that motivationally insignificant reinforcers (i.e., 
mere points or small amounts of money) are likely to induce performance defi-
cits during associative learning and decision making. However, we hypothesised 
that the ‘right’ rewards and punishers may motivate psychopathic offenders to 
make more appropriate behavioural adaptations, both in the lab setting and in 
real life situations. The studies reported in this thesis take these issues into con-
sideration when studying passive avoidance learning, reversal learning, and risky 
decision making in psychopathy.
1.8 AIMS AND SCOPE OF THIS THESIS
As outlined above, psychopathy is associated with abnormalities in reward and 
punishment processing, which has primarily been experimentally studied during 
feedback-based learning and risky decision making. However, the motivational 
significance of the rewards and punishers used in these studies may have been 
insufficient to promote adaptive behaviour in psychopathic individuals. The 
work presented in this thesis takes into account the subjective values of per-
sonalised rewards in incarcerated offenders with psychopathy, and how these 
values may affect associative learning and risky decision making. To provide an 
overview of prior empirical research that is relevant to the research questions of 
this thesis, Chapter 2 summarises and discusses the existing literature regard-
ing maladaptive learning and risky decision making in psychopathic offenders. 
Chapter 3 describes an explorative study aimed at identifying rewards that are 
considered attractive by forensic patients, using a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative analyses methods. The results of this study were used as input 
for the experimental studies on associative learning and risky decision making. 
More specifically, we selected and provided a number of naturalistic rewards 
that our participants could earn by performing well during two experimental 
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tasks of which the results are presented in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, a 
study on passive avoidance and reversal learning is reported. For each partic-
ipant, subjective values were obtained for the selected naturalistic rewards, 
which were linked to overall performance. Chapter 5 describes an experimental 
study on risky decision-making, also using rewards with individually obtained 
subjective values. Finally, Chapter 6 provides a summary and a more general 





in psychopathic offenders:  
An overview of associative learning and risky  
decision-making studies
ABSTRACT
Individuals with psychopathy present with maladaptive tendencies that have 
been linked to disturbed processing of outcomes during decision making 
in particular with respect to aversive outcomes. In general, individuals with 
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behaviour. This chapter provides an overview of empirical work on maladaptive 
behaviour in psychopathy in the context of reinforcement learning and risky 
decision making.
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Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised by interpersonal and emo-
tional dysfunctions, as well as impulsive and maladaptive behaviour, with an 
increased risk for the development of an antisocial lifestyle. The disorder is 
prevalent among offender populations and is a strong predictor of various forms 
of recidivism (Hawes et al., 2013; Leistico et al., 2008). This tendency for psy-
chopathic individuals to reoffend at a much higher rate than non-psychopathic 
offenders is indicative of a reduced ability to adapt behaviour appropriately in 
response to negative outcomes (e.g., incarceration). Historically, the maladaptive 
tendencies have been attributed to a relative insensitivity to punishment, or at 
least an incapacity to learn from experiences leading to aversive outcomes. The 
relationship between maladaptive behaviour and psychopathy has been de-
scribed since the early 1800’s (see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016, for an overview).
Through time, many experimental paradigms have been employed in an 
attempt to unravel and explain the core impairments associated with the mal-
adaptive behavioural tendencies observed in psychopathy. Among the most 
extensively studied impairments observed in individuals with psychopathy are 
those related to the disturbed processing of reward and punishment in relation 
to different forms of learning and decision making. The main goal of this chap-
ter is to provide an overview of the empirical work on maladaptive behaviour 
in psychopathy, with a particular focus on aversive conditioning, instrumental 
learning, and risky decision making. 
2.2 AVERSIVE CONDITIONING  
Aversive conditioning studies focus on autonomic reactivity to aversive stim-
uli, most often by measuring electrodermal responses. They are based on the 
principles of classic conditioning, in which an emotionally salient event (UCS) 
that evokes a biological (reflexive) response (UCR) is repeatedly paired with a 
neutral stimulus (NS). The NS becomes associated with the UCS, and is eventu-
ally transformed into a conditioned stimulus (CS) that will evoke the reflexive re-
sponse (conditioned response: CR) in the absence of the UCS. During appetitive 
conditioning, repeated pairing of a pleasant stimulus with a neutral stimulus will 
eventually result in approach-related reflexes in response to the neutral stimulus, 
whereas pairing with unpleasant stimuli during aversive conditioning typically 
results in withdrawal-related reflexes. As such, abnormal conditioned reflexes 
may indicate deficient or excessive processing of appetitive or aversive events, 
or normal processing but deficient association of these unconditioned events 
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with the NS. Physiological reactivity to conditioned threat cues can therefore be 
used to investigate the fear deficits that may underlie the failure to refrain from 
previously punished behaviour observed in psychopathic individuals.
David Lykken (1957) was the first to obtain experimental evidence for what 
he believed were fear-based learning deficits in individuals with psychopathy 
(for a contemporary view, see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016). Lykken (1957) 
measured electrodermal reactivity to conditioned auditory cues for electric 
shock in an offender sample and found that individuals with psychopathy devel-
oped weaker anticipatory responses to threats than healthy controls. Almost a 
decade later, Hare (1965) reported that besides the slower acquisition of condi-
tioned fear responses to shock cues in psychopathic offenders, these responses 
also generalised less to unconditioned cues than in controls. Schmauk (1970) 
found that anticipatory electrodermal reactivity to both shock cues and social 
disapproval cues was lower in psychopathic offenders than in controls, but no 
differences were found in anticipation of loss of money. Another two decades 
later, in a study by Ogloff and Wong (1990), psychopathic offenders displayed 
increased heart rate but no significant increase in electrodermal activity during 
anticipation of an aversive auditory stimulus. 
Since the early days, several studies on brain activation during aversive con-
ditioning in criminal psychopaths have been performed. Birbaumer et al. (2005) 
measured electrodermal responding and brain activation using fMRI during 
anticipation of painful pressure. Compared to healthy controls, criminal psycho-
paths (although non-incarcerated at the time of testing) showed reduced elec-
trodermal reactivity and reduced brain activation in areas associated with the 
acquisition of conditioned threat (e.g., amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate, anterior insula; see Büchel & Dolan, 2000). However, when comparing 
probability and contingency ratings between the two groups, no differences 
emerged. This suggests that the psychopathic participants were able to predict 
the occurrence of harmful events from threat cues on a cognitive level, with 
deficits emerging during the emotional processing of this information. Similar 
results were obtained in a study by Rothemund et al. (2012), in which psycho-
pathic individuals displayed deficient conditioned startle and skin conductance 
responses, whereas cognitive processing of the stimuli appeared intact. 
In line with this central role for deficient emotional information processing, 
Veit et al. (2013) showed that deficient threat conditioning in psychopathic 
offenders, as reflected by reduced electrodermal reactivity in anticipation of 
electric shock, was most strongly related to the affective facet of psychopathy. 
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On the other hand, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) showed scores on the 
interpersonal facet to be related to increased information processing, whereas 
the antisocial facet was related to decreased attention to the conditioned threat 
cues. Interestingly, Larson et al. (2013) showed in another fMRI study that ma-
nipulating the focus of attention could regulate the reduction in amygdala acti-
vation observed in psychopathic individuals during threat anticipation. When 
attention was explicitly directed to the threat cues signalling an electric shock, 
non-psychopathic and psychopathic offenders did not differ in amygdala ac-
tivation during threat conditioning. Conversely, when attention was directed 
to goal-relevant non-threatening stimuli prior to the presentation of the threat 
cues, psychopaths displayed decreased amygdala activation and increased acti-
vation in the lateral prefrontal cortex. Schultz et al. (2016), however, observed 
enhanced amygdala responding to conditioned threat cues in psychopathic 
individuals relative to controls. Moreover, disrupted processing of conditioned 
threat cues in psychopathy was related to level of anxiety. BOLD activity pat-
terns and electrodermal responses in low anxious psychopathic individuals were 
consistent with normal threat conditioning, whereas electrodermal responses 
and brain activity patterns consistent with fear inhibition were observed in high 
anxious psychopathic individuals. 
2.2.1 Summary: Aversive conditioning in psychopathy
Offenders with high levels of psychopathy consistently show reduced autonom-
ic responding to conditioned threat cues as indexed by electrodermal reactivity, 
at least when threat cues indicate physical harm (i.e., electric shock; painful 
pressure; loud noises) or social disapproval. However, cues indicating loss of 
money do not elicit abnormal autonomic responding. It might be argued that 
cues regarding social disapproval and loss of money require more higher-order 
cognitive processing, whereas the primary reflexes associated with the avoid-
ance of physical harm may reflect a more direct measure of threat conditioning. 
More recently, imaging studies have provided evidence for reduced activation in 
brain areas associated with threat conditioning, such as the amygdala and the or-
bitofrontal cortex. However, the focus of attention during aversive conditioning 
may modulate amygdala reactivity to threat cues, with explicit direction of at-
tention to aversive stimuli resulting in normal amygdala responses. Interestingly, 
one study to date showed enhanced instead of reduced amygdala activation 
in psychopathy and suggests that the threat-conditioning deficit pertains ex-
clusively to high anxious as opposed to low anxious psychopathic individuals. 
All in all, it is evident that more research is needed to investigate how the dif-
ferent underlying aetiological mechanisms of psychopathy (e.g., on a factor or 
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facet level) contribute to the observed deficiencies in threat conditioning. Other 
forms of associative learning have also been studied, with a focus on instrumen-
tal learning.
2.3 INSTRUMENTAL LEARNING PARADIGMS
2.3.1 Passive avoidance learning
One of the most extensively studied instrumental learning deficits in psychop-
athy is passive avoidance learning. During passive avoidance learning, partici-
pants are instructed to learn by trial and error, which stimuli to respond to and 
which stimuli to withhold responding to. Immediately after responding to a stim-
ulus, positive (i.e., rewarding) or negative (i.e., punishing) feedback is presented. 
The participant should use this feedback information to guide future behaviour 
during encounters with the stimuli.
Lykken (1957) found that psychopathic offenders were less successful than 
non-psychopathic offenders and controls in learning to avoid shock punish-
ment. Participants were instructed to learn a sequence of twenty ‘choice points’ 
in a mental maze, each consisting of four alternatives. In each choice point, one 
alternative was correct and one of the three incorrect alternatives gave an elec-
tric shock punishment. The manifest task was to learn to choose the (rewarded) 
correct alternatives, whereas the latent task was to learn to avoid the punished 
incorrect alternatives. Lykken (1957) found that psychopathic offenders per-
formed significantly worse than controls on the latent task. This was the first 
study providing evidence for avoidance learning deficits in psychopathy. In a 
similar paradigm, Schmauk (1970) partly replicated this finding, as psychopathic 
offenders performed worse than healthy controls when electric shocks or social 
disapproval were used as punishment, but performed equally well when the 
punishment was loss of money. Also using a similar task, Schachter and Latané 
(1964) found that an injection with norepinephrine, which increases (emotional) 
arousal, improved avoidance learning in offenders with psychopathy, but not in 
non-psychopathic offenders. These results were regarded as evidence for defi-
cient punishment processing, or, more general, a fear deficit.
Newman and Kosson (1986) developed a go/no-go discrimination task, in 
which participants were presented with eight different two-digit numbers 
of which half were go-stimuli (S+) and the other half were no-go stimuli (S-). 
Participants were instructed to learn to respond to S+ and to withhold a response 
to S-. The task was performed under two conditions: a punishment-only condi-
tion, in which participants only had the opportunity to learn from punishment for 
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incorrect responses, and a reward+punishment condition, in which both correct 
responses were rewarded and incorrect responses were punished. Interestingly, 
there were no differences between psychopathic and non-psychopathic offend-
ers in the punishment-only condition, but in the reward+punishment condition, 
psychopathic offenders made significantly more commission errors than the 
non-psychopathic offenders. There were no group differences in the number of 
omission errors. According to Newman and Kosson (1986), these results could 
not be explained by a ‘simple’ fear deficit, as in that case there also would have 
been differences in the punishment-only condition. Instead, they attributed the 
differences to disturbances in attentional processing and developed the RM- 
hypothesis (see previous section).
A number of variations of this task have been developed over the last dec-
ades. For example, to establish a dominant response set, by providing a high 
probability of reward for responding at the start of the task, Newman et al. 
(1990) gave participants a four-trial reward pre-treatment for the four S+. Again, 
psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders did not differ in the number 
of omission errors, and psychopathic offenders did make significantly more 
commission errors than the non-psychopathic offender group. Newman and 
Schmitt (1998) replicated this finding using the reward pre-treatment, but when 
the groups were split in low-anxious and high-anxious subgroups, the difference 
was only observed in the low-anxious subgroups. When applying this variation 
of the paradigm in incarcerated female offenders, no group differences in ei-
ther commission or omission errors were observed between psychopathic and 
non-psychopathic offenders, or between low-anxious and high-anxious sub-
groups (Vitale et al., 2011).
In addition, Newman et al. (1990) measured reflection after negative feed-
back, as indexed by the response time to terminate visual feedback on the screen 
in order to move on to the next trial. The extent to which participants slow down 
after punishment is generally the most predictive of passive avoidance learning 
(Patterson et al., 1987). Psychopathic offenders displayed less reflection after 
negative feedback, and when reflection required the interruption of a dominant 
response set, the differences between the two groups in passive avoidance 
errors were most profound.  In another adaptation of the go/no go-task of 
Newman and Kosson (1986), Arnett et al. (1993) measured autonomic respon-
sivity to reward and punishment feedback. Low-anxious but not high-anxious 
psychopathic offenders displayed lower heart rate responding following pun-
ishment than following reward. Moreover, following punishment, psychopathic 
offenders showed weaker heart rate and skin conductance responding than 
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non-psychopathic offenders. These results were interpreted as the first evi-
dence of psychopaths being less reactive to punishment, as until then, there was 
only evidence of reduced autonomic responding in anticipation of punishment. 
Importantly, no behavioural differences in either commission or omission errors 
were observed between the psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders. 
However, this might be explained by the long and variable inter-stimulus in-
tervals (8 – 14 s) that were incorporated to measure autonomic responding to 
feedback, forcing longer time to reflect on the outcomes of previous responses. 
In order to evaluate effects of differential reward and punishment value on 
passive avoidance learning, Blair et al. (2004) attached different values to the 
four different S+ and S- stimuli in the design of Newman and Kosson (1986). 
As expected, psychopathic offenders made more commission errors than 
non-psychopathic offenders. In addition, psychopaths displayed a weaker 
learning effect across blocks than non-psychopathic offenders. It should be 
noted, however, that intelligence was a significant covariate and only a modest 
correlation between PCL-R score and commission errors remained after con-
trolling for IQ. Interestingly, punishment value was not related to the perfor-
mance of psychopathic offenders, but non-psychopathic offenders made more 
commission errors as punishment level increased. In addition, both groups 
were more likely to respond under high reward conditions, as indexed by a 
decrease in omission errors. De Brito et al. (2013) used the same task as Blair 
et al. (2004) in offenders with and without psychopathy and included a healthy 
control group. Both offender groups tended to make more commission errors 
than healthy controls, although this difference did not reach statistical signifi-
cance. However, contrary to previous findings, there were no differences in the 
number of commission errors between the two offender groups. In addition, 
unlike the two comparison groups, psychopathic offenders were more likely to 
respond under the lowest reward value condition, which is a different finding 
than reported in Blair et al. (2004). 
A portion of these studies suggests an effect of anxiety level on passive avoid-
ance learning in psychopathic individuals. Both Lykken (1957) and Schmauk 
(1970) divided their psychopathic participant groups in ‘primary (low-anxious) 
sociopaths’ and ‘neurotic (high-anxious) sociopaths’. In Lykken’s study, the 
difference in performance of low anxious and high-anxious psychopaths was 
not statistically significant. In the study of Schmauk (1970), low-anxious psy-
chopaths showed stronger passive avoidance learning deficits than high-anx-
ious psychopaths in the psychical punishment condition. However, in the social 
punishment and the tangible punishment condition, the two psychopathic 
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subgroups did not differ in passive avoidance learning. Other studies analysing 
subgroups of low-anxious and high-anxious offenders have found that the 
observed effects were either stronger in the subgroup of low-anxious psycho-
pathic offenders (Arnett et al., 1993), or the difference between psychopathic 
and non-psychopathic offenders was only present between the low-anxious 
subgroups (Newman & Schmitt, 1998). On the other hand, psychopathic and 
non-psychopathic offenders in the study of Newman and Kosson (1986) did 
not differ in anxiety levels. Moreover, Kosson et al. (1990) as well as Thornquist 
and Zuckerman (1995), both using the go/no go-task of Newman and Kosson 
(1986), found PCL-R score and anxiety to be unrelated, although group differ-
ences based on anxiety level were not directly assessed. Vitale et al. (2011) did 
find a positive relation between PCL-R score and anxiety in female offenders, 
but there were no differences in passive avoidance learning between the low- 
and high-anxious subgroups. In addition, Newman et al. (1990), finding that 
low-anxious psychopathic offenders were less likely to interrupt a dominant 
response set to process negative feedback than low-anxious non-psychopathic 
offenders, reported that their results were even stronger when high-anxious 
participants were included. Others, such as De Brito et al. (2013) and Blair et 
al. (2004), did not include measures of anxiety level. Overall, the exact role of 
anxiety in passive avoidance learning remains unclear. 
Differences in psychopathy-related passive avoidance learning deficits have 
also been reported in relation to ethnic differences, but it is still unclear what 
underlies these observations. Moreover, ethnic differences are not consistently 
observed in all passive avoidance studies. Newman and Schmitt (1998) and 
Thornquist and Zuckerman (1995) only observed the expected psychopa-
thy-specific passive avoidance learning deficit in Caucasian offenders, and not 
in African-American or Hispanic offenders. However, Kosson et al. (1990) did 
observe the expected pattern of psychopathy-specific passive avoidance learn-
ing deficits in African-American offenders, but the effect was not as profound 
as observed in previously obtained data from Caucasian offenders, since group 
differences did not reach statistical significance. Importantly, when combining 
the data from this sample with the previously obtained data from their Caucasian 
offender sample, there were no effects of ethnic background on passive avoid-
ance learning. Although not explicitly testing for ethnic differences due to a small 
number of non-Caucasian participants, Blair et al. (2004) reported that there 
were no indications that psychopathic and non-psychopathic African-American 
offenders performed differently than the Caucasian offenders in these respec-
tive groups. Other forms of instrumental learning, in particular reversal learning, 
have also been comprehensively studied in relation to psychopathy.
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2.3.2 Reversal learning
As discussed in the section on passive avoidance learning, psychopathy is asso-
ciated with deficiencies in learning stimulus-outcome contingencies. However, 
psychopathic individuals also have difficulties to adapt their behaviour to chang-
ing contingencies (e.g., Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Brazil et al., 2013; Budhani 
et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). The updating of information on reward and 
punishment contingencies appears disturbed, which is typically studied in rever-
sal learning paradigms. During reversal learning, participants first acquire stimu-
lus-reinforcement associations guiding them to discriminate between rewarding 
and punishing stimuli. At a certain point, however, the learned reinforcement 
contingencies will reverse and participants have to re-learn the discrimination in 
order to gain reward and to avoid punishment.
In the first study on reversal learning in psychopathic offenders, Lapierre et 
al. (1995) used a go/no-go paradigm. In the first fifty trials a strong response set 
was created, by having participants learn to respond to one stimulus (a square) 
and to avoid responding to another stimulus (a cross). In the next 150 trials partic-
ipants had to withhold their response to the square and to respond to the cross. 
Psychopathic offenders made more commission errors than non-psychopathic 
offenders in the reversal phase, but there were no differences in omission errors 
or reaction times. However, Lapierre et al. (1995) did not report on performance 
during acquisition, whether there were any rewards or punishments contingent 
on responding, or how feedback was provided. More recently, Brazil et al. (2013) 
also used a go/no-go reversal task with two stimuli, but this time including two 
distinct cues indicating whether a go or a no-go stimulus was more likely to 
follow. Halfway the task, the predictive (probabilistic) relationship between 
the cues and the stimuli was reversed. Participants performed the task twice: 
once without instructions on the predictive relationship between the cue and 
the stimulus (i.e., automatic learning) and once with explicit instructions on this 
relationship (i.e., controlled learning). Psychopathic offenders, unlike healthy 
controls, displayed abnormal response reversal during controlled learning (as 
indexed by prolonged reaction times), but this impairment was absent in the au-
tomatic learning condition. These results suggest that psychopathic individuals 
do not have a general response reversal deficit, but that they experience prob-
lems in behavioural adaptation when information on predictive relationships 
between stimuli is actively processed.
Mitchell et al. (2002) used the intradimensional/extradimensional (ID/ED) 
shift task to assess reversal learning, which is a multicomponent instrumental 
learning task. The ID/ED shift task has nine phases, in which participants have 
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to respond to different features of presented stimuli. After a fixed number of 
correct trials, the task shifts to the next phase. The task starts with two different 
shapes and the participant has to learn to respond to shape 1 and to withhold 
a response to shape 2. Once the participant has learned this discrimination, the 
contingencies are reversed. In the next phases, new shapes and features are 
added, cueing participants to adapt their responding (i.e., attentional set shift-
ing), or the newly learned contingencies are simply reversed again (i.e., response 
reversal). The measure of interest in this task is the number of errors within a 
phase, before shifting to the next phase (i.e., errors to criterion). 
Mitchell et al. (2002) found that psychopathic offenders made more errors 
than non-psychopathic offenders in two of the four reversal phases, whereas 
there were no differences in attentional set shifting performance. Dargis et al. 
(2017) obtained similar results with the ID/ED shift task, but also found an inter-
action between psychopathy and childhood maltreatment history. Offenders 
with higher levels of psychopathic traits who had suffered a greater degree of 
childhood maltreatment performed worse on reversal learning. Interestingly, 
when controlling for childhood maltreatment history, psychopathic offenders 
did not differ from offenders with low and intermediate levels of psychopathy 
on reversal learning performance. Dolan (2012), however, found that offender 
groups with differing levels of psychopathic traits all performed worse than 
healthy controls in the reversal phases as well as the attentional shift phases, 
but there were no differences between the offender groups. In addition, psy-
chopathy scores were not related to any outcome measures of the ID/ED task.
Another reversal learning paradigm was developed by Budhani et al. (2006). 
On each trial, participants were presented with two images. Using probabilistic 
feedback that was provided after choosing one of the two images, participants 
learned by trial and error which image was the correct choice most often and 
were instructed to stay with this choice until the contingencies were reversed. 
During reversal, psychopathic offenders made more errors and were less likely 
to stay with a rewarded response than controls, whereas no impairments were 
observed during acquisition. De Brito et al. (2013) also applied this paradigm, 
but only observed differences between a combined offender group and con-
trols in the number of errors during reversal. Similar to the previously discussed 
results of their passive avoidance study, which were obtained in the same sam-
ple, the subgroups of offenders that were high and low in psychopathy did not 
differ in response reversal performance.
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Mitchell et al. (2006) designed an instrumental learning task with two re-
versal phases, which was presented to offender groups with differing levels of 
psychopathy. In the acquisition phase, participants were instructed to choose 
one of two stimuli presented on each trial, learning the stimulus-outcome asso-
ciations by trial and error. In the first reversal phase, the contingencies of two of 
the four of the stimuli were reversed and in the second reversal phase the contin-
gencies of the other two stimuli were reversed. Highly psychopathic offenders 
performed worse during acquisition and the second reversal phase than the 
group with low levels of psychopathy. The intermediate group also performed 
worse than the low-psychopathy group in the second reversal phase. Although 
there were no performance differences between the high and intermediate psy-
chopathy group, psychopathy scores were negatively related to performance 
during acquisition and the second reversal phase. 
In order to further disentangle the relation between psychopathy level and 
response reversal deficits, Gregory et al. (2015) investigated the neural basis 
of reversal learning in antisocial offenders with and without psychopathy. 
Although behavioural differences between the groups were not observed, there 
were remarkable group differences regarding brain activation in response to 
rewarded and punished responses. In psychopathic offenders, activity in the 
posterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula was increased in response to pun-
ished reversal errors. Additionally, offenders in this group were hyporesponsive 
to reward information in the superior temporal gyrus. These patterns were not 
seen in offenders without psychopathy and suggest that prediction error signal-
ling and consolidation of reward information is dysfunctional in psychopathy.
2.3.3 Summary: Instrumental learning in psychopathy
Psychopathy has consistently been found to be related to deficits in instrumen-
tal learning based on stimulus-outcome contingencies. During passive avoid-
ance learning, psychopathic offenders show deficits in withholding responses 
to avoid punishment, particularly when a dominant response set for reward has 
been established. However, the influence of other variables on passive avoidance 
learning, such as anxiety levels or ethnic background, is still unclear. Offenders 
with high levels of psychopathy are also impaired in adapting their behaviour to 
changing contingencies as indexed by reversal learning. However, performance 
differences between offender groups with different levels of psychopathy are 
not as robust as the differences found when comparing psychopathic offenders 
with healthy controls. In addition, other cognitive and clinical variables, such 
as the level of processing of predictive information or childhood maltreatment 
history, appear to play an important role in the severity of the reversal learning 
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impairment in psychopathy. Also, several maladaptive behavioural outcomes 
share underlying mechanisms of cognitive impairments associated with psy-
chopathy. For instance, impaired processing of predictive information, such as 
the probability of upcoming aversive outcomes, does not only affect reversal 
learning and passive avoidance, but also promotes risky decision making, which 
we will further discuss in the next section.
2.4  RISK-TAKING STUDIES
A key characteristic of psychopathy is a strong need for stimulation; psycho-
pathic individuals often show excessive risk behaviour, such as sexual risk taking 
and substance abuse. Moreover, offences committed by psychopathic individu-
als often have a violent and/or sexual nature and can therefore be characterised 
as behaviour intended to gain immediate rewards despite potential punishment. 
As such, risk-taking studies performed in psychopathic offenders focus on the 
ability to forego potential large immediate rewards for small longer-term rewards 
to avoid larger losses. 
Risk-taking behaviour has often been explained using the framework of the 
somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara et al., 1994), which states that autonom-
ic physiological reactions to learned appetitive or aversive cues rather than 
cognitive processes guide choices under ambiguous circumstances. The Iowa 
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994) involves probabilistic learning using 
(monetary) reward and punishment information and was developed as a test of 
the somatic marker hypothesis. Participants are given four decks of cards, of 
which two are ‘risky decks’ involving high reward and even higher punishment 
magnitudes, and the other two are ‘non-risky decks’ involving lower reward and 
punishment magnitudes. Over time, selection of the non-risky decks results in 
the greatest accumulated reward magnitude. In healthy individuals, increased 
anticipatory electrodermal responses are present before choosing cards from 
the risky decks and these implicit, unconscious markers guide them to choose 
advantageously throughout the task. However, individuals with lesions in the 
vmPFC do not develop these anticipatory warning signals (i.e., somatic mark-
ers), resulting in impaired decision making. Individuals with psychopathy show 
behavioural and affective similarities with orbitofrontal patients, such as impul-
sivity, low empathy and impaired learning from experience, and recent research 
suggests that psychopathic individuals are indeed impaired in recognizing their 
bodily sensations during stressful events (Gao et al., 2012; Nentjes et al., 2013). 
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The IGT has also been used to study risk behaviour in psychopathy, but 
studies focusing on IGT performance in psychopathic offenders primarily use 
behavioural measures rather than including additional indices of autonomic 
physiological responses. Only one (unpublished) study (Broom, 2011) included 
autonomic measures and found stronger electrodermal responses in psycho-
pathic offenders compared to non-psychopathic offenders after selecting cards 
from the non-risky decks. Contrary to predictions based on the somatic marker 
hypothesis, no relation was found between psychopathy and anticipatory 
autonomic responses. Although this study used a modified version of the IGT 
including contingency reversals, overall psychopathy score was related to im-
paired performance throughout the task. In the previously discussed Mitchell et 
al. (2002) study, psychopathy was also related to impaired performance on the 
IGT. In line with the somatic marker hypothesis, psychopathic offenders tend-
ed to choose cards from the risky decks more often and failed to become risk 
averse over the course of the task. Similar results were obtained in a sample of 
ex-offenders (Beszterczey et al., 2013). Both PCL-R total score (reflecting over-
all psychopathy) and PCL-R Factor 2-score (reflecting an unstable and antisocial 
lifestyle) were positively related to IGT performance. Interestingly, IGT-scores 
strongly predicted recidivism at follow-up. Conversely, Lösel and Schmucker 
(2004) found no relation between psychopathy and IGT performance in offend-
ers. However, analysing high-attentive and low-attentive subgroups revealed 
that low-attentive psychopathic offenders performed worse than individuals in 
the high-attentive psychopathic subgroup, whereas no differences were found 
between the non-psychopathic offender subgroups. Using both psychopathy 
and level of anxiety as grouping variables, Schmitt et al. (1999) found low-anx-
ious offenders to perform worse than high-anxious offenders, but no predictive 
relation between psychopathy and learning in the IGT. Along the same line, Kuin 
and Masthoff (2016) found no relation between IGT performance and general 
psychopathy or specific psychopathic traits. Contradictory to other findings, 
Hughes et al. (2015) found psychopathy to be positively related to IGT perfor-
mance. However, this study was somewhat atypical, since all three groups of 
participants (healthy controls, non-psychopathic and psychopathic offenders) 
failed to show learning over the course of the task.
Another well-known risk-taking task is the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; 
Lejuez et al., 2002), in which participants are instructed to accumulate money or 
points by inflating balloons. Every button press inflates a balloon presented on a 
computer screen and increases the amount of money in a temporary bank. The 
money that has been accumulated in the temporary bank can be transferred into 
a permanent bank at each point in the experiment, after which a new balloon 
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is presented. However, inflating the balloon too much will make it ‘pop’, result-
ing in a loss of all money accumulated in the temporary bank. Unlike the IGT, 
the BART does not involve a learning component. Although risk behaviour on 
the BART correlates with real-world risk behaviour also seen in psychopathic 
individuals such as substance abuse, gambling, stealing and unsafe sex (Lejuez, 
Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003; Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, et al., 2003; Lejuez et al., 
2002), Swogger et al. (2010) found no relation between psychopathy scores and 
BART performance in offenders, although there was a relation between psy-
chopathy and self-reported real-world risk-taking behaviour. Moreover, similar 
to the results of Schmitt et al. (1999) obtained in the IGT, there was a negative re-
lation between anxiety and BART performance. Snowden et al. (2017) did find a 
relation between psychopathy and risk taking on the BART in a mixed offender 
and community sample, but this effect could be largely attributed to Boldness 
dimension of the triarchic psychopathy model (Patrick et al., 2009) rather than 
to the Meanness and Disinhibition dimensions. As such, BART performance 
seems stronger related to psychopathy-associated fearlessness than to affective 
impairments and antisocial tendencies.
De Brito et al. (2013) used the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 
1999) to assess risk taking in psychopathic offenders. Like the BART (Lejuez 
et al., 2002), the CGT does not include a learning component. On each trial, 
participants are presented with a row of ten boxes that are either red or blue. 
Participants have to guess under which of the two colours a token has been 
hidden by betting a proportion of their earned points or money. De Brito et al. 
(2013) did find controls to outperform offenders with and without psychopathy 
on decision-making quality (i.e., the proportion of trials the most likely colour 
is chosen), but there were no group differences in risk taking (i.e., the percent-
age of earned points that is betted in each trial) and pre-betting deliberation 
time. These findings suggest that both offender groups were cognitively aware 
of the risks associated with certain choices, but failed to adjust their behaviour 
accordingly. Since there were no differences between psychopathic and non- 
psychopathic offenders, antisociality rather than psychopathy seems to account 
for these performance deficits. 
2.4.1 Summary: Risk-taking behaviour in psychopathy 
According to the somatic marker hypothesis, psychopathic individuals should 
fail to develop anticipatory warning signals towards risky events or choices. 
Although research findings are quite mixed, most studies suggest that psychop-
athy is negatively related to task performance in risk-taking tasks. However, at-
tention may moderate the relation between psychopathy and impaired learning 
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in the IGT. Moreover, primarily psychopathic characteristics related to lifestyle 
instability and antisociality appear to be related to impaired decision making 
under risk in the IGT, rather than interpersonal and affective psychopathic fea-
tures. This makes sense as the similarities between patients with orbitofrontal 
lesions and those with psychopathy mostly pertain to the behavioural domain. 
However, research using the BART in psychopathic offenders indicates that 
performance on the BART is stronger related to low anxiety levels associated 
with psychopathy, rather than emotional deficits or antisocial and impulsive 
behavioural tendencies. Moreover, one study using the IGT and one study using 
the BART did not find performance to be related to psychopathy, but to anxiety 
level. Taken together, findings from studies using behavioural measures of risk 
taking are far from conclusive, and more research is needed to disentangle the 
mechanisms explaining risk behaviour in psychopathic offenders. Specifically, 
the role of anxiety, attention and the underlying aetiology of the psychopathy 
construct in offenders needs to be further clarified.
2.5 CONCLUSION
Maladaptive behaviour involving aversive and appetive outcomes (i.e., punish-
ment and reward) in relation to psychopathy has been extensively studied in the 
past decades. To summarise, psyhopathy has been related to deficient aversive 
conditioning, as indexed by reduced autonomic responding to conditioned 
threat cues, as well as reduced activation in the amygdala and orbitofrontal 
cortex during implicit threat conditioning. However, research suggests that the 
locus of attention and level of trait anxiety modulate the aversive conditioning 
impairment in psychopathy; low anxiety and an explicit focus on threat cues 
appear related to normal processing of aversive stimuli. Studies involving both 
aversive and appetitive stimuli have also consistently shown impairments in in-
strumental learning based on stimulus-outcome contingencies, such as passive 
avoidance learning (withholding responses to avoid punishment) and reversal 
learning (adapting behaviour to changed contingencies). However, as with aver-
sive conditioning, there are indications that anxiety modulates these deficits, 
although in reversed direction; anxiety level seems positively related to task 
performance during instrumental learning. In addition, instrumental learning 
performance is affected by the level of processing of predictive information, 
such as the probability of upcoming aversive outcomes. The latter factor would 
also promote other forms of maladaptive behaviour, such as risky decision mak-
ing. Although the literature suggests a positive relation between psychopathy 
and risk taking, findings are mixed, possibly also due to the use of a variety of 
experimental tasks relying on different paradigms. In addition, it appears that 
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increased risk taking in psychopathy is primarily related to the behavioural fac-
tors associated with psychopathy (lifestyle instability and antisocial behaviour), 
rather than to interpersonal and affective deficits. 
Taken together, there is overwhelming evidence that psychopathic offenders 
show maladaptive behaviour in the face of potential reward and punishment, but 
the exact mechanisms and moderating factors that are involved remain center 
of debate. As pointed out in the previous chapter, one of the things that most 
of these studies have in common is that the experiments used (near-)hypothet-
ical rewards, such as mere points or small amounts of money. We hypothesised 
that these ‘rewards’ may not have been sufficiently motivationally salient for 
psychopathic offenders, but that using relevant rewards could possbly enhance 
processing of predictive information. However, what kinds of rewards are con-
sidered attractive by psychopathic and non-psychopathic offenders, especially 
those incarcerated or under imposed treatment? Do their preferences differ 
from those under community treatment, or from healthy individuals subsiding 
in society? Or are there more or less universal ‘themes’ to identify? We aimed on 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION
The use of reinforcers is a key element of interventions aimed at behavioural 
modification (e.g., Buehler et al., 1966; Kazdin, 2012; Lussier et al., 2006; 
Petscher et al., 2009), in both psychiatric and non-psychiatric forensic settings 
(e.g., Timmerman & Emmelkamp, 2005; Wodahl et al., 2011; Wong et al., 2007). 
Finding relevant reinforcers may be of importance for promoting treatment 
response in forensic patients, because low treatment responsivity is common 
in these populations (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Howells & Day, 2007; 
Ogloff et al., 1990). Given the growing focus on considering individual differ-
ences in responsivity to treatment (Brazil et al., in press; Insel & Cuthbert, 2015), 
the use of patient-specific reinforcers is a key step towards developing individ-
ualised mental health care and may have positive contributions to the patient’s 
motivation for treatment. 
However, to be effective, reinforcement must be tailored to the needs, pref-
erences, and values of each patient. This is in line with the responsivity principle 
of the Risk-Need- Responsivity model (RNR; Bonta & Andrews, 2007), which 
is one of the most prominent theories regarding forensic interventions. The 
RNR model highlights three principles that promote treatment success: the Risk 
Principle focuses on the level of risk of the individual offender (i.e., higher-risk 
offenders will benefit more from more intensive treatment), the need principle 
highlights the importance of criminogenic needs (i.e., only significant crimino-
genic factors should be targeted in interventions), and the responsivity principle 
describes how treatment should be provided (i.e., the intervention should be 
matched to offender characteristics such as motivational level, learning style, 
and (inter)personal circumstances). The RNR model has been criticised for 
over-emphasising risk and criminogenic factors, at the expense of attention to 
individual needs and values (Ward et al., 2007), which led to the development 
of the Good Lives Model as an alternative or complementary approach (GLM; 
e.g., Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 2006). The GLM states that relapse in risky 
behaviour can be ameliorated by incorporating and emphasising positive factors 
during treatment, such as the use of positive reinforcement. The use of positive 
reinforcement strongly predicts treatment effectiveness within various clinical 
disciplines (Marshall et al., 2003; Marshall et al., 2002). 
Importantly, a critical consideration for all forms of reinforcement-based 
(treatment) programs is that for something to be experienced as rewarding, 
several requirements must be met: (a) it must be attractive (affective aspect), 
(b) it must motivate the individual for action (motivational aspect), and (c) the 
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thought of obtaining the reward must lead to an expectation of an enhanced 
positive state (cognitive aspect; Berridge & Robinson, 2003). This highlights the 
multi-facetted nature of the experience of reward as well as the need to consider 
how individual preferences may differ according to these aspects. 
There are also more general psychological processes that influence valuation 
of reward. For instance, the degree of attractiveness of an expected reward is 
positively related to the amount of effort needed to obtain the reward. This ten-
dency to give greater value to rewards that are harder to obtain has been referred 
to as effort justification (Aronson & Mills, 1959). It has also been accounted for 
by the within-trial contrast model (Alessandri et al., 2008; Klein et al., 2005), 
which assumes that the value of a reward is dependent on the value of the event 
that preceded it. In other words, the contrast between a relatively aversive event 
(such as the exertion of great effort) and a relatively pleasant event (e.g., the 
reward that follows it) inflates the subjective value of the reward. 
Another example is that the temporal distance to the delivery of an expected 
reward is negatively related to the subjective value of that reward, a phenome-
non called delay discounting or temporal discounting (Kirby & Maraković, 1996; 
Logue, 1988). In other words, individuals generally prefer a smaller immediate re-
ward over a larger delayed reward, but the rate at which the value of the delayed 
reward decreases differs across individuals. More rapid discounting of rewards 
is associated with impulsivity-related dysfunctional behaviour (Reynolds, 2006), 
such as substance abuse (Bickel & Marsch, 2001), pathological gambling (Alessi 
& Petry, 2003), and overeating (Weller et al., 2008). Moreover, rapid discounting 
is related to antisocial behaviour in both children (Barkley et al., 2001) and adults 
(Petry, 2002). It is important to take these discounting effects into account in 
reinforcement-based therapy, especially in (clinical) populations known to have 
high discounting rates (e.g., Lussier et al., 2006). 
Error justification and delay discounting are examples of how subjectivity af-
fects motivation and reward valuation, depending on individual characteristics 
and the context in which a reward can be obtained. As such, it should not only 
be considered how important the use of reward is, but also how reward is expe-
rienced, which, in turn, extends to clinical practice. A prominent example of a 
successful therapeutic approach that incorporates reward and subjective valua-
tion is the Community Reinforcement Approach (CRA), a treatment method for 
substance use disorders (Hunt & Azrin, 1973). This approach assumes that the 
use of naturalistic reinforcers with high ecological validity, such as enjoyment 
of a new hobby, new employment opportunities, or other pleasant activities, 
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promote the development of alternative behavioural styles that are expected to 
ultimately become more rewarding relative to disruptive tendencies (i.e., sub-
stance abusing). One of the main objectives of CRA is to increase the number 
of healthy social, vocational, and recreational activities that are experienced as 
rewarding by determining relevant reinforcers for each individual. 
Studies on the effectiveness of CRA and its derivatives have yielded pos-
itive results in non-residential treatment settings (for a review, see Meyers et 
al., 2011). Adaptations of CRA employ contingency management by rewarding 
desirable behaviours by, e.g., giving vouchers for drug abstinence (e.g., Secades-
Villa et al., 2013). These vouchers are explicit, material reinforcers, and have 
specific monetary values. Contingency management programs are also used in 
correctional settings. Points (or vouchers) earned for showing good behaviour 
can be cashed-in to receive material goods or to participate in activities. When 
such programs are individualised, this may help to decrease both misconduct 
and reported offender complaints in the prison setting (French & Gendreau, 
2006; Gendreau et al., 2014; Webb, 2003). 
In forensic populations, deficiencies in reward and punishment responsivity 
have been associated with chronic adult offending (e.g., Buckholtz et al., 2010; 
Glenn & Yang, 2012), which makes it even more challenging to find well-tailored 
individualised reinforcers that can be used during treatment, especially in pop-
ulations of psychiatrically ill offenders. A portion of forensic inpatients has not 
been continuously engaged in society for a long time, as they have spent time in 
prison and under imposed forensic psychiatric care. Consequently, they may have 
developed different needs and thus may experience different stimuli and activi-
ties as rewarding compared with individuals who are active members of society in 
the outside world. Importantly, the desirable and adaptive behavioural tendencies 
acquired through treatment must be generalised to life outside of incarceration. 
However, for forensic inpatients, behavioural change should first be established 
within the boundaries of the institution. It is therefore essential for in- and outpa-
tients to identify and use those reinforcers that are experienced as being the most 
rewarding, but are also sufficiently meaningful in their current lives. 
Despite the importance of incorporating reinforcers with high subjective 
value to promote treatment success, it still remains to be assessed which 
stimuli and activities are generally experienced as sufficiently rewarding by 
forensic in- and outpatients. To this end, the aims of the present study were 
to: (a) identify categories of naturalistic rewards that are considered relevant 
by forensic inpatients and outpatients; (b) investigate how these rewards are 
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valued by these groups of patients; and (c) identify the dimensions across 
which these rewards can vary. 
3.2 METHODS
3.2.1 Concept mapping 
An approach known as concept mapping (e.g., Jackson & Trochim, 2002; 
Trochim, 1989) was applied to answer the central questions of this study. In gen-
eral, concept mapping consists of a standardised research protocol that allows 
the exploration and quantification of how different types of items are clustered 
into coherent sets and how these sets are mapped on to a higher-order target 
concept (determined a priori by the experimenter). Ultimately, this approach 
yields a multidimensional graphical map depicting clusters of items and their 
interrelationships, and each cluster describes a different aspect of the target 
concept. It involves collecting qualitative data obtained in processes such as 
question-driven item generation and unstructured sorting, which in turn are an-
alysed quantitatively by multidimensional scaling techniques. The concept map-
ping process used in the present study comprised six stages based on the proce-
dure described by Trochim (1989): (1) participant selection, (2) item generation, 
(3) item rating, (4) item sorting, (5) statistical analyses, and (6) interpretation. 
STAGE 1: PARTICIPANT SELECTION 
In order to obtain representative samples of both in- and outpatients, inclusion 
depended exclusively on the judgment of the head therapists regarding the cur-
rent mental and emotional stability of the patient. Some of the most prevalent 
reasons for head therapists advising against recruiting a patient at that particular 
time were (a) severe depressive symptoms, (b) diminished or disturbed contact 
with reality (e.g., psychosis), or (c) an intellectual level that was considered too low 
for constructive contributions to the tasks. Information about the clinical status 
and index offences of the patients was obtained from their patient files. Sample 
characteristics, including the most prevalent diagnoses and index offence cat-
egories in the patient samples, can be found in Table 3.1. Psychopathological 
diagnoses were defined by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, Fourth Edition, Text Revision (DSM-IV-TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). 
JG conducted the recruitment and consent procedures, with the assistance 
of interns and the clinicians in the respective treatment facilities. All patients 
were approached for participation only after consulting and having obtained 
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permission from their head therapists. All participants received written and 
oral information about the study, a financial compensation, and gave written 
informed consent. Potential participants were allowed a period of at least two 
weeks to consider and discuss their participation before signing the consent 
form. The protocol was approved by the local academic ethics committee. 
Inpatient sample. Thirty-four male inpatients (item generation: N=11; 
item rating: N=34; item sorting: N=33), with ages ranging from 21–64 years 
(M=43.00, SD=10.40), and 76% having a Dutch cultural background, were 
selected from the population of a high security forensic psychiatric institute 
in The Netherlands.1 All individuals constituting the inpatient population have 
committed serious criminal offences in connection with having a DSM-IV axis-I 
and/or axis-II disorder. Placement in the institute falls under a measure known 
as ‘Ter Beschikking Stelling’ (TBS), which is a court-ordered intensive inpatient 
treatment measure on behalf of the state. TBS can be imposed when the fol-
lowing conditions are met: (a) an offender suffered from a mental disorder at 
the time of the offence, (b) there is a risk of recidivism due to this disorder, and 
(c) the offence is punishable by a custodial sentence of at least four years. The 
inpatient data were collected in 2013 (item generation: N=11; item rating: N=15; 
item sorting: N=14) and 2016 (item rating and sorting: N=19). 
Outpatient sample. The outpatient sample consisted of 41 male patients 
(item generation: N=13; item rating and sorting: N=31), from three affiliated 
Dutch forensic outpatient treatment centres2, with ages ranging from 20–67 
years (M=40.02, SD=12.71) and 83% having a Dutch cultural background. 
Individuals in the outpatient sample were engaged in treatment programs fo-
cused on problems of aggression regulation or sexual misconduct. Treatment 
of these patients is voluntary or has been ordered by the court (e.g., as part of 
probation). The collection of outpatient data took place in 2015. 
1 Forensic Psychiatric Centre Pompestichting, Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
2 Kairos forensic outpatient treatment centers. locations: Arnhem, Den Bosch, and 
Nijmegen, The Netherlands.
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Average number of years (SD) 41.97 (9.98) 40.12 (12.71)
Range 21 - 64 20 - 67
Ethnicity
Both parents Dutch nationality 76% 83%
At least one parent Asian, African or South American 24% 17%
Type of offence
Sexual offence 65% 12%
Age of victim < 16 years 47% 10%
Age of victim ≥ 16 years 18% 2%
Violent offence (no sexual or material motive) 26% 34%
Miscellaneous (incl. burglary, theft, stalking, arson) 9% 7%
No known offence 0% (N/A) 46%
Legal pressure
Court mandated 100% 41%
Voluntary 0% (N/A) 54%
Not yet sentenced 0% (N/A) 5%
Time in treatment
≤ 3 months 0% 29%
4-9 months 0% 34%
10-18 months 6% 20%
> 18 months 94% 17%
Psychopathology
Axis I Depressive disorder 0% 22%
Attention deficit (hyperactivity) disorder 9% 24%
Pervasive developmental disorder 18% 5%
Substance abuse disorder 50% 46%
Intermittent explosive disorder 0% 37%
Paedophilia 47% 10%
Other axis I disorder 24% 34%
No axis I disorder 9% 0%
Axis II Cluster A personality disorder 3% 0%
Cluster B personality disorder 35% 32%
Cluster C personality disorder 0% 10%
Personality disorder NOS 56% 41%
With characteristics of cluster A / B / C 3% / 29% / 21% 2% / 27% / 12%
Without specified characteristics in record 21% 5%
No personality disorder 6% 17%
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STAGE 2: ITEM GENERATION 
Items were generated in group sessions that lasted approximately 90 min, focus-
ing on a central question that incorporated the three central elements of reward 
as outlined by Berridge and Robinson (2003): “What do you regard attractive 
(affective aspect) to an extent that you would be willing to take effort to achieve 
it (motivational aspect), because you expect it would bring you a pleasant feeling 
(cognitive aspect)?” These three elements served as criteria that all items were 
required to meet in order to be included. In addition, this formulation allowed 
for the identification of both material and immaterial rewards. 
Participants were encouraged to generate as many items as possible, which were 
directly displayed on a big screen. Both the central question and the generated 
items remained visible throughout the entire session. When participants came 
up with items that did not meet all three elements of the central question, they 
were stimulated to restate the item or to think of related concepts. The same was 
done when items were considered too vague, too broad, too specific, or when 
items were formulated negatively (e.g., “Not having (...)”). 
Highly similar items within one of the two patient samples were removed or 
merged. When a group of items was considered to consist of examples of a 
higher order concept, the exemplary items were merged into one item that was 
named according to this higher order concept. For instance, the items ‘Playing 
soccer’, ‘Playing tennis’, and ‘Playing volleyball’ were merged into the higher or-
der item ‘Playing ball games’. A stopping rule was applied after more than 70% of 
items generated in a single session overlapped the total pool of items generated 
in previous sessions. 
Inpatient sample. Two item generation sessions were organised for the inpa-
tient sample. Six patients participated in the first session and five other patients 
took part in the second session. In the first session, a total of 108 items were 
generated, of which 54 items (50%) remained in the final list after selection and 
merging of items by the authors; 150 individual items were generated in the sec-
ond session, of which 44 items (29%) remained. The final list consisted of 98 
individual items. 
Outpatient sample. Item generation by the outpatient sample occurred in four 
sessions, in groups of two (sessions 1, 2, and 4) or seven patients (session 3). In 
the first session, 55 items were generated, of which 42 items (76%) remained in 
the final list after selection and merging of items by the authors; 72 individual 
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items were generated in the second session, of which 36 items (50%) remained; 
42 items were generated in the third session, of which 17 items (40%) remained; 
and 74 items were generated in the fourth session, of which 20 items (27%) re-
mained. The final list consisted of 115 individual items. 
STAGE 3: ITEM RATINGS 
All items were numbered and printed on plastic cards. During individual ap-
pointments, participants were given a sheet of paper containing five sections 
numbered 1 (labelled least important) to 5 (labelled most important). It was 
explained to participants that their personal attitudes towards the items were 
of interest and they were then instructed to distribute all rewarding concepts 
evenly over the five sections. For the inpatient sample, this meant that the 98 
cards were to be divided in such a way that two sections would contain 19 cards 
and three sections would contain 20 cards. Outpatients were instructed to put 
23 cards in each section, as their item set contained 115 cards. 
STAGE 4: SORTING TASK 
The sorting task was performed immediately after the rating task. Participants 
were instructed to group the cards based on similar themes or content in differ-
ent piles. It was explicitly stated that the sorting should be done in a way that 
made sense to the participant, and that at least two piles should be created. In 
addition, the participants gave each pile a label that covered the connection be-
tween the items. The sorting data of one inpatient were removed as this partici-
pant combined all his categories into one pile at the end of the task and refused 
to re-establish his previously formed categories. However, the item ratings of 
this participant (obtained in stage 3) were preserved. Therefore, in the inpatient 
sample, Nitem sorting= 33, whereas Nitem rating =34.
STAGE 5 AND STAGE 6: ANALYSES AND INTERPRETATION 
In order to analyse the sorting data, a binary similarity matrix was created, in 
which the rows and columns represented the individual reward items (inpatient 
sample: 98×98 matrix; outpatient sample: 115×115 matrix). In this matrix, cell 
values represented the number of participants that placed a pair of items in the 
same category. Thus, higher scores reflected higher similarities between items. 
The similarity matrices served as input for nonmetric multidimensional scaling 
54 |
analyses (MDS, PROXSCAL) using SPSS (IBM Corp., 2015), in order to translate 
the similarity of items into coordinates in a two-dimensional space. For each 
sample, these coordinates were plotted in a point map, with smaller distances 
between items on the map reflecting higher similarities. 
When evaluating the congruence between the raw data and the final config-
urations in our study, we deviated from more traditional practices regarding the 
judgment of MDS solutions in two ways. First, the goodness of fit of the final 
model is reflected by the stress index, ranging from 0 (perfect fit) to 1 (random 
configuration). The average stress value of .28 reported in concept mapping stud-
ies (Rosas & Kane, 2012) is higher than recommended in the literature on MDS 
(e.g., Kruskal, 1964), which states that configurations with stress values >.20 are 
to be considered unreliable (for detailed explanations, see Trochim (1993) and 
Kane and Trochim (2007)). Importantly, this threshold was established based on 
simulations and experimental data, which differ fundamentally from the type 
of data generated using the protocol for concept mapping. Therefore, it seems 
more appropriate to judge the stress value of our model in relation to results 
of similar studies, rather than using stress value thresholds obtained from very 
different data collection protocols (Rosas & Kane, 2012). 
The second consideration concerns the primary purpose of the MDS con-
figuration in concept mapping studies, which is to display the clustering results 
visually. Although a better fit of the data might be observed using more than two 
dimensions, it would be difficult to generate equally parsimonious and interpret-
able results in three or more dimensions (Kruskall & Wish, 1978). In addition, 
Sturrock and Rocha (2000) showed that two-dimensional MDS solutions have 
less than a 1% probability of having no structure or a random configuration 
when stress values are below an upper limit of .39. As we expected our stress 
value to be close to the average stress value of .28 found in concept mapping 
studies (Rosas & Kane, 2012), we chose to restrict the MDS analyses in the cur-
rent study to a two-dimensional solution. 
Next, hierarchical cluster analysis using Ward’s algorithm was performed 
on the MDS coordinates in order to group individual items into clusters, each 
representing a reward category. The cluster analysis was set at a maximum of 
20 clusters and a minimum of 3 clusters (Trochim, 1989). On each step in the 
analysis, the cluster solution was moved to a lower number of clusters (e.g., from 
20 to 19 clusters). The within-cluster sum of squared errors, reflected by the 
agglomeration coefficient, naturally increases with each step in the clustering 
procedure. Small coefficients indicate fairly homogeneous clusters, whereas 
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large coefficients or a sudden large incremental percentage change in the co-
efficient indicates heterogeneous clusters (Hair et al., 1998). The decision on 
the number of clusters was therefore based on the percentage change in the 
agglomeration coefficient when moving through the different cluster solutions, 
as well as on interpretability (i.e., whether a grouping still made sense for the 
items in the conceptualisation). 
In order to label the dimensions represented by the axes of the concept maps, 
the authors independently evaluated the distribution of the items in terms of 
shared reward features. In other words, it was determined which features were 
common to rewards on one extreme of an axis and discerned them from those 
at the other extreme of the axis. For each axis, these features were combined 
into one dimensional concept that correctly represented all items in the concept 
map. Finally, average patient ratings for items and clusters were calculated. 
3.3  RESULTS
For clarity and readability purposes, the individual item names have been omit-
ted from the two concept maps. However, the complete lists of reward items are 
provided as supplemental material (see Supplement 3A). 
3.3.1 Inpatient sample 
The MDS procedure performed on our inpatient data resulted in a final stress 
value of .26 after 22 iterations. Hierarchical cluster analysis was performed 
on the item coordinates and inspection of the agglomeration coefficients (see 
Table 3.2) shows that the first large percentage change occurs when moving 
from the eight- to the seven-cluster solution after relatively small increases, and 
a second jump when moving from the four- to the three-cluster solution. Since 
(1) the first jump indicates that in the seven-cluster solution two dissimilar clus-
ters have been combined, and (2) the eight-cluster solution was judged by the 
authors to have the most clearly interpretable reward categories, this indicated 
that the eight-cluster solution is both statistically and conceptually the most 
appropriate. Figure 3.1 shows the inpatient concept map, depicting the eight 
reward clusters and their average ratings in two-dimensional space. Exemplary 
items of the clusters are presented in Table 3.3. 
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Percentage change in 
coefficient in next level
15 1.834 0.183 0.09
14 2.017 0.239 0.11
13 2.256 0.274 0.11
12 2.530 0.31 0.11
11 2.840 0.427 0.13
10 3.267 0.526 0.14
9 3.793 0.624 0.14
8* 4.417* 1.405* 0.24*
7 5.822 1.467 0.20
6 7.289 2.029 0.22
5 9.318 2.264 0.20
4 11.582 6.595 0.36
3 18.177 9.911 0.35
2 28.088 17.241 0.38
1 45.329
Note. * indicates an abrupt large percentage change when moving to a lower number of clusters.
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FIGURE 3.1 Concept map resulting from multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster 
analysis for the inpatient sample. The figure shows the position of the eight reward clusters, the 
cluster names and average ratings (between parentheses). Dots represent the individual reward 













TABLE 3.3 Cluster names and exemplary items of inpatient rewards
INPATIENT REWARDS
Cluster name Exemplary items
Luxury and material rewards • Salary raise
• Coffee
General social recognition • Promises being kept
• Helping others
Ward climate and restrictions • Visits of volunteers
• Possibilities to look for a partner outside the clinic
Active lifestyle • Swimming
• Organizing or attending activities in the clinic
Substances • Cigarettes
• Marijuana
Autonomy • Taking care of pets
• Individually adjusted internet access
Relaxation • Singing and making music
• Watching a movie
Leave • Going on leave in the evening
• Meeting someone from outside during leave
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Percentage change in 
coefficient in next level
15 2.351 0.272 0.10
14 2.623 0.275 0.09
13 2.898 0.327 0.10
12 3.225 0.455 0.12
11 3.680 0.628 0.15
10 4.308 0.631 0.13
9 4.939 0.733 0.13
8 5.672 0.83 0.13
7 6.502 0.973 0.13
6 7.475 1.222 0.14
5* 8.697* 4.428* 0.34*
4 13.125 5.045 0.38
3 18.170 9.542 0.34
2 27.712 25.16 0.48
1 52.872
Note. * indicates an abrupt large percentage change when moving to a lower number of clusters.
3.3.2 Outpatient sample 
Performing MDS on our outpatient data resulted in a stress value of .27 after 
39 iterations. An abrupt change in the size of the agglomeration coefficients re-
sulting from hierarchical cluster analysis (see Table 3.4) indicated that dissimilar 
groups of items were merged when moving from the five- to the four-cluster 
solution. As the five-cluster solution was also judged to consist of conceptually 
coherent reward item groups, this solution was identified to be the best rep-
resentation of the current data. Figure 3.2 depicts the outpatient concept map, 
showing the five reward clusters and their average ratings in two-dimensional 













FIGURE 3.2 Concept map resulting from multidimensional scaling and hierarchical cluster 
analysis for the outpatient sample. The figure shows the position of the five reward clusters, the 
cluster names and average ratings (between parentheses). Dots represent the individual reward 
items generated by the inpatients. Lines depict the cluster boundaries. 
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TABLE 3.5 Cluster names and exemplary items of outpatient rewards
OUTPATIENT REWARDS
Cluster name Exemplary items
Maintaining intimate relationships • Having contact with my children on a regular basis
• Having a life partner
General social recognition • Being appreciated for my efforts
• Being seen and acknowledged as a person
Future orientation • Having a job
• Making a deadline
Relaxation • Watching a good movie or documentary
• Walking the dog
Experience seeking • Speeded activities (e.g., quad driving)
• Holidays and travelling 
3.4 DISCUSSION
3.4.1 Main findings 
The present study identified relevant reward categories for forensic in- and out-
patients, as well as the dimensions across which these rewards vary. In addition, 
preference ratings were collected and mean ratings for each reward category 
were calculated. Cluster analysis resulted in eight reward categories in the inpa-
tient sample and five reward categories in the outpatient sample. A conceptual 
comparison of the reward categories of the two samples (see Figures 3.1 and 
3.2) suggested that both groups identified categories of rewards related to so-
cial functioning and personal efficacy, as well as more tangible rewards such as 
concrete items and activities. Not surprisingly, these shared categories concern 
topics that are important common denominators in the lives of most individuals 
and are central to classic and contemporary models of human motivation (e.g., 
Kenrick et al., 2010; Maslow, 1943; Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
The labelling procedure applied on the axes of the two concept maps result-
ed in one comparable dimension and one dimension differing between the two 
samples. Both for inpatients and outpatients, the experience of rewards varied 
according to the amount of effort required to achieve a reward (y-axis, Figures 
3.1 and 3.2). Low-effort rewards (e.g., material items or relaxing activities) 
concerned items that are relatively easy to access, as opposed to high-effort 
rewards that would require more cognitive and emotional effort and larger time 
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investments. Although this label parallels one of the three reward aspects in 
the instructions during item generation (based on Berridge & Robinson, 2003), 
the decision to label this dimension ‘effort’ was reached by comparing the re-
ward items and their positions in the map. For the inpatient group, the other 
dimension referred to the degree to which the rewards were independent of the 
clinical environment (x-axis, Figure 3.1). In the outpatient group, this dimension 
concerned the level of arousal associated with the rewards (x-axis, Figure 3.2). 
In both samples, patients tended to rate high-effort rewards as the most 
valuable, especially when the rewards involved the clinical environment of the 
patient (inpatient sample) or when the rewards were associated with lower levels 
of arousal (outpatient sample). One interpretation is that the rewards requiring 
higher effort were more abstract and long-term rewards that are associated with 
more intrinsic motivation, which in turn has been shown to be reduced by ex-
trinsic, tangible rewards (Deci et al., 1999; Ryan & Deci, 2000). 
The change in cluster ratings when moving along the environment dimension 
of the inpatients’ concept map shows that the inpatient group rates rewards that 
apply to their current situation and status in the forensic psychiatric clinic as 
more valuable than rewards relating to their future lives outside. Low-effort and 
high-effort rewards related to low independency of the clinical environment are 
more applicable to patients in later treatment stages. One prediction generated 
from these findings is that the subjective values of the rewards shift as treatment 
progresses, so that patients who have the end of incarceration in sight show 
stronger preferences for rewards that are focused on their lives outside. Further 
research relating treatment stage to reward (cluster) ratings is needed to explore 
this hypothesis. 
The outpatient group gave higher ratings to rewards that involved lower lev-
els of arousal relative to rewards requiring equal effort but were associated with 
higher levels of arousal. One explanation of this observation could be that high 
arousal experiences are perceived as stressful, and as such are linked to negative 
affective states. Most people will try to avoid experiences leading to these states 
(e.g., Krieglmeyer et al., 2010; Rinck & Becker, 2007). Thus, the findings suggest 
that patients showed a tendency to prefer low-arousal rewards because it seems 
likely that these rewards were intrinsically associated with more positive affec-
tive states relative to high-arousal rewards. 
In line with this, literature on positive emotions (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001) 
suggests that effort and arousal are two dimensions of basic positive emotions 
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such as interest, joy, contentment, and love. Interest, characterised as a high-ef-
fort and high-arousal emotion (Fredrickson, 1998), is believed to motivate 
focused attention, receptivity to information, and learning across situations 
and throughout the life span (Dougherty et al., 1996). As such, it shows overlap 
with the outpatients’ cluster ‘future orientation’, which captures items related to 
personal development, career opportunities and goal setting. Joy, described as a 
low-effort and high-arousal emotion (Fredrickson, 1998), is associated with the 
need to be playful, creative, and pushing the limits (Fredrickson, 2001) which 
parallels the characteristics of the rewards pertaining to the cluster ‘experience 
seeking’. Contentment, a low-effort and low-arousal emotion (Fredrickson, 
1998), has been described as a state of inner peace that is felt when people feel 
comfortable, at ease in, or at one with their situation (Fredrickson, 2013; Mitte & 
Kämpfe, 2008), which applies to the cluster ‘relaxation’. In this theoretical frame-
work (Fredrickson, 1998), love was originally described as overlapping the other 
emotions and as such was associated with variable levels of arousal and effort. 
However, when love is interpreted as a mixture of positive emotions in relation 
to other individuals (Mitte & Kämpfe, 2008), this applies to both the high-effort 
clusters ‘maintaining intimate relationships’ and ‘general social recognition’ of 
which the items represent low and intermediate levels of arousal, respectively. 
Thus, the pattern of results converges with the predictions made by the positive 
emotions framework to explain the link between positive affective states, effort, 
and arousal. 
Moreover, the position of the reward items along the ‘effort’ dimensions 
appears related to the extent to which the rewards relate to the pursuit of he-
donism and eudaimonia (Ryan & Deci, 2001). Hedonism can be described as 
a state of immediate, momentary pleasure, with an emphasis on physical stim-
ulation, or a state of relaxation, whereas eudaimonia can be reached through 
personal growth and development. Stated differently, hedonism refers to a state 
of happiness, whereas eudaimonia can be explained as a higher state of well-be-
ing. Waterman (1993) found that eudaimonia was more associated with being 
challenged and exerting effort, whereas hedonic enjoyment was more related 
to being relaxed, away from problems, and happy. Our findings are in agreement 
with this dichotomy. Rewards related to autonomy, quality of social functioning, 
personal growth, and development, are in both concept maps on the high-effort 
level. Relaxing activities, substance use, and other stimulating experiences are 
more situated on the low-effort level. 
However, it could be argued that criminal activity is often focused on im-
mediate gratification of materialistic desires (e.g. Petry, 2002), or relates to an 
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inability to control inappropriate emotional and sexual impulses (Gottfredson 
& Hirschi, 1990; Pratt & Cullen, 2000). From that perspective, one could expect 
that more hedonic rewards would hold higher values in forensic populations, 
as a hedonistic lifestyle focused on short-term immediate rewards has often 
contributed to the criminal careers of these individuals. In addition, long-term 
goals relating to the pursuit of self-fulfilment are often lacking in a large portion 
of offenders (Pratt & Cullen, 2000), especially in offenders with more severe 
antisocial tendencies and psychopathy (Hare, 2003b; Wiebe, 2003). However, 
our data show that, at least in these samples, individuals in forensic populations 
still prefer the achievement of personal growth or development over short-term 
materialistic rewards. 
3.4.2 Clinical implications 
It is important to keep in mind that determining which reinforcers to use dur-
ing treatment of offenders with mental disorders is a complex undertaking. 
To illustrate, reinforcers can be classified as implicit (e.g., personal attention 
of the therapist) or explicit (e.g., vouchers), short-term (i.e., those effectuated 
during treatment) or long-term (i.e., the positive effects of successful treat-
ment), and these dimensions will always interact and can even be in conflict. 
The reinforcers used in reinforcement-based treatments in correctional set-
tings most often involve short-term, explicit, low-effort rewards (Gendreau 
et al., 2014). Contingency management programs that focus on short-term 
rewards help promote discipline and structure in prison settings (Webb, 2003), 
and are effective in the treatment of substance dependence in community 
settings (Secades-Villa et al., 2013). Regarding long-term behavioural change, 
our findings are in line with the GLM (Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 2006) 
and suggest that it may be more beneficial to focus on rewards or goals that 
increase personal growth and social functioning, which will likely provide more 
opportunities for success in the future. 
The potential of this approach is further highlighted by the fact that offend-
ers released from incarceration are often unprepared for life outside, resulting in 
unemployment, housing problems, drug abuse, and family conflict (Travis et al., 
2001). Similarly, forensic patients in community settings often experience prob-
lems in psychosocial and occupational functioning (Feitsma et al., 2010; Henrichs 
et al., 2014). In our samples, the rewards increasing eudaimonic well-being were 
rated as the most valuable, which suggests that forensic patients are willing to 
provide the effort required to achieve these goals. Therefore, individualised re-
inforcement programs should not only focus on low-effort, short-term rewards, 
but should be designed to also include higher-effort, long-term goals in order to 
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further improve treatment success in forensic patients. One approach would be 
to move from low-effort to high-effort rewards in the course of treatment, as it 
is likely that while progressing through treatment stages, therapy commitment 
will increase and treatment goals will become more generalisable to everyday life 
(Willis et al., 2012). Another step toward the development of personalised re-
ward-based interventions would be to determine the links between patient and 
offence characteristics, stage of treatment, and the identified reward preferenc-
es. It can be expected that different types of forensic patients (e.g., aggressive 
violent offenders and sex offenders) will differ in what they find rewarding, and 
that these preferences are also influenced by how responsive they have been to 
other treatment programs. 
3.4.3 Limitations and recommendations 
It is possible that the recruitment and inclusion process in this study has affect-
ed the generalisability of our results to forensic patients in general. Although we 
aimed to cover the complete range of patient characteristics in our samples, we 
were dependent on the judgment of the patients’ head therapists regarding each 
patient’s vulnerability and capacity to participate in ongoing scientific research 
in addition to their daily therapeutic routines. Consequently, our data may not 
reflect the reward preferences of psychotic, severely depressed, or intellectual-
ly impaired patients. More research focused specifically on vulnerable patient 
groups such as these could shed a light on their respective reward preferences. 
However, our samples covered a wide range of complex psychopathology, often 
including comorbid personality and axis-1 disorders, which in our opinion re-
sulted in reasonably heterogeneous groups. 
Regarding the item generation process, a limitation of our study is that the 
lists of rewards that were generated may not have been exhaustive. However, 
in order to minimise unnecessary strain on participants, a stopping rule was 
applied when the amount of overlap between items generated in an individual 
session and the total pool of items across sessions exceeded 70%. So, it could 
be argued that we did not identify all of the possible items that are experienced 
as rewarding in these populations. On the other hand, it seems unlikely that 
the results would have been significantly different given (a) the large amount of 
overlap in the items generated in the last sessions and (b) the fact that the num-
ber of items identified are similarly distributed across each of the clusters. The 
latter suggests that additional items would probably also fall within one of the 
identified clusters and that the concept mapping procedure yielded a relatively 
complete set of clusters. 
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A related limitation is that there is a possibility that procedural differences 
during the item generation stages may have affected the generative process in 
the two populations. Specifically, more item generation sessions were organised 
in the outpatient group, because it took longer to reach the stopping criterion. 
One explanation is that most sessions with outpatients included a lower num-
ber of participants, which was mostly due to participants not showing up. Also, 
whereas there are many parallels across the daily lives of inpatients with respect 
to, for instance, restrictions and structures, the lives of outpatients are consid-
erably more diverse. Therefore, they may have generated more unique instances 
of rewarding items that showed less overlap with items from previous sessions. 
Another potential issue is that although all three aspects of reward (affective, 
motivational, cognitive) were required to apply to each generated reward item, 
it is possible that the item rating procedure may have given unintended extra 
weight to the affective aspect. Moreover, we do not claim that the current results 
reflect the only possible outcome. It is possible that other samples of offenders 
will generate other reward items, even when recruited from the same locations. 
This is inherent to the subjective nature of the concept mapping process. In 
addition, the labelling of clusters and axes remains a subjective process and it 
is possible that we missed other interpretations that could have applied equally 
well or even better. However, we still found similar clusters (resulting from HCA) 
as well as one similar dimension (i.e., effort) when comparing the inpatient and 
outpatient data. This suggests that it is likely that a replication study will yield a 
similar set of clusters and axes, although the specific reward items may differ to 
a certain degree from those generated in the current study. 
Since we did not include a social desirability measure, it is difficult to say to 
what degree socially desirable responding can account for the observed general 
preference for rewards related to personal growth over materialistic rewards. 
However, both inpatients and outpatients were engaged in intensive therapeutic 
programs in which personal development is essential to reach the behavioural 
change required to successfully finish therapy. Moreover, especially inpatients 
are confronted with severely constrained levels of autonomy and, often, a di-
minished social network. Consequently, these themes play a prominent role in 
everyday live, providing a further explanation for the relatively high ratings of 
related rewards related to these topics. 
We did not directly determine whether our data violate the metric axioms that 
are also required for MDS (Tversky & Gati, 1982). Although the sorting task does 
not allow violations of minimality and symmetry, it is possible that violations of 
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the triangle inequality principle occur when using similarity judgments. However, 
the clusters and dimensions were similar between the groups, which is an unlikely 
finding under severe violations of the triangle inequality assumption because the 
configuration of points in the MDS map would be highly distorted. This can be 
seen as an indication that triangle inequality did not have a large effect on our 
results. Nonetheless, it is important to consider the potential impact of triangle in-
equality in future studies, which may further aid reproducibility. Finally, the study 
did not include a healthy control group, which makes it difficult to determine the 
extent to which the identified clusters differ from what is found rewarding in the 
general community. It could be very useful to uncover differences in reward prefer-
ences between healthy individuals and outpatients, as they have access to similar 
resources and activities as healthy nonpatients in everyday life. Moreover, while 
this may be less informative for the inpatient population due to the restrictions 
imposed by institutionalisation, it would still be interesting to explore common 
factors in the preferences of forensic patients in general that differ from those 
of healthy individuals. In the future, identifying how these groups differ could 
provide a reference point for clinicians when determining the areas that need to 
be targeted through personalised treatment. 
3.4.4 Conclusions 
In summary, to our knowledge this is the first study investigating reward prefer-
ences in forensic in- and outpatient populations. Using a unique mixed-methods 
approach, we found that both inpatients and outpatients tend to rate rewards 
requiring greater effort (e.g., rewards related to autonomy, quality of social func-
tioning, or personal growth and development) as more valuable than low-effort 
rewards (e.g., substances, material goods, relaxing activities, or stimulating ex-
periences), especially when the rewards involve the direct environment of the 
patient or lower levels of arousal. The findings may foster the development of 
individualised treatment plans that incorporates a patient’s reward preferences. 
One scenario is that clinicians could use (a subset of) the reward categories that 
emerged in the current study to aid in developing individualised reward sched-
ules with their patients. For instance, helping their patients to think of examples 
in each of the reward categories may provide a structured framework to con-
template which elements in the patient’s life are, or could be, rewarding. A next 
step could be to make the patient rate the items in terms of attractiveness (i.e., 
subjective reward value) and to determine together what would be needed to 
obtain these rewards; the feasibility, the conditions to be met, whether the re-
wards can be obtained on a short term or a longer term, and so on. Although the 
therapeutic impact of such an approach will need to be examined, the present 
study offers a first step toward achieving this goal. 
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3.5 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
S.3A Overview of clusters and reward items
TABLE 3A.1 Complete list of the eight clusters with the 98 reward items 




• Being committed to something (e.g., to achieving a certain goal or 
objective)
• Achieving goals or a diploma / Performing well
• Experiencing a good cooperation with someone
• Helping others 
• A good health
• Receiving a compliment
• Touching someone (e.g., as showing support or as a way of congratulating)
• Intimacy and sexual contact
• Receiving (mental and emotional) support
• Promises, commitments and appointments being honoured
• Feeling and receiving love
• Having a good professional position
• Having my own, save house
• Receiving trust (and feeling trusted)
• Having contact with family / social network
• Autonomy / being independent from others
• Receiving personal attention / being seen (as a person)
• Receiving good advice
• (A feeling of) security
• Freedom 
• Receiving excuses / others admitting their mistakes
• Having unexpected visitors
Leave • Making supervised leave a fun activity
• ‘Shared’ leave; going on leave with other patients
• Going on leave
• Extension of leave possibilities
• Having more time during leave
• Being paid for non-worked hours during leave
• Meeting someone from outside during leave
• Being able to go on leave during the evening
• Going on leave without a pre-specified plan, or being able to deviate from 
the plan
• Knowing good destinations to spend leave time
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CLUSTER NAME ITEMS
Autonomy • Being able to use mobile phone
• Taking care of pets
• Pursuing (academic) studies
• Going to a prostitute or having a prostitute visiting the clinic
• Individually adjusted internet access in my room
• Digital television in my room
• An enjoyable way to spend my days (work, study, etc)
• Larger and square rooms
• Being able to stay in my room without being bothered
• Doing my own shopping
Ward climate and 
restrictions
• Less controls in the clinic (cell control, urine control, control of visitors)
• Treatment staff having and/or making time during the evening
• Interacting with people from outside during social activities or sports 
inside the clinic
• Possibilities to search for a partner outside the clinic
• Permanent staff in the clinic
• Informal, non-clinical, non-paranoid contact with staff members
• A positively written legal record
• Being able to use the apartment within the clinic (with my partner)
• Possibilities to invest privately in an intimate relationship
• Having volunteers visiting the clinic
• Not being locked up (in my room)
• Termination of TBS order
• Attention to a lively atmosphere inside the clinic




• Winning (e.g., a game)
• Having extra salary instead of holiday hours
• Computer/I-pad/Tablet
• Having my own stuff
• Having my own cooking supplies and instruments (or my own kitchenette)
• Good and tasty food
• Keeping administrative records
• Having high-quality music equipment and loudspeakers
• Coffee
• Money
• A comfortable bed




Active lifestyle • Sports facilities inside the clinic
• Being able to use sporting facilities in the clinic without planning
• Swimming
• Organizing and attending fun group activities within the clinic 
• Recreational (group) activities outside the clinic (e.g., amusement park, 
summer festival)
• Visiting a museum
• Open air and/or nature activities (hiking, MTB, walking the dog, working 
in the garden)
• Dog training program in the clinic
• Fishing (within the clinic)
• Pursuing hobbies or sports outside the clinic
Relaxation • Doing small craftwork (e.g., using wood, paper, fabric)
• Solving puzzles (e.g., sudoku, crossword, jigsaw)
• Reading books
• Playing ball games, both individually or in a team (e.g., soccer, tennis)
• Leisure time
• Watching soccer
• Singing and making music
• Going out (movies, bowling, (house)party)
• Going on a holiday
• Playing a game
• Cooking
• Physical relaxation (massage, sauna)
• Listening to music
• Watching a movie
Substances • Tobacco
• (Medicinal) cannabis or hash
• Alcoholic drinks




TABLE 3A.2 Complete list of the five clusters with the 115 reward items gen-




• Being supported by my partner
• Feeling safe and peaceful at home
• My children being happy
• Activities with my children or family (e.g., going to the zoo)
• Enjoying myself at home
• Being understood by my partner
• Having contact with my children on a regular basis
• Having a liveable home
• Humour
• Having good contact with my family
• Being sociable with friends
• Being able to control my anger
• Openness
• Sexual experiences
• A quiet, peaceful relationship with my partner
• A good health
• Enjoying the small things in life together
• Being able to keep the good things in my life
• Being able to have and overcome arguments with my partner
• Making my partner happy
• Having a life partner
• Having a good contact with my children
• A quiet, peaceful life
• Having time for myself






• Feeling and receiving interpersonal trust
• Being judged on what I do instead of on how I look
• Feeling and receiving empathy
• Being taken seriously by others
• Meeting new people
• Being able to pay my bills
• Doing my bit and feeling useful
• Being appreciated for my efforts
• Being able to be myself
• Honesty (in myself as well as others)
• Having good contact with my colleagues
• Being able to express my aggression
• Being accepted by my family and parents when doing things my own way
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CLUSTER NAME ITEMS
General social  
recognition 
(continued)
• Others giving me space
• Receiving a compliment
• Helping others
• Having good contact with a fellow client in therapy
• Having control over my own life
• Having good conversations with friends
• Being seen and acknowledged as a person
• Real friendship
• Feeling calm in my head
• Being able to deal with situations in a relaxed and effective way
Future orientation
 
• A challenge to take on
• Getting confidence and pride out of my work
• Attending treatment





• Applying what I have learned during treatment
• Setting and reaching goals; making a deadline
• Good tools
• Having security in my job
• Money
• Building or creating something
• Gaining knowledge
Relaxation • Having a phone
• Swimming
• Feeling freedom on the road (e.g., in a car, motorcycle or truck)
• Listening to music
• Watching a good movie or documentary
• Taking a shower
• Having a nice tattoo
• Personal care (e.g., hairdresser, solarium) 
• Nice weather
• Sleeping in and starting the day quietly and peacefully
• A bed
• Alcohol
• A day of doing nothing and just hanging around
• Walking the dog






• Relaxing on the couch at home
• Having a day off 
• Coffee
• Going out for dinner
• Having a car
• Having a television
• Tasty food




Experience seeking • Tobacco
• Smoking marijuana
• Growing marijuana
• Reading a good book
• Partying without having to think of consequences
• Quitting smoking
• Gaming
• Seeing new things
• Learning about other countries and cultures during when traveling
• Speeded activities (e.g., quad driving)
• Going out
• Enjoying a jacuzzi
• Being away from home without email and telephone
• Cocaine
• Medication (e.g., benzodiazepines)
• Holidays and traveling
• Getting drunk
• Going to a bar or concert
• Long train rides
• Hiking
• Doing sports
• Being surrounded by stretched plains of nature




CHAPTER 4  So what’cha want? 
The impact of individualised rewards on  
associative learning in psychopathy
ABSTRACT
Psychopathic individuals typically present with associative learning impairments under 
explicit learning conditions. The present study aimed to investigate whether the formation 
of stimulus-outcome associations as well as updating of these associations after changed 
contingencies could be improved by using rewards with sufficiently high subjective values. 
To this end, 20 psychopathic offenders, 17 non-psychopathic offenders and 18 healthy 
controls performed a passive avoidance task with a reversal phase under three motivational 
conditions, using naturalistic rewards. The subjective values of the rewards were assessed for 
each individual participant using a visual analogue scale. The correspondence of these values 
to their internal representation was confirmed by analyses of brain potentials. Psychopathic 
offenders performed worse during passive avoidance learning when a hypothetical reward was 
used (‘neutral reward’ condition), but performed similar to the other groups when naturalistic 
rewards could be obtained (‘low reward’ and ‘high reward’ conditions). No effects of group or 
condition were present in overall reversal learning performance. Analysis of win-stay and lose-
shift behaviour showed that psychopathic offenders were less likely to stay with a rewarded 
response during passive avoidance learning in the neutral reward condition. In addition, 
regardless of experimental phase or condition, psychopathic offenders were less likely to stop 
responding to a particular stimulus after receiving negative feedback. Our findings suggest 
that psychopathic offenders have the ability to adapt their behaviour to environmental 
contingencies when positive reinforcers with sufficiently high subjective values are used. 
THIS CHAPTER IS UNDER REVIEW AS:
Glimmerveen, J.C., Maes, J.H.R, Bulten, B.H., Scheper, I., & Brazil, I.A. (2019). So what’cha 
want? The impact of individualised rewards on associative learning in psychopathy.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Healthy social functioning relies on having a well-developed set of cognitive 
skills and functions that allows us to flexibly adapt our behaviour. Such func-
tions include the capacity to learn from feedback, behavioural inhibition, the 
anticipation of behavioural consequences and evaluation of punishment and 
reward (Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000; Ogilvie et al., 2011). Individuals that show 
impairments in these neurocognitive functions are more likely to engage in an-
tisocial behaviour, which might eventually result in entering the criminal justice 
system. For these individuals it may be particularly difficult to benefit from the 
approach used in many correctional systems, in which offenders are expected to 
reflect on and learn from the negative outcomes of their choices, and to acquire 
new behavioural repertoires associated with (more) positive consequences. 
As offenders are likely to show psychiatric symptoms (Gottfried & 
Christopher, 2017; James & Glaze, 2006), those afflicted would likely bene-
fit more from psychiatric interventions to achieve this behavioural change. 
However, highly antisocial offenders, particularly those with psychopathy, are 
known to respond poorly to traditional therapeutic interventions (see Brazil et 
al., 2018a). Psychopathy is a personality disorder characterised by emotional 
abnormalities in combination with severe antisociality. Psychopathic individuals 
are known for their reckless and impulsive behaviour as well as a callous dis-
regard for others, presenting with a lack of empathy and guilt (Hare, 2003a). 
Consequently, psychopathic offenders constitute one of the most difficult 
groups to treat and show high rates of recidivism, while they are often involved 
in extremely violent offences (Barbaree, 2005; Hare et al., 2000; Hildebrand et 
al., 2004; Salekin et al., 2010). These high reoffending rates suggest a relatively 
low sensitivity to corrective experiences, or an impaired ability to adapt and 
correct previously acquired antisocial behaviour. 
The reduced ability to learn from negative behavioural consequences, like 
previous incarceration, has often been linked to a number of cognitive pro-
cessing deficits that are typically observed in psychopathy. A well-established 
finding is that psychopathy is associated with maladaptive behaviour following 
negative feedback (e.g., Von Borries et al., 2010), as well as impaired learning 
from reward and punishment (e.g., Budhani et al., 2006; Newman & Kosson, 
1986). Earlier studies on associative learning in psychopathy were focused on 
passive avoidance learning, during which individuals learn by trial and error 
which stimuli they should respond to in order to obtain rewards, and which stim-
uli require a response to be withheld as they do not yield any rewards or are even 
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associated with punishment. Psychopathic individuals made more commission 
errors than healthy individuals during passive avoidance learning, but the groups 
had a similar number of omission errors (Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman et 
al., 1985; Thornquist & Zuckerman, 1995). The findings indicated that, in con-
ditions including both punishment and reward, the acquisition of stimulus-out-
come associations based on punished responses was compromised. 
Later studies also identified an impairment in reversal learning in psychopa-
thy (e.g., Brazil et al., 2013; Budhani et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). During re-
versal learning, participants first learn which stimuli are associated with reward, 
and which stimuli are associated with punishment. After a predefined learning 
criterion has been reached, contingencies are reversed, so that previously re-
warded stimuli should be avoided, and previously punished stimuli yield positive 
outcomes. The findings indicated that psychopathic individuals performed 
worse than controls in the reversal phase, suggesting that they had trouble up-
dating the stimulus-outcome mappings (e.g., Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Brazil 
et al., 2013; Budhani et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). 
It is likely that the learning impairments associated with psychopathy con-
tribute to the limited capacity for behavioural change that is often seen during 
treatment of psychopathic individuals. However, facilitating adaptive behaviour 
also requires the use of reinforcers with sufficiently high motivational value 
(Bissonette & Roesch, 2016; Miendlarzewska et al., 2016; Schultz, 1998). An in-
dividual can assign a value to a reinforcer based on how motivationally relevant 
(i.e. attractive or unattractive) the reinforcer is for the individual, and individuals 
will vary in the value assigned to the same reinforcer. For example, an apple can 
have a relatively high value when a person is hungry, but the same apple will 
have a lower value if the person is already satiated. As the physical properties 
(e.g., caloric content) of the apple are equal in both situations, the assignment of 
value to the apple is subjective. Human and animal research has indeed shown 
that the subjective values assigned to rewards can guide a variety of cognitive 
processes, including associative learning and decision making (Gallagher et al., 
1999; Medic et al., 2014; Padoa-Schioppa & Cai, 2011). However, the majority of 
studies on reinforcement learning in psychopathy used mere ‘points’ that could 
be earned or lost (e.g., Blair et al., 2004; Budhani et al., 2006; Dargis et al., 2017; 
Mitchell et al., 2002), without considering the role of subjective valuation. Only 
a handful of studies concerned other types of rewards that may be valued as 
being more rewarding, such as money, cigarettes, or snacks (Newman & Kosson, 
1986; Newman et al., 1990; Newman & Schmitt, 1998). The latter category of 
studies yielded results indicating that such ‘naturalistic’ rewards do not influence 
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learning in a manner different from merely earning or losing points. However, 
these studies did not provide any information on the extent to which the in-
cluded rewards were experienced as being relevant and of high value for their 
participants. As such, experimental research focusing on reward-based learning 
in psychopathy may have used reinforcers with relatively low subjective value. 
Importantly, evaluating and comparing different types of rewards require 
the values assigned to each reward to be placed on a common scale, and animal 
research has shown that the reward with the highest subjective value on this 
common scale is often chosen (Lak et al., 2014). There is compelling evidence 
that subjective reward values are represented by a common neural currency 
in (pre)frontal brain areas in humans as well (Levy & Glimcher, 2012; Peters & 
Büchel, 2010). These representations seem to be generated in the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), a region for which various neuroimaging studies in 
psychopathic individuals have reported reduced volume (Boccardi et al., 2011; 
de Oliveira-Souza et al., 2008; Tiihonen et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2010) and 
activity during task performance (Birbaumer et al., 2005; Finger et al., 2011; 
Rilling et al., 2007). Such findings support one of the predictions generated 
by the Integrated Emotion Systems (IES) model of psychopathy (Blair, 2004). 
This model assumes that impaired learning in psychopathy is partly driven by 
dysfunctions in generating representations of reinforcement (including reward) 
expectancies in the vmPFC (e.g., Blair, 2007), in addition to disturbances in 
establishing stimulus-outcome associations in the amygdala. Taken together, 
there are grounds to believe that the computation and representation of reward 
values might be compromised in individuals with psychopathy, which in turn 
could (partly) underlie their maladaptive tendencies and poor decision making. 
However, while there is evidence for disturbances in the computation of re-
ward value in psychopathy (see also Hosking et al., 2017), it is unknown how such 
impairment ultimately affects the learning process. The fact that each individual 
will subjectively assign a different value to a particular reward makes it even more 
challenging to unravel this relationship. One approach to studying the impact of 
individual differences in value assignment would be to study reinforcement learn-
ing using rewards that are matched on their subjective values across individuals. 
Thus, the attractiveness of the rewards can be manipulated and controlled for by 
letting each individual indicate which rewards they value most, and subsequently 
incorporating these rewards in the experimental paradigm. In addition, collecting 
neural responses indexing outcome processing can provide further insights into 
how value assignment affects learning in psychopathy. 
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The overarching aim of the present study was to explore how subjective 
valuation of rewards affects associative learning in psychopathic offenders. 
Specifically, we investigated to what extent self-reported, subjective reward 
values influence both initial learning and contingency updating, and whether 
these processes are different in psychopathic offenders compared to non-psy-
chopathic offenders and healthy controls. In line with previous research, we 
expected both passive avoidance learning and reversal learning to be impaired 
in psychopathic offenders compared to non-psychopathic offenders and con-
trols under low motivational conditions (i.e., using rewards with low subjective 
values), but we expected their performance to improve when rewards with high 
subjective values were incorporated in the task. 
Win-stay and lose-shift percentages, reflecting the tendency to stay with a 
rewarded response and to shift away from a punished response, were also cal-
culated for both acquisition and reversal to understand the relation between 
immediate feedback processing and general task performance. Previous inves-
tigations of contingency processing during associative learning in populations 
presenting with reversal learning deficits (e.g., individuals with psychopathy and 
patients with OFC-lesions) have focused on win-stay and lose-shift behaviour 
during reversal learning only (Berlin et al., 2004; Budhani et al., 2006). However, 
we were also interested in studying win-stay and lose-shift behaviour during 
acquisition, as this would allow for a more thorough investigation of whether 
impaired passive avoidance learning in psychopathy is mainly related to reduced 
processing of reward information, reduced processing of punishment informa-
tion, or both. Since reward processing often seems to come at the cost of pun-
ishment processing in psychopathy, at least during passive avoidance learning 
(Blair et al., 2004; Newman et al., 1990), we expected psychopathic offenders 
to be less prone to shift away from a punished response but to be equally likely 
to stay with a rewarded response compared to the two other groups. In addition, 
similar to our general expectations regarding passive avoidance and reversal 
learning, we expected their win-stay and lose-shift behaviour to increase under 
conditions with high subjective reward values. 
Finally, electrophysiological responses to feedback (as indexed by the feedback- 
related negativity; FRN) were collected to examine brain responses to rewards as 
a function of their subjective values. The FRN is an event-related potential (ERP) 
commonly used to study outcome processing in reinforcement learning tasks. 
The FRN has been found to be particularly sensitive to the valence and magni-
tude of external feedback representing performance-based outcome (i.e., gain or 
loss), and is generated in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and other prefrontal 
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areas associated with outcome evaluation (Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Holroyd 
& Coles, 2002; San Martín, 2012; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). The amplitude of the 
FRN is generally larger following losses than following gains, but it is also mod-
ulated by motivational significance. For example, one study found that the am-
plitude of the FRN increased as the level of personal relevance of the outcomes 
increased during joint action (Loehr et al., 2015). As such, the FRN could provide 
information on whether associative learning deficits in psychopathy stem from 
deficient coding of outcome value. We reasoned that higher subjective reward 
values would evoke stronger neural responses to negative feedback, and that 
the groups would not differ in this regard given prior findings indicating intact 
feedback processing in psychopathic offenders (Von Borries et al., 2010).
4.2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
4.2.1 Participants 
Participants in the offender groups were recruited from the inpatient popula-
tion of a maximum security forensic psychiatric institute in The Netherlands. 
Offenders were initially selected based on available information about clin-
ical status and history obtained from their head therapists and patient files. 
Healthy controls were recruited via advertisements on social media, via research 
participant pools, and among employees in the facility. Subsequently, trained 
psychologists screened potential participants using the Dutch version of the 
MINI Psychiatric Interview (Van Vliet et al., 2000) and the Structured Clinical 
Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II; Weertman et al., 
1996). Exclusion criteria were all major current Axis I and Axis II disorders 
(with exception of cluster B personality disorders), chronic use of intoxicating 
substances, and the use of psychotropic medication at the time of testing. All 
participants received written information about the experiment, gave written 
informed consent and received financial compensation. The experimental pro-
tocol was approved by the local ethics committee of the Radboud University 
Nijmegen (ECSW2016-2501-373). 
Each participant’s IQ was estimated using a combination of two subtests 
(Information and Coding) of the core Dutch Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale–IV (WAIS-IV) subtests (Girard et al., 2015; Wechsler, 2012a, 2012b). 
For assignment to the group with psychopathic offenders, a cut-off score of 
26 (Rasmussen et al., 1999) on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist — Revised 
(PCL-R; Hare, 2003a) was used, an instrument combining file information and a 
semi-structured interview to assess the core interpersonal, affective and behav-
ioural attributes of psychopathy. The offender groups and healthy controls were 
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matched for age and IQ. No PCL-R scores were available for the control group, 
as these participants did not have criminal records. Demographics of the three 
participant groups are presented in Table 4.1. 
Statistical evaluation of these variables showed that psychopathic offenders 
had significantly higher PCL-R scores compared to non-psychopathic offend-
ers, t(34)=-9.42, p<.001. Furthermore, the three groups did not differ in terms of 
age, F(2,52)=0.11, p=.900,  =.004. However, there was a significant difference in 
IQ, F(2,51)=5.59, p=.006, ηp
2=.180. Post hoc analyses showed that psychopathic 
offenders had statistically significant lower IQ’s than non-psychopathic offend-
ers and controls (t(51)=2.86, p=.017 and t(51)=2.86, p=.019, respectively; see 
Table 4.1). No differences were observed between non-psychopathic offenders 
and controls (t(51)=-.08, p=1.000).
The sample size was similar to that of prior studies focused on feedback-based 
learning and/or error processing in offenders with psychopathy (e.g., Brazil et al., 
2009; Budhani et al., 2006; Von Borries et al., 2010), and an a priori performed 
power analysis (G*Power 3.1;Faul et al., 2009) confirmed that our sample size 
would generate sufficient statistical power (>.80) to investigate our effects of 
interest (Cohen’s f=.25, α=.05, two-tailed). 








Age (years) 43.3 (10.2) 44.9 (13.9) 44.7 (8.8)
FSIQ score 97.0 (17.3) 97.4 (14.3) 83.4 (11.3)
Years of education 15.4 (3.1) 13.1 (2.9) 10.5 (2.8)
PCL-R total score (mean [range]) N/A 18.7 (10-25) 30.2 (27-35)
Note. Group data are mean (SD) unless stated otherwise. FSIQ=full-scale intelligence quotient. PCL-
R=psychopathy checklist-revised. N/A=not applicable. *For one participant in the psychopathic 
offenders group, no exact PCLR-score was available. However, multiple legal documents in this 
participant’s patient file stated that the PCL-R had been assessed, and that the resulting score indi-
cated that this offender had (very) high levels of psychopathic traits. Mean PCL-R total score was 
therefore calculated with data from 19 psychopathic offenders. In addition, for one participant in 
the psychopathic offenders group, the IQ score that was obtained in the screening session could 
not be traced at the time of data analysis. Therefore, calculation of mean FSIQ score, as well as 
further analyses containing IQ, was performed with data from 19 psychopathic offenders.
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4.2.2 Task and design
First, participants sorted different items representing potential rewards based 
on their attractiveness using a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), on which ratings 
could range from -25 (extremely unattractive) to +25 (extremely attractive). The 
reward items were selected from a larger pool of items we identified in a previous 
study on reward preferences in forensic samples (see Chapter 3; Glimmerveen 
et al., 2018), and could be roughly divided into three categories: material re-
wards, food-related rewards, and rewards related to personal development (e.g., 
attending workshops; see Supplement 4A, for an overview). Participants in the 
offender samples sorted 20 different items, and healthy controls were presented 
a subset of 10 items that were identical or comparable to the items presented to 
the offender groups. One reason for this difference was that a number of items 
related to personal development were difficult to arrange outside the clinical 
setting. In addition, the descriptions of some rewards differed in specificity be-
tween groups, resulting in multiple specific items in the offender groups versus 
a single more inclusive item for the healthy control group. For each participant, 
the two rewards with the lowest positive ratings and the two rewards with the 
highest positive ratings were selected. The negatively valued items were discard-
ed, as they could not be considered as rewarding items. One of the two selected 
low-value rewards and one of the two selected high-value rewards were used in 
another task (described in Chapter 5) that was performed in the same session; 
allocation of the highest and lowest rated high-value and low-value rewards to 
each task occurred in counterbalanced order. In addition, task order was coun-
terbalanced across participants. 
The experiment consisted of an adapted version of the passive avoidance task 
developed by Newman and Kosson (1986), in which a reversal component 
was added based on the reinforcement contingency scheme used by Budhani 
et al. (2006). The experiment was run with OpenSesame v3.0 (Mathôt et al., 
2012). Participants were seated in front of a 100 Hz computer screen on which 
events were presented against a black background (see Figure 4.1). A trial start-
ed with the presentation of a white fixation cross in the middle of the screen, 
followed by a go or a no-go stimulus. Stimulus presentation was terminated by 
a response, or by time-out. Participants made their responses by pressing the 
spacebar of a keyboard. After presentation of the stimulus, a blank screen was 
presented, followed by visual and auditory feedback on the response. Feedback 
consisted of the Dutch words goed (correct) or fout (incorrect), presented in 
green (correct) or red (incorrect) capitals, accompanied by a high or a low tone, 
respectively. When no response had been made (and stimulus presentation had 
timed-out), no feedback was presented. 
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FIGURE 4.1 Sequence of events and their timing (ms) during the experiment. ITI = Inter-trial 
interval. The figure depicts a trial in the neutral reward condition, with the cartoon character in 
the upper left corner of the screen, and a picture of the reward (i.e., a donut in the current (neutral 
reward) condition) in the upper right corner of the screen. In the low- and high reward conditions, 
pictures of the corresponding low-valued and high valued rewards were displayed in the upper 
right corner. The yellow bar between the cartoon character and the reward reflects the accumulat-
ed number of points and thus the progress towards obtaining the reward at the end of the current 
experimental run. In the figure can be seen that about 40% of the required number of points has 
been accumulated, as the yellow bar is almost halfway between the cartoon figure and the reward.
In line with Newman and Kosson (1986), participants were presented with 
eight different two-digit numbers of which four were go stimuli and the other 
four were no-go stimuli. However, half of the go and no-go stimuli had proba-
bilistic reinforcement contingencies, such that a response on the two probabil-
istic go stimuli would yield positive feedback on 80% of the trials and negative 
feedback on 20% of the trials, and, likewise, a response on the two probabilistic 
no-go stimuli would yield negative feedback on 80% of the trials and positive 
feedback on 20% of the trials. In addition, there was a go/no-go reversal for half 
of the stimuli, such that responses to previously correct stimuli (i.e., go stimuli) 
were followed by negative feedback indicating a wrong response, and responses 
to previously wrong stimuli (i.e., no-go stimuli) were followed by feedback indi-
cating a correct response. This subset included each of the four stimulus types 
(non-probabilistic go, non-probabilistic no-go, probabilistic go, probabilistic 
no-go) and was gradually introduced throughout the experiment following a 
predefined schedule (see Table 4.2). Participants were not informed when these 
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reversals would occur. For both non-reversing and reversing stimuli, there were 
20 initial presentations, after which reversing stimuli had 20 additional presenta-
tions with reversed contingencies. One experimental run comprised of 240 trials, 
divided into five blocks of 40, 60, 40, 60, and 40 trials, respectively. Participants 
were unaware of this segmentation, but were offered self-paced pauses in the 
middle of the second and fourth blocks.
Each participant performed the task under three reward conditions, in coun-
ter balanced order using a Latin Square: ‘neutral reward’, involving a hypothetical 
reward (further explained below), ‘low reward’, involving the selected low-value 
reward, and ‘high reward’, involving the selected high-value reward. The neutral 
reward was considered as having a subjective value equalling zero. A horizontal 
bar representing the participant’s performance during the task was displayed 
continuously on the top of the screen (see Figure 4.1). The bar increased and 
decreased in steps of 25 points, simultaneously with the presentation of positive 
and negative feedback, respectively. Since we wanted participants to be focused 
on the reward, and not on the number of points needed to gain the reward, they 
were not informed about this underlying point system. A cartoon figure (i.e., 
Homer Simpson) was placed at the beginning of the bar, and the upper right 
corner of the screen showed a picture of either the neutral, low or high rewards. 
The pictures representing low and high rewards were similar to the pictures 
that were used to rate the rewards on the VAS at the start of the experiment, 
and thus depended on the participants’ individual choices. In the neutral (i.e., 
hypothetical) reward condition, the reward was represented by a donut. It was 
explained to the participants that they would not gain this donut themselves, but 
that Homer would be very grateful if they could help him to get it. Participants 
(or the cartoon figure, in the neutral reward condition) gained the reward when 
the horizontal bar reached (or crossed) the reward picture at the end of the task. 
To account for learning effects, the numbers of points to be earned for obtaining 
the reward were determined separately for each experimental run (first, second, 
or last), based on the median numbers of points participants earned in an (un-
published) pilot study (1410, 1550, or 1750 points, respectively). Material and 
food-related rewards (except the supervised dinner-preparing session to take 
place on the ward) were handed immediately at the end of the session; for the 
rewards related to personal development, appointments were arranged.
4.2.3 ERP acquisition and data processing 
Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded using 32 active electrodes (Acticap, 
Brain Products GmbH, Germany) arranged according to an extended version of 
the 10–20 system. All electrodes were referenced to the left earlobe. Vertical 
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and horizontal eye movements were monitored using bipolar electrooculogra-
phy (EOG) electrodes positioned above and beneath the right eye and at the 
outer canthi of both eyes. Impedance was kept below 10 kΩ and all signals were 
acquired with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. 
EEG data processing was performed offline using Brain Vision Analyzer 
software (V2.01.3931, Brain Products GmbH, Germany). The data were re-ref-
erenced to the mean of both earlobe electrodes. Ocular artefacts were removed 
using Independent Component Analyses (Jung et al., 2000). The data were fil-
tered using high- and low-pass filters of 0.05 Hz (24 dB/oct) and 30 Hz (24 dB/
oct), respectively. Next, the EEG data were segmented into epochs ranging from 
200 ms before to 900 ms after feedback onset. The FRN was identified as the 
most negative peak relative to a 200 ms pre-feedback baseline period measured 
on the FCz electrode in the 150-400 ms interval after feedback onset. The 
choice for this interval was based on the time windows that are most commonly 
reported in the literature (Hajcak et al., 2006; Holroyd et al., 2003; Von Borries 
et al., 2013; Yeung & Sanfey, 2004). Finally, difference waves were calculated 
by subtracting FRN amplitude after win-feedback from FRN amplitude follow-
ing loss-feedback. This subtraction procedure should isolate the components 
specifically related to differences in the processing of win and loss feedback 
(Hajcak et al., 2007; Holroyd & Coles, 2002). Hence, larger difference waves are 
thought to reflect stronger neural responses to losses. 




(PF-NF) 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Non-reversing 100-0 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 20 trials
Reversing 100-0 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 10 (No-go) 10 (No-go) 40 trials
Non-reversing 80-20 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 20 trials
Reversing 80-20 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 10 (No-go) 10| (No-go) 40 trials
Non-reversing 20-80 10 (No-go) 10 (No-go) 20 trials
Reversing 20-80 10 (No-go) 10 (No-go) 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 40 trials
Non-reversing 0-100 10 (No-go) 10 (No-go) 20 trials
Reversing 0-100 10 (No-go) 10 (No-go) 10 (Go) 10 (Go) 40 trials
40 trials 60 trials 40 trials 60 trials 40 trials 240 trials
Note. PF=Positive Feedback, NF=Negative Feedback. For each stimulus, the number of trials and 
expected (non-)response is given for each block. The order of presentation of the different stimuli 
was randomised within each block.
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4.2.4 Data analyses
Prior to analysis, hit rates and false alarm rates were calculated for each phase 
and contingency probability (both separately and combined), as well as for the 
total experiment (hit rate = number of hits / number of go trials; false alarm rate 
= number of false alarms / number of no-go trials). Next, hit rates and false alarm 
rates were converted into d’ discriminability values using a signal detection 
framework: d ’ = Z(hit rate) − Z(false alarm rate). 
In order to examine participants’ behaviour after receiving reward or punish-
ment, win-stay and lose-shift percentages were calculated based on trial-by-trial 
data. Win-stay percentage reflects the proportion of instances a participant 
repeats a rewarded response on the subsequent encounter with a specific stim-
ulus, instead of (incorrectly) withholding a response to this stimulus (win-stay 
percentage = number of win-stay trials / (number of win-stay trials + number of 
win-shift trials) × 100). Lose-shift percentage reflects the proportion of instanc-
es a participant withholds a response when confronted with a stimulus on which 
responding was punished during the previous encounter, instead of incorrectly 
responding to this stimulus again (lose-shift percentage = number of lose-shift 
trials / (number of lose-shift trials + number of lose-stay trials) × 100). 
ERP data were analysed using a 3 × 3 repeated measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) with Condition (neutral reward, low reward, high reward) as 
within-subject variable and Group (psychopathic offenders, non-psychopath-
ic offenders, controls) as between-subjects factor. Response accuracy data 
were analysed by entering d’ values into a 3 × 2 × 2 × 3 repeated measures 
ANOVA with Condition (neutral reward, low reward, high reward), Probability 
(100–0, 80 –20), and Phase (acquisition, reversal) as within-subject factors 
and Group (psychopathic offenders, non-psychopathic offenders, controls) as 
between-subjects factor. Win-stay and Lose-shift percentages were analysed 
using a 3 × 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (neutral reward, 
low reward, high reward) and Phase (acquisition, reversal) as within-subject 
factors and Group (psychopathic offenders, non-psychopathic offenders, 
controls) as between-subjects factor. Since IQ was found to differ significantly 
between groups, and IQ was expected to contribute to inter-individual learning 
variability, it was added as a covariate in the behavioural analyses. Effect sizes 
are reported as partial eta-squared (ηp
2; small ≥ .01, medium ≥ .06, large ≥ .14 
(Cohen, 1988)). Statistical analyses were performed in SPSS 23.0 (IBM Corp., 
2015). An overview of all tested effects in primary analyses and post-hoc tests is 




First, the mean peak amplitude of difference waves at FCz was compared be-
tween reward conditions. Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 6.29, p=.043, therefore degrees of freedom 
were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .88). The results 
showed a main effect for reward level, F(1.91, 82.11)=3.40, p=.040, ηp
2=.073. Post 
hoc paired samples t-tests indicated stronger responses to negative feedback in 
the high reward condition (M=-8.58, SE=1.68) compared to the neutral reward 
(M=-4.76, SE=0.59) and low reward (M=-5.61, SE=1.09) conditions, t(46)=-2.19, 
p=.034 and t(47)=-2.03, p=.048, respectively (see Figure 4.2). This indicates 
that feedback processing was positively related to (subjective) reward value at 
the neural level. The analysis revealed no other statistically significant main and 
interaction effects. 
4.3.2 Response accuracy
Analysis of accuracy data revealed that IQ was significantly related to d’ values 
(F(1, 50)=6.06, p=.017, ηp
2=.108). Moreover, there was a significant three-way 
interaction between condition, phase and group (Wilk’s Lambda=.812, F(4, 
98)=2.69, p=.036, ηp
2=.099). Separate analyses for each condition, controlling 
for IQ, revealed that psychopathic offenders (M=1.46, SE=.18) performed worse 
than non-psychopathic offenders (M=2.21, SE=.18; B=.748, p=.005) and con-
trols (M=1.98, SE=.17; B=.523, p=.044) during acquisition in the neutral reward 
condition. No group differences were observed in the reversal phase for the 
neutral reward condition (p=.891 and p=.177, respectively), nor in either phase 
of the low reward (acquisition: p= .786 and p=.955, respectively; reversal: p=.334 
and p=.290, respectively) and the high reward conditions (acquisition: p= .267 
and p=.311, respectively; reversal: p=.687 and p=.401, respectively; see also 
Figure 4.3a and 4.3b). To further investigate the three-term interaction effect, 
we ran subsequent analyses for each group separately, which did not reveal an 
effect of condition within acquisition (psychopathic offenders: F(2, 34)=0.59, 
p=.562, ηp
2=.033; non-psychopathic offenders: F(2, 30)=1.00, p=.378, ηp
2=.063; 
healthy controls: F(2, 32)=0.90, p=.416, ηp
2=.053). 
88 |
FIGURE 4.2 Mean peak amplitude (µV) of FRN difference waves at FCz for each condition, 
across groups. Data are expressed as mean ± 1 standard error. Negative values are plotted upwards.
FIGURE 4.3 A. Response accuracy for each group in each condition during acquisition, 
as indexed by d-prime (d’). B. Response accuracy for each group in each condition during 
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| 89
4.3.3 Win-stay and lose-shift behaviour 
Analysis of win-stay percentages showed an interaction effect of group and con-
dition, Wilk’s Lambda=.78, F(4,98)=3.24, p=.015, ηp
2=.117. Separate univariate 
analyses revealed significant group differences in the neutral reward condition, 
F(2,51)=4.63, p=.014, ηp
2=.154. Pairwise comparisons showed that, in the neutral 
reward condition, psychopathic offenders were less likely to stay with a reward-
ed response than non-psychopathic offenders, (t(51)=3.01, p=.012), but no dif-
ferences were observed between psychopathic offenders and controls (t(51)= 
1.85, p=.210), or between non-psychopathic offenders and controls (t(51)=1.17, 
p=.743); M(psychopathic offenders)=94.1%, SE=.86%; M(non-psychopathic of-
fenders)=97.9%, SE=.91%; M(controls)=96.4%, SE=.88%. No group differences 
regarding win-stay percentage were observed in the low reward and high reward 
conditions (see Figure 4.4).
Regarding lose-shift percentages, there was an interaction effect of group 
and phase, Wilk’s Lambda=.88, F(2,50)=3.35, p=.043, ηp
2=.118. In order to 
examine this interaction effect, repeated measures ANOVAs were performed 
for acquisition and reversal separately (see Figure 4.5a and 4.5b, respectively). 
This revealed a main effect of group during acquisition, F(2,51)=5.53, p=.007, 
ηp
2=.178. Pairwise comparisons showed that, during acquisition, psychopathic 
offenders were less likely to shift away from a punished response compared to 
non-psychopathic offenders (t(51)=-2.66, p=.031) and controls (t(51)=-3.03, 
p=.012), but no differences were observed between non-psychopathic offend-
ers and controls (t(51)=-0.32, p=1.000); M(psychopathic offenders)=33.7%, 
SE=2.88%; M(non-psychopathic offenders)=44.8%, SE=3.05%; M(controls)= 
46.2%, SE=2.96%. During reversal, there was also an effect of group on lose-
shift percentages, F(2,51)=3.22, p=.048, ηp
2=.112. 
Psychopathic offenders were less likely to shift away from a punished response 
compared to controls (t(51)=-2.53, p=.044), but no differences were observed 
between psychopathic offenders and non-psychopathic offenders (t(51)=-1.00, 
p=.969), or between non-psychopathic offenders and controls (t(51)=-1.47, 
p=.443); M(psychopathic offenders)=28.3%, SE=2.72%; M(non-psychopathic 
offenders)=32.2%, SE=2.88%; M(controls)=38.1%, SE=2.80%. The analysis 
revealed no other statistically significant main and interaction effects. 
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FIGURE 4.4 Win-stay behaviour for each group in each condition across phases. Percentages 
reflect the proportion of instances participants repeated a rewarded response on the subsequent 








Neutral Reward Low Reward High Reward
Non-psychopathic offenders Psychopathic offenders
FIGURE 4.5  A: Lose-shift behaviour for each group in each condition during acquisition. 
B: Lose-shift behaviour for each group in each condition during reversal. Percentages reflect 
the proportion of instances participants withheld a response when confronted with a stimulus on 
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The aim of the present study was to explore to what extent the subjective valua-
tion of rewards influences feedback-based associative learning in psychopathic 
offenders. Analyses of brain potentials showed that rewards with relatively high 
subjective values evoked stronger neural responses compared to neutral and 
low value rewards, providing evidence for consistency between the a priori as-
signed subjective values to the rewards and the internal representation of these 
reward values. In addition, the ERP analyses did not indicate any group differ-
ences, suggesting that the mechanisms involved in the computation of value and 
processing of feedback were unaffected in the offender groups.
4.4.1 Passive avoidance
On the behavioural level, psychopathic offenders performed worse during 
acquisition than the two comparison groups in the neutral reward condition. 
In other words, with no reward with sufficiently high subjective value to look 
forward to, psychopathic offenders learned less about the contingencies com-
pared to non-psychopathic offenders and controls. This finding is in line with 
previous research reporting passive avoidance learning deficits in psychopathy 
when reinforcers with relatively neutral subjective value are used (Blair et al., 
2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman et al., 1990; Newman & Schmitt, 
1998). Interestingly, however, we found this deficit to be absent in conditions 
where rewards with sufficient subjective values could be earned, suggesting 
that the attractiveness of these rewards facilitated the acquisition of new stimu-
lus-outcome relationships in psychopathic offenders. 
This finding is in line with the notion of the IES model that the disturbances 
in reinforcement expectancies and stimulus-outcome associations can be mod-
ulated by saliency, such as reward level (Blair, 2007; Blair et al., 2004). Blair et 
al. (2004) indeed found performance of psychopathic offenders during passive 
avoidance learning to be positively related to the reward level of specific stimuli. 
Although our results do not reveal a clear improvement (or decrement) across 
conditions for any group, they do show that the passive avoidance deficit that 
our psychopathic participants displayed in the neutral reward condition was 
absent in the low and high reward conditions. In addition, our results can only 
partly be explained by the Response Modulation (RM) hypothesis (Gorenstein & 
Newman, 1980; Newman & Kosson, 1986; Patterson & Newman, 1993), which 
is another influential framework used to explain impaired associative learning 
in psychopathy. The RM hypothesis states that the impaired passive avoidance 
learning displayed by individuals with psychopathy is caused by an attentional 
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deficit, directing too much attentional resources to reward-related information 
in conditions involving both reward and punishment (i.e., gains and losses). 
According to the RM hypothesis, this would result in a loss of attention for other 
contextual information, such as punishment, leading to impaired learning from 
negative feedback. However, the RM hypothesis can only explain our results in 
the neutral reward condition, suggesting that this holds exclusively for situations 
in which there is nothing at stake that is regarded as being sufficiently attractive. 
Apparently, the psychopathic offenders in our study were able to use infor-
mation from both gains and losses effectively to learn new stimulus-outcome 
associations, provided that relevant rewards were used. One explanation could 
be that there is a critical threshold for subjective reward value, which determines 
whether psychopathic individuals are able to process both positive and nega-
tive performance feedback effectively to learn new associations. In conditions 
where rewards have sufficient subjective values, negative feedback (such as the 
experience of losses) may shift towards their goal-directed focus of attention, 
and consequently become relevant, non-ignored information. Although a few 
earlier studies on passive avoidance learning did use more or less naturalistic 
rewards (Newman & Kosson, 1986; Newman et al., 1990; Newman & Schmitt, 
1998), they did not include measures of subjective reward value. Future research 
should therefore further elucidate whether the existence of such a threshold is 
plausible.
4.4.2 Reversal learning
All groups performed similarly in the reversal phase of each condition. This find-
ing is contrary to expectations as reversal learning impairments in psychopathy 
have been shown before, at least under explicit learning conditions (e.g., Brazil 
et al., 2013; Budhani et al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2002). However, there are indica-
tions that reversal learning impairments in offenders with psychopathy are less 
robust than previously believed (De Brito et al., 2013; Mitchell et al., 2006). The 
presence of the reversal learning deficits seems to be dependent on the learning 
context provided by the experimental task used (Brazil, 2015; Brazil et al., 2013). 
In addition, sample-specific cognitive and clinical variables, such as the level of 
processing of predictive information and childhood maltreatment history, also 
appear to play important roles in the severity of the reversal learning impairment 
in psychopathy (Dargis et al., 2017; Gregory et al., 2015). We cannot rule out that 
such factors may have affected task performance during reversal learning in our 
particular samples. 
Another explanation might be that there could be a relation between task 
complexity and the locus of the learning impairments in psychopathy (Estrada 
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et al., 2019). In relatively simple tasks including few stimuli, psychopathic offend-
ers show intact acquisition and reversal (Brazil et al., 2013). However, in tasks 
including a more intermediate number of stimuli, they are still able to perform 
acquisition, but show impaired reversal (Budhani et al., 2006). Furthermore, in 
very complex tasks, including a large number of stimuli, they also show impaired 
acquisition (Von Borries et al., 2010). Importantly, in these studies, psychopathic 
offenders and comparison individuals were matched for (estimated) IQ or educa-
tional level, controlling for possible differences in intellectual abilities. Together, 
these data suggest that increased task complexity elicits a shift in the locus of 
impairment, but to date no studies have examined this hypothesis systematical-
ly. In our study, including eight (i.e., an intermediate number of) different stimuli, 
it would be expected that, like in the study of Budhani et al. (2006), they would 
at least present with impaired reversal. The fact that they showed intact reversal 
as compared with healthy controls and non-psychopathic offenders, highlights 
the need to further specify how task complexity may affect associative learning 
in psychopathy in future studies.
4.4.3 Win-stay behaviour
To investigate the immediate behavioural effects of reward or punishment, we 
also looked at participants’ behaviour in every next encounter with each par-
ticular stimulus. Compared to non-psychopathic offenders, psychopathic of-
fenders were less likely to stay with a rewarded response in the neutral reward 
condition. Although win-stay behaviour of controls did not differ from both 
offender groups, this suggests that the motivational drive of offenders with 
psychopathy to use positive feedback information to guide future decisions is 
lower than what is observed in other violent offenders when explicit rewards 
are lacking. Hence, their ability to use positive feedback depends on whether 
the feedback is linked to an explicit and attractive reward with a subjective value 
(e.g., the low and high value rewards used in our experiment) that is higher than 
that of neutral rewards (e.g., points). A practical implication of this could be 
that, in order to have psychopathic offenders using positive feedback to develop 
more adaptive behavioural repertoires, feedback should be explicitly linked to 
clear and attractive rewards that they are willing to pursue. 
On the other hand, as previously noted, the IES model states that the forma-
tion and updating of expectancy representations may be compromised in psy-
chopathic individuals because of abnormalities in (the connectivity between) 
the amygdala and the vmPFC. Indeed, Budhani et al. (2006) found reduced win-
stay behaviour in psychopathic offenders during reversal (the authors did not 
report on win-stay and lose-shift behaviour during acquisition). However, the 
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IES model does not explain how differences in subjective reward value would 
influence feedback processing. Perhaps the neural processes involved in the 
formation and representation of stimulus-outcome associations and expec-
tancies become more efficient when subjective reward values exceed a critical 
threshold. Interestingly, the findings obtained by Gregory et al. (2015) suggest 
that subjective value promotes associative learning in psychopathic offenders, 
although they found the neural processing of subjective value information to be 
highly atypical compared to non-psychopathic offenders and controls.
4.4.4 Lose-shift behaviour
Compared to non-psychopathic offenders and healthy controls, psychopathic 
offenders were less likely to shift away from a punished response during acqui-
sition. In other words, psychopathic offenders seemed less likely to use negative 
feedback during passive avoidance learning than the two comparison groups, 
which is in agreement with the results obtained by Von Borries et al. (2010). 
During reversal learning, the likelihood of shifting away from punished respons-
es only differed between psychopathic offenders and controls. Interestingly, in 
both phases, there was no effect of reward condition on this immediate meas-
ure of negative feedback processing, which suggests that a more general deficit 
underlies these impairments. This finding is in line with the RM hypothesis, 
which predicts limited attentional resources for negative feedback information 
processing in tasks involving both rewarded and punished responses. When 
evaluated from the neurocognitive perspective of the IES model, it suggests that 
the formation and updating of expectancy representations in the amygdala and 
vmPFC is especially compromised when negative feedback is being processed. 
4.4.5 Limitations
One potential caveat of our study is that we were not able to test for effects of 
PCL-R factor scores, since for a number of participants factor scores were not 
available. We were dependent on file information and did not have permission 
nor resources to assess the PCL-R by ourselves in the present study. A second 
limitation of our study design is that we exclusively focused on subjective reward, 
without looking at subjective punishment. Investigating how varying levels of 
subjective punishment affect associative learning would be particularly relevant 
for understanding how behavioural change can be achieved in settings where 
it is difficult to implement the use of a wide array of subjective rewards (e.g., 
prison). Importantly, ethical aspects of research into subjective punishment in 
populations from the criminal justice system should be well-considered, both 
with respect to study design and the practical implications of its findings.
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4.5 CONCLUSIONS
Our findings suggest that naturalistic rewards facilitate initial learning of new 
information in psychopathic offenders, as well as their ability to use positive 
feedback information to guide future decisions. Importantly, the attractiveness 
of each reward was tailored to the subjective preferences of each individual 
participant, but the observed effects were independent of the magnitude of the 
associated subjective reward values. Contrary to expectations, we did not find 
any group differences nor any effects of reward condition on reversal learning 
performance. However, in both phases, and irrespective of reward condition, 
psychopathic offenders were impaired in adapting their behaviour following 
negative feedback. Our findings suggest that psychopathic offenders, despite 
a more general deficit in negative feedback processing, have the ability to adapt 
their behaviour according to environmental contingencies when positive rein-
forcers with sufficiently high subjective values are used. These findings are the 
result of a novel approach to associative learning in psychopathy, and stress the 
importance of personalised methodologies when using reinforcement tech-
niques in forensic treatment.
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4.6 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
S.4A Overview of experimental rewards
TABLE 4A.1 Rewards available to participants
PARTICIPANT GROUP
Reward category Offenders Healthy controls
Material 
rewards
• A set of cosmetics and toiletries • A set of cosmetics and toiletries
• An 8-pack of batteries • An 8-pack of batteries 
• A voucher for the in-house  
second-hand clothes shop
• A voucher for a large number  
of (online) clothing stores
• A voucher for the rent of five DVD’s • A voucher for the cinema
Food-related 
rewards 
• A package of crisps and peanuts • A package of crisps and peanuts
• A package of chocolate • A package of chocolate
• A package of cookies • A package of cookies
• Preparing a dinner together with 
other patients on the ward
Personal 
development
• A workshop on preparing healthy 
bites and shakes
• A workshop on bee-keeping
• A workshop on painting on canvas • A workshop on painting on canvas
• Two piano or singing lessons • A singing lesson
• A (bass) guitar lesson • A lesson on a musical instrument 
of choice
• Three lessons to try out different 
musical instruments
• Preparing a song for a jam session 
under supervision of a music teacher
• One session to play with the 
inpatient rock band
• A fitness lesson
• A judo lesson
• A welding lesson
• A bike repair lesson
• An introductory computer lesson
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S.4B Overview of tested effects in primary analyses
TABLE 4B.1 ERP analyses
DIFFERENCE WAVE AMPLITUDE  AT FCZ
Tested  effect F p ηp
2
Group .601 .553 .027
Condition 3.402 .044 .073
Group  × Condition .126 .962 .006







Tested  effect F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2 F p ηp
2
IQ 6.057 .017 .108 .331 .568 .007 .229 .635 .005
Group .963 .389 .037 .919 .405 .035 4.339 .018 .148
Condition .586 .560 .023 .657 .523 .026 .186 .830 .008
Probability .472 .495 .009 - - - - - -
Phase 2.760 .103 .052 3.238 .015 .117 2.757 .103 .052
Condition × IQ .712 .496 .028 .657 .523 .026 .101 .905 .004
Condition × Group 1.154 .336 .045 3.238 .015 .117 .436 .782 .017
Condition × 
Probability
.283 .755 .011 - - - - - -
Condition × Phase .783 .462 .031 .508 .605 .020 .111 .895 .005
Probability × IQ .191 .664 .004 - - - - - -
Probability × Group .394 .707 .014 - - - - - -
Probability × Phase 2.637 .111 .050 - - - - - -
Phase × IQ .121 .729 .002 .089 .767 .002 .292 .591 .006
Phase × Group .813 .450 .031 .089 .767 .002 .353 .043 .118
Condition × 
Probability × IQ








Tested  effect F p ηp
2 F p ηp




.173 .952 .007 - - - - - -
Condition × Phase 
× IQ
.692 .505 .027 .508 .605 .020 .199 .820 .008
Condition × Phase × 
Group
2.689 .036 .099 1.516 .204 .058 .778 .542 .031
Condition × 
Probability × Phase
1.193 .312 .046 - - - - - -
Probability × Phase 
× IQ
.601 .442 .012 - - - - - -
Probability × Phase × 
Group
1.508 .231 .057 - - - - - -
Condition × 
Probability × Phase 
× IQ
.958 .391 .038 - - - - - -
Condition × 
Probability × Phase × 
Group
1.421 .233 .055 - - - - - -
TABLE 4B.3 Hit & false alarm rates for all groups in each phase & condition
ACQUISITION REVERSAL
HiR FaR HiR FaR
Condition Group M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE)
Neutral reward Healthy controls .91 (.03) .33 (.04) .69 (.04) .50 (.05)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
.91 (.03) .33 (.05) .79 (.04) .48 (.06)
Psychopathic offenders .93 (.03) .52 (.04) .86 (.04) .56 (.05)
Low Reward Healthy controls .90 (.02) .35 (.05) .77 (.04) .46 (.05)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
.88 (.02) .39 (.05) .77 (.04) .47 (.05)
Psychopathic offenders .96 (.02) .47 (.05) .83 (.04) .60 (.05)
High Reward Healthy controls .91 (.03) .36 (.05) .77 (.04) .47 (.06)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
.89 (.03) .34 (.05) .72 (.04) .46 (.06)
Psychopathic offenders .96 (.03) .54 (.05) .84 (.04) .63 (.06)
Note. HiR = Hit rate, FaR = False alarm rate, M = Mean, SE = Standard error.
TABLE 4B.2 Continued
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TABLE 4B.4  Mean d’ values for all groups in each phase and condition
ACQUISITION REVERSAL
Condition Group M (SE) M (SE)
Neutral reward Healthy controls 1.98 (.17) 0.59 (.20)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
2.21 (.18) 1.03 (.20)
Psychopathic offenders 1.46 (.18) 0.99 (.20)
Low Reward Healthy controls 1.87 (.17) 0.99 (.19)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
1.79 (.17) 0.97 (.19)
Psychopathic offenders 1.86 (.17) 0.70 (.19)
High Reward Healthy controls 1.92 (.19) 0.93 (.16)
Non-psychopathic 
offenders
1.95 (.19) 0.86 (.16)
Psychopathic offenders 1.63 (.19) 0.76 (.16)
Note. M = Mean, SE = Standard error.
S.4C Overview of post hoc tested effects 
TABLE 4C.1 Response accuracy
CONDITION TESTED EFFECT F p ηp
2
Neutral reward IQ 2.623 .112 .050
Group 1.825 .172 .068
 Phase 2.621 .112 .050
Phase × IQ .113 .739 .002
Phase × Group 4.732 .013 .159
Low reward IQ 6.115 .017 .109
Group .260 .772 .010
Phase .153 .698 .003
Phase × IQ .734 .396 .014
Phase × Group .681 .511 .027
High reward IQ 2.983 .090 .056
Group .727 .488 .028
Phase 3.199 .080 .060
Phase × IQ .348 .558 .007
Phase × Group .234 .792 .009
100 |
TABLE 4C.2  Win-stay percentage
CONDITION TESTED EFFECT F p ηp
2
Neutral reward Group 4.633 .014 .154
Low reward Group .232 .794 .009
High reward Group .764 .471 .029
TABLE 4C.3 Lose-shift percentage
PHASE TESTED EFFECT F p ηp
2
Acquisition Group 5.533 .007 .178
Condition 5.644 .006 .184
Condition  × Group 1.175 .327 .045
Reversal Group 3.216 .048 .112
Condition .135 .874 .005
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Short-term gains overrule outcome  
probabilities during risky decision making 
in psychopathic offenders
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ABSTRACT
In daily life, psychopathy is associated with suboptimal and maladaptive decision making, 
which often leads to substance abuse, criminal behaviour and imprisonment. However, 
experimental findings regarding risky decision making in psychopathy have been 
inconclusive. The present study investigated whether rewards with varying subjective values 
affected risky decision making in psychopathic offenders. To this end, 20 psychopathic 
offenders, 17 non-psychopathic offenders and 18 healthy controls performed a decision-
making task involving explicit gain and loss probabilities under three reward conditions. 
The rewards used were tailored to the subjective preferences of each participant. The 
results showed no effects of subjective reward value on risky decision making in any group. 
However, irrespective of reward condition, both offender groups made more risky decisions 
than healthy controls when large gains were available, despite the low probabilities of these 
large gains. Psychopathic offenders also gambled more often than healthy controls when 
low-probable small gains were available. Furthermore, psychopathic offenders made more 
risky decisions than both other groups when the expected values of options were relatively 
similar and a large possible gain with low probability was involved. The current findings 
suggest that psychopathic individuals tend to base their decisions on the prospect of short-
term attractive outcomes, regardless of the associated risks, whereas longer-term rewards 
seem to have little effect on risky decision making. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
Each day, we encounter numerous situations that require fast decision making. 
Decisions may lead to social, monetary or health outcomes, to name a few, and 
some have more impactful consequences than others. There are individuals 
who have the tendency to consistently make poor choices that have a negative 
impact on own and others’ well-being (e.g., Blair, 2007; Pletti et al., 2017). This is 
particularly the case for individuals with high levels of psychopathy, whose sub-
optimal decision-making strategies often lead to criminal behaviour and impris-
onment (e.g., Beszterczey et al., 2013). Psychopathy is a personality construct 
defined by severe emotional and interpersonal impairments in combination 
with antisocial behaviour and an impulsive and reckless lifestyle (Hare, 2003a). 
Psychopathic individuals often show, for example, a reduced capacity to form 
sincere social bonds, emotional bluntness, a strong need for stimulation and en-
gaging in risky behaviour, and their offences often reflect a propensity towards 
immediate gains despite potential losses. 
On the phenotypical level, psychopathic individuals share a number of affec-
tive and behavioural characteristics with patients with damage to the ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), such as impulsivity, reduced empathy, antisocial 
behaviour, and impaired learning from aversive outcomes (Damasio et al., 1990; 
Koenigs & Tranel, 2006). The learning impairment seen in vmPFC patients has 
often been studied with the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994), 
which involves probabilistic learning using reward and punishment informa-
tion. In this task, participants are offered four decks of cards, of which two are 
‘risky decks’ (high reward and punishment magnitudes) and two are ‘non-risky 
decks’ (low reward and punishment magnitudes). In the long run, consistently 
choosing cards from the non-risky decks will result in better outcomes. Patients 
with lesions to the vmPFC show impaired decision making throughout the task, 
and, whereas healthy individuals show increased electrodermal responses prior 
to making risky decisions on the IGT, these responses have been found to be 
attenuated or even absent in vmPFC patients. Such reductions in physiological 
responses to aversive events have also been observed in relation to increased 
levels of psychopathy (for a review, see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016) but pub-
lished studies using the IGT in psychopathic populations did not include indices 
of autonomic physiological responses. Behavioural results of studies using the 
IGT in psychopathic offenders are mixed, with studies showing no relation 
with psychopathy (Kuin & Masthoff, 2016; Lösel & Schmucker, 2004; Schmitt 
et al., 1999), impaired performance (Beszterczey et al., 2013; Boulanger et al., 
2008; Broom, 2011; Mitchell et al., 2002), and even enhanced performance 
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in psychopathic individuals (Hughes et al., 2015). With some exceptions (e.g., 
Miranda Jr et al., 2009; Takahashi et al., 2014), studies in community samples 
generally point to a negative relation between psychopathic traits and IGT per-
formance (e.g., Mahmut et al., 2008; Morgan et al., 2011; Vassileva et al., 2007), 
although there is evidence that this relation may be linked to the antisocial and 
lifestyle component of psychopathy rather than to affective and interpersonal 
impairments (Dean et al., 2013).
However, although impaired performance on the IGT is often associated 
with real-life suboptimal decision making (Buelow & Suhr, 2009), it should be 
noted that similar patterns of poor performance across individuals could result 
from different sources of impairment in neuropsychological functioning (e.g., 
learning ability, cognitive flexibility, working memory, or reward and punish-
ment sensitivity). Other tasks that have been used to assess risk taking in psy-
chopathy are the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART; Lejuez et al., 2002) and 
the Cambridge Gambling Task (CGT; Rogers et al., 1999). Unlike the IGT, both 
the BART and the CGT do not involve a learning component. In the BART, par-
ticipants accumulate points in a temporal bank by inflating a virtual balloon with 
button presses. Accumulated points can be transferred to a permanent bank 
at any time during the task, after which a new balloon is presented. However, 
pumping too many times will make the balloon pop and will, thereby, result in a 
loss of the accumulated points in the temporal bank. BART performance gener-
ally correlates with real-world risk behaviour (Lejuez, Aklin, Jones, et al., 2003; 
Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, et al., 2003; Lejuez et al., 2002), but findings regarding 
its relation with psychopathy are mixed. Hunt et al. (2005) found a positive 
relation between self-reported psychopathy and risk taking on the BART in a 
community sample, in contrast to Crysel et al. (2013). Offender studies also 
either did not find a direct association (Swogger et al., 2010), or the association 
was attributed to psychopathy-related boldness (referring to stress tolerance, 
emotional resiliency, and social dominance) rather than to affective impairments 
and antisocial tendencies (Snowden et al., 2017).
In the CGT, a token is hidden in a row of ten coloured boxes, and participants 
guess the location of this token by betting a proportion of their earned points on 
one of the two colours. The ratio between the two colours varies between trials. 
De Brito et al. (2013) did not find a relation between psychopathy and risk taking 
on the CGT, but both non-psychopathic offenders and psychopathic offenders 
performed worse than healthy controls with respect to decision-making qual-
ity (i.e., their choices were less beneficial). This suggested that both offender 
groups were aware of the associated risks, but failed to adjust their behaviour 
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accordingly. In sum, risk-taking studies suggest that psychopathic individuals 
may be more prone to risky decision making than healthy individuals, but find-
ings are mixed and seem to at least partly rely on the psychopathy construct that 
is used to define experimental groups. 
Another cause of the mixed findings across studies could be that the impact 
of the motivational significance of the rewards involved in the different tasks 
has been systematically overlooked. In both humans and animals, the subjective 
valuation of rewards is a key element in decision-making processes (Medic et 
al., 2014; Padoa-Schioppa & Cai, 2011). Importantly, the same reward can be 
assigned a different value both within and across individuals, depending on var-
iations in individual preferences and contextual states (Levy & Glimcher, 2012). 
This implies that similar rewards may elicit different motivational states, and, 
hence, differences in perceived risks during decision making. Likewise, individ-
uals can assign the same subjective value to rewards of different types or with 
different properties. Since factors like motivation and perceived risk should be 
kept as equal as possible when assessing propensity to risk taking in the lab set-
ting, this suggests that incorporating the subjective valuation of rewards in risk- 
taking studies would result in a more realistic approach to real-life risky decision 
making. 
Despite the impact that subjective valuation has on motivating risk taking, 
prior studies in psychopathy did not account for this factor and employed simi-
lar rewards for all participants, without assessing how these rewards were valued 
by individual participants. This implicates that the used rewards may not have 
had equal subjective values across participants, and the task may not have been 
maximally motivating for psychopathic offenders. Fairchild et al. (2009) used 
the Risky Choice Task (RCT; Rogers et al., 2003) to study risky decision making 
in boys and adolescents with disruptive behavioural disorders under different 
motivational conditions. In the RCT, participants choose between two gambles 
with explicit gain and loss magnitudes and probabilities. One gamble is the risky 
option, in which magnitudes and probabilities of outcomes are varied across 
trials. The other gamble is the safe option with stable outcome magnitudes and 
probabilities. The results showed that boys with conduct disorder made more 
risky choices than healthy controls, but that increased motivation and stress, as 
operationalised by a standardised laboratory stressor combined with a mone-
tary incentive, decreased risky decision making in all groups. 
Importantly, the term ‘disruptive behavioural disorders’ is an umbrella con-
struct for integrating developmental disorders that are considered to be the 
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precursors of antisocial and psychopathic personality disorders in adulthood 
(Fairchild et al., 2019), and it remains to be shown whether the effects of sub-
jective valuation of reinforcement is also visible in adult antisocial offenders. 
Therefore, the goal of the current study was to investigate decision making 
under risk in adult offenders with and without psychopathy. Motivation was 
manipulated using different types of reward based on the subjective values 
assigned to each reward by each participant. We hypothesized that both 
offender groups would show increased risky decision making compared to 
healthy controls, as reflected by higher gamble ratios (i.e., the proportion of 
trials in which the experimental gamble was chosen). However, since individu-
als generally become more risk averse when there are more valuable outcomes 
at stake (Bornovalova et al., 2009; Ruggeri et al., 2020; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), rewards with high subjective values were expected to promote more risk-
averse behaviour in all groups. These results would be in line with the findings 
of Fairchild et al. (2009) concerning risky decision making under increased 
motivational conditions. Considering the mixed findings from earlier studies 
with respect to risk taking in psychopathy, we were also interested in possible 
differences in risk taking between offender groups with and without psychop-
athy, respectively. In addition, prior performance is another factor that seems 
to affect decision making in the RCT (Fairchild et al., 2009). Our hypotheses 
concerning the effect of the outcome of the previous trial were largely based 
on the findings of Fairchild et al. (2009). As such, we expected that, under low 
motivational conditions, the experience of a loss would promote risky decision 
making on the next trial in all groups. However, we also expected that psycho-
pathic offenders would gamble more frequently after a small gain relative to the 
other groups. Under high motivational conditions, we expected the reduced 
tendency for risky decisions to also attenuate the effects of the previous trial in 
all groups. Finally, we were interested in the effect of framing on response bias. 
In healthy individuals, comparing possible gains is associated with risk aversion, 
whereas choosing between possible losses is associated with more risk seeking 
behaviour. We expected group differences to be more pronounced in negatively 
framed trials, with psychopathic individuals making more risky decisions than 
the other groups, and non-psychopathic offenders also taking more risks than 
healthy controls. In addition, we expected framing effects to be less prominent 




A total of 20 psychopathic and 17 non-psychopathic offenders1 were recruited 
from the inpatient population of a maximum security forensic psychiatric insti-
tute in The Netherlands. Selection was based on available information about clin-
ical status and history obtained from their head therapists and patient files. 18 
healthy control participants were recruited via advertisements on social media, 
via research participant pools, and among employees in the facility. Subsequently, 
all potential participants were screened by trained psychologists using the 
Dutch version of the MINI Psychiatric Interview (Van Vliet et al., 2000) and the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II; 
Weertman et al., 1996). They were excluded in case of any major current Axis I 
and Axis II disorders (with exception of cluster B personality disorders), chronic 
use of intoxicating substances, and the use of psychotropic medication at the 
time of testing. The experimental protocol was approved by the local ethics 
committee of the Social Sciences Faculty at Radboud University Nijmegen, the 
Netherlands (ECSW2016-2501-373). All participants received written informa-
tion about the experiment, gave written informed consent and received financial 
compensation. The sample was identical to the sample described in Chapter 4.
Each participant’s IQ was estimated using a combination of two subtests 
(Information and Coding) of the core Dutch Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale–
IV (WAIS-IV) subtests (Girard et al., 2015; Wechsler, 2012a, 2012b). The group 
with psychopathic offenders was composed of individuals with a score of 26 or 
higher on the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R; Hare, 2003a), which 
is the customary threshold in Europe (Cooke & Michie, 1999; Rasmussen et al., 
1999). The PCL-R is a 20-item instrument assessing the affective, interpersonal 
and behavioural characteristics associated with psychopathy, based on a file re-
view and a semi-structured interview. The offender groups and healthy controls 
were, as far as possible, matched for age and IQ. No PCL-R scores were assessed 
in the control group, as these participants did not have criminal records. 
For one participant in the psychopathic offender group, no exact PCLR-
score was available. However, multiple legal documents in this participant’s 
patient file stated that the PCL-R had been assessed, and that the resulting score 
1  Our sample sizes were above the required thresholds according to an a priori power 
analysis based on the effect sizes obtained in similar prior studies (power =.80, Cohen’s 
f=.25, α=.05, two-tailed).
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indicated that this offender had (very) high levels of psychopathic traits. Mean 
PCL-R total score was therefore calculated with data from 19 psychopathic 
offenders. PCL-R scores were significantly higher in psychopathic offenders 
(M=30.2; range=27-35) compared to non-psychopathic offenders (M=18.7; 
range=10-25), t(34)=-9.42, p<.001. The three groups did not differ in terms of 
age (psychopathic offenders: M=44.7, SD=8.8; non-psychopathic offenders: 
M=44.9, SD=13.9; healthy controls: M=43.3, SD=10.2), F(2,52)=0.11, p=.900, 
ηp
2=.004. For one participant in the psychopathic offender group, the IQ score 
that was obtained in the screening session could not be traced at the time of 
data analysis. Therefore, calculation of mean IQ score, as well as further analyses 
containing IQ, was performed with data from 19 psychopathic offenders. There 
was a significant group difference in IQ, F(2,51)=5.59, p=.006, ηp
2=.180, with 
significantly lower IQ’s in psychopathic offenders (M=83.4, SD=11.3) compared 
to non-psychopathic offenders (M=97.4, SD=14.3; t(51)=2.86, p=.017) and con-
trols (M=97.0, SD=17.3; t(51)=2.86, p=.019). No differences in IQ were observed 
between non-psychopathic offenders and controls (t(51)=-.08, p=1.000). 
5.2.2 Task and design
The experiment started with the collection of reward attractiveness ratings. 
This was the same procedure as described in Chapter 4. Each participant sorted 
items representing potential rewards, extracted from a larger pool of items that 
were identified in an earlier study (see Chapter 3; Glimmerveen et al., 2018), on 
a Visual Analogue Scale (VAS), ranging from -25 (extremely unattractive) to +25 
(extremely attractive). The items could be characterised as representing food 
rewards, material rewards, or rewards related to personal development (see 
Supplement 4A, for an overview). Offenders sorted a larger number of poten-
tial rewards (20) than controls (10). One important reason for this difference 
concerned feasibility of the rewards in the facility versus ‘the outside world’. For 
instance, a number of items offered to offenders were formulated more specif-
ic (e.g., “guitar lessons”, “piano lessons”, “singing lessons”) than those offered 
to controls (“lessons on a musical instrument”). Moreover, a number of items 
in the offender group were restricted to the clinical setting (e.g., “Preparing a 
dinner together with other patients on the ward”). For each participant, the two 
rewards with the lowest positive ratings and the two rewards with the high-
est positive ratings were selected. One of the two low-value rewards and one 
of the two high-value rewards were selected for the current study; the other 
low- and high-value rewards were used in another task (described in Chapter 4) 
that was performed in the same session. Both task order and allocation of the 
highest and lowest rated high- and low-value rewards to each task occurred in 
counterbalanced order.
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To study risky decision making, we used a modified version of the Risky 
Choice Task (RCT) developed by Fairchild et al. (2009). Participants were seated 
in front of a 100 Hz computer screen on which events were presented against 
a black background, and made their response by pressing the m or z key on a 
keyboard (see Figure 5.1). On each trial, participants chose one of two options, 
both associated with different outcomes and probabilities of these outcomes. 
The options were displayed as two ‘roulette wheels’ that were divided into eight 
segments displaying the associated numbers of points. After choosing a wheel, 
a white triangle moved around quickly in clockwise direction for 2000-4000 
ms, accompanied by a rattling sound, to successively highlight each possible 
outcome and ultimately stopping on one of the possible outcomes. Feedback 
was provided for 3500 ms, by keeping the white triangle on the final segment 
(displaying the gained or lost number of points), accompanied by a sound with 
increasing pitch (gain), decreasing pitch (loss), or stable pitch (zero points). The 
experiment was run with OpenSesame v3.0 (Mathôt et al., 2012).
FIGURE 5.1 Sequence of events and their timing (ms) during the experiment. ITI = Inter-trial 
interval. The figure shows a ΔEV-55 trial type in the neutral reward condition, with the experimen-
tal wheel on the left and the control wheel on the right side of the screen. The cartoon character 
is placed in the upper left corner of the screen, and a picture of the reward (i.e., a donut in the 
current condition) in the upper right corner of the screen. The yellow bar reflects the accumulated 
number of points and thus the progress towards obtaining the reward at the end of the current 
experimental run. In the figure can be seen that about 50% of the required number of points has 
been accumulated, as the yellow bar is almost halfway between the cartoon figure and the reward. 
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One of the two options (the ‘control wheel’) was always less risky than 
the other, and was on most trials (except on framing trials) associated with a 
.5 probability of gaining 10 points and a .5 probability of losing 10 points. The 
other (‘experimental’) wheel varied in terms of magnitude (80 or 20 points) and 
probability (.75 or .25) of gaining and losing. Combining these variables resulted 
in eight different trial types varying in the difference of expected values (EV) of 
the two options, referred to as delta expected value (ΔEV = EV experimental 
option – EV control option). The control wheel always had an EV of 0 (.5 x 10 
+ .5 x -10), but the EV of the experimental wheel depended on the combination 
of both the magnitude and probability of obtaining each possible number of 
points on the wheel. For instance, a .75 probability of gaining 20 points and .25 
probability of losing 80 points resulted in an EV of -5 (i.e., .75 x 20 + .25 x -80). 
Hence, in this trial type, ΔEV would be -5. See Table 5.2 for an overview of ΔEVs 
and the associated gain and loss magnitudes and probabilities.
Two additional trial types, in which ΔEV was 0, were included to assess the 
effect of framing on response bias. In the positively framed trial (+0 frame), the 
control wheel was associated with a certain gain of 40 points, and the experi-
mental wheel provided a .5 probability of gaining 80 points and a .5 probability 
of gaining 0 points. In the negatively framed trial (-0 frame), the control wheel 
was associated with a certain loss of 40 points, and the experimental wheel pro-
vided a .5 probability of losing 80 points and a .5 probability of losing 0 points 
(see also Table 5.1). There was a total of 60 trials, in which all 10 trial types were 
presented six times in randomised order. The experimental wheel and the con-
trol wheel appeared pseudo-randomly on the left and right side of the screen.
Each participant performed the task under three reward conditions (hypo-
thetical reward, low reward and high reward), in counter balanced order using 
a Latin Square. Participants could monitor their performance with a horizontal 
bar that was displayed continuously on the top of the screen (see Figure 5.1), 
increasing and decreasing according to the valence and magnitude of the out-
come of each trial. A gain of 80 points resulted in the largest possible increase 
and a loss of 80 points resulted in the largest possible decrease of the bar. A 
cartoon figure (i.e., Homer Simpson) was placed at the left start point of the 
bar. The upper right corner of the screen displayed a picture of the reward. 
The low and high rewards were represented by the same pictures that were 
used to sort the items on the VAS and thus depended on the individual partic-
ipants’ choices. The hypothetical reward was always represented by a donut. 
Participants were explained that they would not gain the donut themselves, 
but that it would be appreciated if they would help Homer to get this donut. 
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The reward was gained when the horizontal bar reached or crossed the reward 
picture at the end of the task. To account for learning effects, the numbers of 
points to be earned for obtaining the reward were determined separately for 
each experimental run (first, second, or last), based on the median numbers 
of points participants earned in an (unpublished) pilot study (470, 575, or 575 
points, respectively). The accumulated number of points at any point in the ex-
periment, as well as this criterion, were unknown to the participants, whose only 
reference was the length of the yellow bar and its distance to the reward.
5.2.3 Data analyses
Decision-making data were first analysed by entering gamble ratios (i.e., the 
proportion of trials in which the experimental wheel was chosen) into a 3 × 10 
× 3 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (neutral reward, low reward, 
high reward) and Trial type (ΔEV-55, ΔEV-40, ΔEV-10, ΔEV-5, ΔEV-0, ΔEV+0, 
ΔEV+5, ΔEV+10, ΔEV+40, ΔEV+55) as within-subject factors and Group 
(psychopathic offenders, non-psychopathic offenders, controls) as between- 
subjects factor. 
TABLE 5.1 Overview of trial types with corresponding gain/loss magni-
tudes and probabilities for both gambles
TRIAL TYPE EXPERIMENTAL GAMBLE CONTROL GAMBLE
ΔEV-55 0.25 20 -80 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV-40 0.25 80 -80 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV-10 0.25 20 -20 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV-5 0.75 20 -80 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV-0 0.50 0 -80 0.00 0 -40
ΔEV+0 0.50 80 0 1.00 40 0
ΔEV+5 0.25 80 -20 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV+10 0.75 20 -20 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV+40 0.75 80 -80 0.50 10 -10
ΔEV+55 0.75 20 -20 0.50 10 -10
Note. For each trial type, gain probability and gain and loss magnitudes are given for both gambles. 
ΔEV-0 and ΔEV+0 refer to negative and positive framing trials, with both gambles having the same 
EV (-40 and +40, respectively).
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To investigate the immediate effect of gamble outcome on subsequent deci-
sion making, gamble ratios were also calculated over trials immediately following 
either a large loss (-80), a small loss (-20), a small gain (+20) or a large gain (+80). 
Data from five participants (three controls, one non-psychopathic offender, 
and one psychopathic offender) were excluded, since they never experienced a 
small or large loss. For these analyses, gamble ratios were entered into a 3 × 2 × 
2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA with Condition (neutral reward, low reward, 
high reward), Outcome (loss, gain) and Magnitude (small, large) as within-sub-
ject factors and Group (psychopathic offenders, non-psychopathic offenders, 
controls) as between-subjects factor. 
Since IQ was found to differ significantly between groups, and IQ was expect-
ed to contribute to inter-individual decision-making variability, it was added as 
a covariate in the analyses. Effect sizes are reported as partial eta-squared (ηp
2; 
small ≥ .01, medium ≥ .06, large ≥ .14 (Cohen, 1988)). Statistical analyses were 
performed in SPSS 23.0 (IBM Corp., 2015). An overview of all tested effects in 
primary analyses and post-hoc tests is presented in Supplement 5A and 5B.
5.3  RESULTS
First, and most importantly, there were no significant main or interaction effects 
concerning condition on gamble ratio (all ps > .5; see Supplement B). However, 
there was an effect of group on gamble ratio, F(2,50)=6.44, p=.003, ηp
2=.205. 
Pairwise comparisons showed that controls were less likely to choose the exper-
imental wheel than psychopathic offenders (t(50)=-3.46, p=.001) and non-psy-
chopathic offenders (t(50)=-2.44, p=.018), but no statistically significant dif-
ference was observed between the two offender groups (t(50)=-1.11, p=.272); 
M(controls)=47.2%; M(psychopathic offenders)=57.1%; M(non-psychopathic 
offenders)=53.9%; all SEs=2.0%. 
Concerning trial type, Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated, χ2(44) = 328.63, p<.001, therefore degrees of free-
dom were corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .506). This 
revealed an effect of trial type on gamble ratio, F(4.55,227.61)=7.38, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.129. As expected, participants showed relatively low gamble rates when 
confronted with highly negative expected values (see Table 5.2; ΔEV-55, ΔEV-
40, and ΔEV-10), and high gamble rates when confronted with highly positive 
expected values (see Table 5.2; ΔEV+10, ΔEV+40, and ΔEV+55). However, 
relatively small differences in expected values between choices had a dramatic 
effect on the gradual increase of gamble ratio with expected value (see Table 
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5.2; ΔEV-5 and ΔEV+5). This resulted in significantly higher gamble ratios in 
the ΔEV-5 trial type compared to the ΔEV-10 trial type, F(1,50)=14.26, p<.001, 
ηp
2=.222, and significantly lower gamble rates in the ΔEV+5 trial type compared 
to the ΔEV+10 trial type, F(1,50)=10.50, p=.002, ηp
2=.174. Interestingly, post hoc 
analysis of ΔEV-5 and ΔEV+5 trial types showed that participants chose the 
experimental wheel more often in the ΔEV-5 trial type compared to the ΔEV+5 
trial type, F(1,50)=8.09, p=.006, ηp
2=.139. This suggests that participants relied 
primarily on the probability of gaining or losing in these trial types, regardless 
of the actual magnitude of the gains and losses. In addition, as expected, par-
ticipants showed higher gamble ratios in the negatively framed trials compared 
to the positively framed trials (see Table 5.2; ΔEV-0 and ΔEV+0), F(1,50)=3.96, 
p=.052, ηp
2=.073. 
In addition, there was a significant trial type × group interaction, F(9.10, 
227.61)=2.23, p=.021, ηp
2=.082. Assessing group effects for each trial type inde-
pendently revealed that psychopathic offenders selected the experimental wheel 
significantly more frequently than controls on the ΔEV-55, ΔEV-40, ΔEV-10, 
ΔEV+0, and ΔEV+5 trial types (see Figure 5.2; p=.041, p=.003, p=.004, p=.007, 
and p=.001, respectively). Non-psychopathic offenders chose the experimental 
wheel also more often than controls on the ΔEV-40 and ΔEV+0 trial types (see 
Figure 5.2; p=.049 and p=.003, respectively), but less often than psychopathic of-
fenders on the ΔEV+5 trial type (see Figure 5.2; p=.047). Finally, analyses revealed 
that IQ was negatively related to gamble ratio (F(1, 50)=4.13, p=.047, ηp
2=.076). 
However, IQ did not significantly interact with any of the other factors.
Analyses of the immediate effect of gamble outcome on subsequent deci-
sion making showed an effect of group on gamble ratio, F(1,45)=7.89, p=.001, 
ηp
2=.260. Pairwise comparisons showed that controls were less likely to choose 
the experimental wheel after a gamble trial than psychopathic offenders (t(45)=-
3.91, p<.001) and non-psychopathic offenders, (t(45)=-2.43, p=.019), but no dif-
ferences were observed between the two offender groups (t(45)=-1.47, p=.148); 
M(controls)=47.4%, SE=2.3%; M(psychopathic offenders)=60.2%, SE=2.3%; 
M(non-psychopathic offenders)=55.2%, SE=2.2%. However, this effect can be 
explained by the finding that controls overall chose the experimental wheel less 
frequently than offenders. No other main effects or interactions were observed, 
indicating that our participants’ choice behaviour was not influenced by their 
experience on the previous trial. 
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FIGURE 5.2 Mean proportion of instances the experimental wheel was chosen for each 
participant group. Trial types are defined as the difference in expected value between options 
(ΔEV). Gamble ratios are expressed as percentages. Error bars represent standard errors. An * 
indicates group differences in the respective trial types. The ΔEV-0 and ΔEV+0 trial types refer to 
the negative and positive framing trials, respectively.
TABLE 5.2 Gamble ratios across trial types for total sample











Note. SE= Standard Error. Gamble ratio and SE values are percentages (%).
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The present study was focused on systematically examining the effect of the 
subjective experience of reward on risky decision making in antisocial offenders 
with and without psychopathy, respectively. However, contrary to expectations, 
no effects of reward were observed. It seems unlikely that the rewards lacked 
motivational relevance to induce behavioural change, given that an identical 
operationalization of reward was used in another study with the same partici-
pants and this study did yield both electrophysiological and behavioural effects 
related to the level of subjective reward. Instead, the lack of effects of reward 
on decision making may be attributed to either task design or the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms involved in task performance. One possibility is that the 
task itself was already maximally motivating; ‘winning the game’ may have been 
a primary goal for our participants, regardless of the associated reward. Another 
explanation could be that there were too many ambiguous variables in the task 
for participants to also take the actual rewards (in addition to the points to be 
gained or lost) into account in their decisions. In particular, considering the var-
ying expected values may have placed a large demand on cognitive resources. 
5.4.1 Overall effects of expected value
In correspondence with the previous explanation, we found that expected val-
ues were not linearly associated with risk aversion. In line with expectations, 
participants showed rational and effective decision-making patterns when dif-
ferences in expected values between choices were evident. In these trials, the 
outcomes associated with the experimental gamble were either highly favour-
able or highly unfavourable. However, in trials with relatively similar expected 
values, where it was less apparent which option was the most beneficial, par-
ticipants used more straightforward rules of thumb to guide decision making. 
Looking at the pattern of gamble ratios across expected values, they seem to 
have particularly considered the probability of gaining or losing points when ex-
pected values were close to zero, regardless of the magnitude of these gains and 
losses. This probability heuristic is often used when individuals are faced with 
complex gamble situations in which outcomes involve both gains and losses, 
since it maximises the overall probability of winning with reduced mental effort 
(Payne, 2005; Venkatraman et al., 2014). In addition, participants were highly 
susceptible to framing, showing higher gamble ratios in the negative decision 
frame compared to the positive decision frame. Both the tendency to use heuris-
tics under ambiguous circumstances and the observed sensitivity to framing are 
robust findings in human decision-making research (see Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
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5.4.2 Group comparisons
In line with expectations, we found that offenders were more likely to make risky 
decisions than healthy controls. Interestingly, the higher gamble ratios of psy-
chopathic offenders compared to healthy controls could be mainly attributed to 
trials with high loss probabilities. In general, controls tended to ‘play on safe’ and 
chose the control wheel in these trials, but psychopathic offenders were more 
inclined to select the risky gamble in an attempt to obtain some points. In par-
ticular, they decided to gamble more often than controls in these trials when a 
large gain was available, regardless of its low probability. This result can be relat-
ed to the general finding of increased reward seeking behaviour in psychopathic 
individuals and their deficient responding to (potential) punishment in the face 
of reward (e.g., Blair et al., 2004; Newman et al., 1990). Moreover, in healthy 
individuals, decision making in a gamble context is more highly correlated with 
gain and loss probabilities than with payoff sizes (Lichtenstein & Slovic, 1971; 
Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1968; Tversky et al., 1988). Our findings suggest that 
this does not hold for individuals with psychopathy. In addition, both offend-
er groups gambled more than controls when large gains were available in trials 
where large losses were highly probable. The relation between antisociality and 
enhanced risk taking in a context with high loss probabilities has been shown 
before (Maes et al., 2018). However, this finding is also attributable to the fact 
that the majority of controls never gambled in this particular trial type. 
We were also interested in possible differences between offenders with and 
without psychopathy. In trials involving a large gain and a highly probable small 
loss, with a positive though close-to-zero expected value (EV=+5), psychopathic 
offenders gambled more often than non-psychopathic offenders. In trials involv-
ing a highly probable small gain and a low-probable large loss, with a negative 
but close-to-zero expected value (EV=-5), all groups displayed similar risky deci-
sion making. In situations that do not allow fast comparing of different options 
(because their outcomes are highly similar), psychopathic individuals thus seem 
to rely on the availability of large gains, whereas non-psychopathic offenders 
and healthy individuals show more risk-averse behaviour. These situations may 
be described as having an increased level of uncertainty, since the difference 
between the two options is not immediately evident. Impaired processing and 
reduction of uncertainty has already been associated with psychopathy during 
threat conditioning (Brazil et al., 2017). 
In the same line of reasoning, the positively framed trials could be described 
as offering large gains with maximum uncertainty, since both options have equal 
EV’s. Although all groups displayed the generally found risk aversion in these 
118 |
trials, both offender groups showed higher rates of risky decisions compared to 
healthy controls. Previous research has shown that interpersonal and affective 
features of psychopathy are positively related to risk taking in gain contexts 
(Maes et al., 2018). However, in the current study this effect was also present 
in non-psychopathic offenders, who display primarily antisocial features. An 
explanation of this finding could be that the higher rates of risky decisions of 
both offender groups in positive framing trials are related to the uncertainty 
associated with these trials, as insensitivity to ambiguous uncertainty has been 
related to antisocial features in general (Buckholtz et al., 2017). In this context 
it is important to note that decision making under ambiguity relies on different 
neural processes than decision making under risk (Krain et al., 2006), and the 
literature generally uses the term ambiguity in decision making to refer to situ-
ations with unknown a priori probabilities, which does not apply to the current 
study. As such, our data suggest that processing of non-ambiguous uncertainty 
during decision making may also be largely similar between non-psychopathic 
and psychopathic individuals.
5.4.3 Effects of the previous trial
Finally, for all three participant groups, decision making was not guided by the 
outcome of the previous trial. Offenders chose the experimental gamble more 
often than controls after a gamble trial, but this was independent of the out-
come of the previous gamble and most likely reflected the overall higher gamble 
frequency of the offender groups compared to controls. This is contrary to the 
findings of Fairchild et al. (2009), who found boys with early-onset conduct 
behaviour disorder to more frequently select the experimental gamble in trials 
following a small gain compared to control participants. As they needed higher 
levels of immediate reinforcement to supress risky decision making, it was hy-
pothesised that these boys had altered levels of reward sensitivity compared to 
control participants. Although our adult participants did not display any effects 
of gamble outcome on subsequent decisions, our offenders, particularly those 
with psychopathy, did show increased reward seeking behaviour, whereas their 
tendency to be guided by payoff sizes more than by probabilities suggests a re-
duced punishment sensitivity. Future research may shed more light on the devel-
opment of reward and punishment sensitivity from adolescence to adulthood 
in populations with antisocial tendencies, and how these mechanisms affect 
(risky) decision making. 
5.4.4 Limitations
Our task design has a few limitations. As previously noted, the task may have 
included too many parameters to assess the effect of reward without the impact 
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of other variables. Future studies using a less complex task may further elucidate 
the effect of personalised rewards on risky decision making in psychopathic 
offenders. Second, in everyday decision making, the exact probabilities of the 
outcomes of our choices are generally unknown. The current study may there-
fore not be an optimal ecologically valid reflection of problematic risk behaviour 
associated with psychopathy. Using individualised rewards in studies focused 
on decision making in psychopathy that do not include explicit outcome proba-
bilities, such as the IGT, could therefore further elucidate the processes under-
lying decision making under ambiguity in psychopathic individuals.
5.4.5 Conclusion
The current study did not reveal an effect of subjective reward value on risky de-
cision making in psychopathic offenders. However, the results did show that of-
fenders are more guided by payoff sizes than probabilities, in contrast to healthy 
controls. This holds especially for situations in which large gains are available. 
Moreover, psychopathic offenders are less inhibited to make risky decisions 
when high loss probabilities are involved, as long as there is something to gain. 
They also make more risky decisions than non-psychopathic offenders when 
two options are relatively similar and a large possible gain with low probability 
is involved. In daily life, the probabilities of the outcomes of our choices are not 
evident, but healthy individuals generally do take the available information into 
account in their decisions. The current findings suggest that psychopathic indi-
viduals are more inclined to be guided by the prospect of attractive outcomes, 
regardless of the associated risk of their decisions. A longer-term attractive re-
ward, linked to overall behavioural performance, seems to have little effect on 
risky decision making, even when gain and loss probabilities are made explicit.
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5.5 SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL
S.5A Overview of tested effects in primary analyses
TABLE 5A.1 Gamble ratios
GAMBLE RATIO
Tested  effect F p ηp
2
IQ 4.133 .047 .076
Group 6.442 .003 .205
Condition .620 .540 .012
Trial type 7.3751 .0001 .1291
Condition × IQ .489 .615 .010
Condition × Group .589 .671 .023
Condition × Trial type .5841 .8881 .0121
Trial type × IQ 1.6851 .1461 .0331
Trial type × Group 2.2301 .0211 .0821
Condition × Trial type × IQ .5711 .8981 .0111
Condition × Trial type × Group .8911 .6361 .0341
1 Degrees of freedom corrected using Huynh-Feldt estimates of sphericity (ε = .506)
TABLE 5A.2  Effects of gamble outcome on subsequent decision making
GAMBLE RATIO
Tested  effect F p ηp
2
IQ 2.207 .144 .042
Group 7.520 .001 .231
Outcome .219 .642 .004
Condition × Outcome 1.938 .149 .037
Outcome × IQ .305 .583 .006
Outcome × Group .129 .879 .005
Outcome × Magnitude .806 .373 .016
Condition × Outcome × IQ 1.649 .197 .032
Condition × Outcome × Group 1.237 .300 .047
Condition × Outcome × Magnitude 1.128 .328 .022
Outcome × Magnitude × IQ 1.120 .295 .022
Outcome × Magnitude × Group 1.838 .170 .068
Condition × Outcome × Magnitude × IQ 1.306 .275 .025
Condition × Outcome × Magnitude × Group .817 .517 .032
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S.5B Overview of post hoc tested effects 
TABLE 5B.1  Comparison of gamble ratios between selected trial types
TRIAL TYPES F p ηp
2
ΔEV-5 vs ΔEV-10 14.263 .000 .222
ΔEV+5 vs ΔEV+10 10.500 .002 .174
ΔEV-5 vs ΔEV+5 8.085 .006 .139
ΔEV-0 vs ΔEV+0 3.955 .052 .073
TABLE 5B.2  Group contrast results for each trial type independently
TRIAL TYPE TESTED CONTRAST p
ΔEV-55 C vs PP .041
Non-PP vs PP .503
C vs Non-PP .146
ΔEV-40 C vs PP .003
Non-PP vs PP .241
C vs Non-PP .049
ΔEV-10 C vs PP .004
Non-PP vs PP .161
C vs Non-PP .108
ΔEV-5 C vs PP .719
Non-PP vs PP .906
C vs Non-PP .801
ΔEV-0 C vs PP .533
Non-PP vs PP .952
C vs Non-PP .474
ΔEV+0 C vs PP .007
Non-PP vs PP .885
C vs Non-PP .003
ΔEV+5 C vs PP .001
Non-PP vs PP .047
C vs Non-PP .123
ΔEV+10 C vs PP .755
Non-PP vs PP .933
C vs Non-PP .812
ΔEV+40 C vs PP .419
Non-PP vs PP .927
C vs Non-PP .346
ΔEV+55 C vs PP .668
Non-PP vs PP .985
C vs Non-PP .639






Psychopathy and its associated violence have been widely acknowledged as a societal 
burden, reaching far beyond the consequences of individual victims (Kiehl & Hoffman, 2011). 
A lack of empathy, a lack of remorse, irresponsibility and diminished behavioural control, 
among others, are factors that contribute to the disruptive outcomes of the behaviour 
of psychopaths (Hare, 2003a). Moreover, psychopathy is associated with impairments 
in cognitive mechanisms that are also involved in (social) learning, such as learning from 
feedback, and predicting aversive outcomes (e.g., Baskin-Sommers et al., 2015; Brazil et 
al., 2013; Budhani et al., 2006; Newman et al., 1990). Considering the complicated nature 
and societal impact of the disorder, evidence obtained from both fundamental and applied 
research is needed to effectively design interventions targeted at psychopathic offenders. 
Criminal justice systems are traditionally focused on punishment, primarily functioning as 
retribution for victims, incapacitation to protect society, as well as discouragement for future 
crimes (Carlsmith, 2006). However, avoiding continued involvement in criminal behaviour 
when offenders return into society after a period of punishment requires sufficient attention 
to rehabilitation and behavioural change, which has become increasingly recognised over 
the last decades (Day et al., 2006; Lipsey & Cullen, 2007). In both forensic and non-forensic 
populations, interventions aimed at establishing behavioural change often incorporate the 
use of reinforcers (e.g., Timmerman & Emmelkamp, 2005; Wodahl et al., 2011; Wong et 
al., 2007). Considering the importance of individual differences in treatment responsivity 
(Brazil et al., 2018b; Insel & Cuthbert, 2015), in addition to the low treatment responsivity 
in individuals with psychopathy (Howells & Day, 2007; Ogloff et al., 1990), it is important 
to find and use reinforcers that are relevant for individual patients. This individualised 
approach is central to the studies described in this thesis, focusing on individual reward 
preferences and taking these into account when studying learning and decision making in 
psychopathic offenders.
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6.1  SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS
In Chapter 2, an overview was provided of research directed at aversive con-
ditioning, instrumental learning and risky decision making in offenders with 
psychopathy. This showed that psychopathy is associated with reduced re-
sponsivity to aversive cues, which has been related to diminished learning from 
punishment. Furthermore, psychopathy has been associated with impaired pas-
sive avoidance learning, at least when tasks require processing of both reward 
and punishment cues, and with deficient updating of learned contingencies, 
such as in reversal learning tasks.The literature is less consistent about risky 
decision making in relation to psychopathy. Although many studies do show 
increased risky decision making in psychopathic offenders compared to healthy 
controls, when compared to individuals with ASPD, the findings are far from 
conclusive. This suggests that increased risk taking may be primarily related 
to the behavioural aspects of psychopathy, and that the core personality char-
acteristics, particularly those related to affective processing, have less impact 
on risk-taking tendencies. Nonetheless, it is important to note that there is 
evidence that the processes underlying maladaptive behaviour in psychopathy 
compared to non-psychopathic antisocial personality structures are distinct 
(Brazil et al., 2012; Moreira et al., 2019; Pasion et al., 2018), which may also apply 
to mechanisms underlying risk-taking behaviour. In addition, one factor that is 
overlooked in many of these studies is how the rewards and punishers (which 
were often mere points or small amounts of money) were subjectively valued by 
participants, but studies focused on which rewards are considered attractive in 
offenders are lacking.
In Chapter 3, this topic was approached with an exploratory study in forensic 
in- and outpatients, using a mixed-methods design also known as concept map-
ping. We found that both in- and outpatients rated rewards requiring greater 
effort as more attractive than low-effort rewards. High-effort rewards were, for 
instance, rewards related to autonomy, quality of social functioning, or personal 
development. Examples of low-effort rewards were those related to substance 
use, material goods, and relaxing or stimulating experiences. In inpatients, re-
wards were especially valued when they involved their direct environment. In 
outpatients, rewards with higher values were often associated with lower levels 
of arousal. Although these findings are in line with reward preferences of healthy 
individuals, they also may seem somewhat counterintuitive in relation to the 
low-effort, hedonistic goals often associated with offending (Felson et al., 2018) 
and what has been found in relation to psychopathy in community samples 
(Glenn et al., 2017). Socially desirable responding and the mixed composition of 
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our samples regarding offence types and psychopathology are factors that may 
have contributed to this discrepancy.
In Chapters 4 and 5, the findings of this study were used in two experimental 
tasks targeted at instrumental learning and risky decision making. Of specific 
interest was whether the subjective values of naturalistic rewards, that were 
tailored to the subjective preferences of each individual participant, would af-
fect performance in these tasks more than ‘typical’ experimental rewards and 
punishers (i.e., earning points). 
The results of the study described in Chapter 4 showed that psychopathic 
offenders were impaired in passive avoidance learning compared to non-psy-
chopathic offenders and healthy controls when mere points could be earned, 
which is in correspondence with the literature on passive avoidance learning 
in psychopathy (Blair et al., 2004; Newman & Kosson, 1986). In addition, they 
were less able to use positive feedback to guide future decisions. However, when 
‘real’, naturalistic rewards could be earned, no group differences were observed. 
Contrary to expectations, there were no group differences, nor effects of 
reward value with respect to reversal learning performance. However, a more 
general deficit in negative feedback processing was observed in psychopathic 
offenders, as they were impaired in adapting their behaviour following negative 
feedback. 
The study described in Chapter 5 revealed no effects of reward value on 
risky decision making. Instead, offenders, particularly those with psychopathy, 
made more risky decisions than healthy controls when large gains were available, 
and those with psychopathy also made more risky decisions than healthy con-
trols when small gains were available. This tendency of offenders to base their 
decisions on the availability of gains was irrespective of outcome probabilities. 
These findings suggest both increased reward-seeking behaviour and reduced 
punishment sensitivity in our offender samples. Moreover, low-probable large 
gains also promoted risky decisions in psychopathic offenders compared to 
non-psychopathic offenders when expected values of outcomes were relatively 
similar. Considering our central research questions, our findings suggest that 
psychopathic individuals are guided by the prospect of short-term attractive 
outcomes, regardless of the associated risks, whereas longer-term rewards have 
little effect on risky decision making.
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6.2  DISCUSSION OF MAIN FINDINGS
A central finding in the experimental studies described in this thesis is the re-
duced processing of predictive information, particularly related to aversive 
outcomes. As explained in the general introduction of this thesis, these charac-
teristics can (partly) explain the development of antisocial behaviour (see Blair, 
2013), but it also offers insights considering appropriate legal responding to of-
fences. Importantly, the results support existing evidence that punishment has 
limited ability to prevent maladaptive behaviour in individuals with psychopathy 
(Ling & Raine, 2018; see also Jurjako & Malatesti, 2016), including future offend-
ing (Hare, 2003a; Hemphill, Hare, et al., 1998; Leistico et al., 2008). On the other 
hand, our findings suggest that psychopathic offenders have the ability to adapt 
their behaviour to environmental contingencies when positive reinforcers with 
sufficiently high subjective values are used. This highlights the potential of in-
dividualised treatment programs using personalised reinforcements to achieve 
behavioural change in forensic psychiatric settings. 
As already outlined in Chapter 3, our findings suggest that such programs 
should include long-term goals that are, for instance, related to personal devel-
opment and improved social functioning. However, especially for incarcerated 
offenders, the attractiveness of rewards and goals increases when they are 
related to their current environment. This environment, in turn, also depends 
on treatment stage, as patients will gain more liberties when showing progres-
sion, which also implies that treatment goals will become more generalisable to 
everyday life in later stages of treatment (Willis et al., 2012). As such, the char-
acteristics of the reinforcers used could be adapted to treatment stage, with a 
focus on more short-term rewards that require less effort earlier in therapy, but 
longer-term goals to establish persistent change in later treatment stages, which 
would also be in line with the GLM (Ward, 2002; Ward & Gannon, 2006). 
It is important to note that the findings presented in Chapter 3 covered the 
preferences of the total group of offenders, without distinguishing patient or 
offence characteristics. As such, we do not know to what extent these findings 
hold specifically for psychopathic individuals. In community samples, high 
levels of psychopathic traits have been related to hedonistic goals and values, 
such as pleasure seeking and material possessions, but also to social dominance 
(Glenn et al., 2017). Importantly, the findings presented in Chapter 5 suggest 
that offenders with psychopathy tend to base their decisions on the prospect 
of short-term attractive outcomes, regardless of the associated risks, whereas 
longer-term rewards seem to have little effect on risky decision making. These 
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results are important from a clinical point of view as well, as they highlight the 
need to also consider short-term goals or intermediate reinforcers in forensic 
treatment of offenders with psychopathy, while being aware of other short-term 
incentives that may interfere with the therapeutic goals.
Considering the experimental findings (Chapters 4 and 5) in the light of the 
prominent theoretical frameworks regarding reward and punishment processing 
in relation to psychopathy, the predictions of these theories could be regarded 
as somewhat opposing. The RM hypothesis (Gorenstein & Newman, 1980; 
Hamilton & Newman, 2018; Newman & Baskin-Sommers, 2016) predicts that 
rewards cause a loss of attention for other contextual information, such as pun-
ishment, leading to impaired learning from negative feedback. With respect to 
instrumental learning, the RM hypothesis can therefore only explain our passive 
avoidance results in the neutral reward condition, suggesting that its predic-
tion holds exclusively for situations in which the outcomes at stake may not be 
regarded as being sufficiently attractive. On the other hand, the RM hypothesis 
could be used to explain the results of the risky decision-making task, where psy-
chopathic offenders often seemed to neglect contextual information concerning 
magnitude and probability of the outcomes in the face of possible gains. 
According to the IES model, disturbances in reinforcement expectancies and 
stimulus-outcome associations in psychopathic individuals can be modulated 
by saliency, such as reward level (Blair, 2007; Blair et al., 2004), which would 
explain our results in the passive avoidance study. Using stimuli that were linked 
to specific reward or punishment levels, Blair et al. (2004) indeed showed that 
participants were better able to adapt their responses to the contingencies of 
high-reward stimuli compared to low-reward stimuli. With respect to the risky 
decision-making findings, it could be argued that psychopathic offenders’ be-
haviour reflected a compromised representation of within-trial reinforcement 
expectancies, irrespective of the overarching reward condition. This would be in 
line with the predictions of the IES model concerning dysfunctional representa-
tions of outcomes in the vmPFC in individuals with psychopathy.
Recently, there has been reported neuroscientific evidence for impaired 
signalling of subjective value in relation to maladaptive decision making in 
psychopaths (Hosking et al., 2017). Specifically, psychopathic offenders were 
found to have weaker intrinsic functional connectivity between the nucleus 
accumbens (NAcc) and vmPFC, while there was stronger subjective value-re-
lated activity within the NAcc. Our ERP results reported in Chapter 4 suggest 
that representation of subjective value in a common neural currency is at least 
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partly intact in psychopathic individuals. However, these results were obtained 
within a learning context. Our findings of the risky decision-making study (i.e., a 
non-learning context) described in Chapter 5 could be explained by the findings 
of Hosking et al. (2017), suggesting that subjective value of reward has differen-
tial effects on learning versus decision making in psychopathy. 
Support for this differentiation could be found in the underlying structure of 
psychopathy, particularly pertaining to the distinction between an affective-in-
terpersonal component and an antisocial lifestyle component. It is likely that 
coding for subjective reward is most strongly related to affective functioning, 
which is reflected in Factor 1 of the PCL-R. Impairments in associative and in-
strumental learning also rely on mechanisms captured by Factor 1, specifically 
regarding deficient affective functioning, whereas risky decision making is 
a form of aberrant behavioural functioning and thus more strongly related to 
mechanisms associated with Factor 2. Unfortunately, we were not able to in-
corporate PCL-R factor scores in our analyses, since factor scores were missing 
from a number of patient files and leaving out these participants would have crit-
ically affected statistical power. Looking at the impact of factor scores in future 
studies may help to further understand which mechanisms could be responsive 
to variations in subjective reward value.
6.3  METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Importantly, attention should be given to possible caveats in our task design 
and interpretation of our results. First, some caution should be taken in the in-
terpretation of the effects of reward in the passive avoidance study. Although 
the passive avoidance impairment found in the neutral reward condition was 
not present in the low and high reward conditions, we did not find an effect of 
reward value per se. However, our findings suggest that reward value does, to a 
certain extent, facilitate initial learning of contingencies in psychopathic offend-
ers. Further research is needed to capture under which circumstances subjective 
reward value will positively affect learning and decision making in psychopathy. 
Second, there may have been too many parameters in the risky choice task to 
be able to distinguish the effects of reward. Increased motivation and stress in the 
original Fairchild et al. (2009) study was operationalised by a standardised labo-
ratory stressor with a monetary incentive, in which frustration and antagonism 
between the participant and a videotaped opponent was induced. This stress 
procedure has been found to significantly affect autonomic stress responses 
(Van Goozen et al., 2000). Our operationalisation of motivation (i.e., reward) 
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required deeper cognitive processing, with information concerning immediate 
gains and losses as well as longer-term rewards to be processed in parallel.  On 
the other hand, it could be argued that our approach was a realistic reflection of 
everyday life, in which impulses often have to be suppressed by keeping a rela-
tively better (though longer-term) outcome in mind. Future risk-taking studies 
using other paradigms with less parameters but the same operationalisation of 
reward could shed more light on this possibility.
Finally, research suggests that offenders differ greatly in what they experience 
as particularly punishing (van Ginneken & Hayes, 2016). As implementing a wide 
array of subjective rewards in non-treatment settings can be difficult, research 
into how subjective punishment facilitates adaptive behaviour in psychopathic 
individuals would be another relevant topic for investigation. Importantly, as also 
outlined in the limitations section of Chapter 4, such research requires thorough 
consideration of design-related ethical standards as well as those related to the 
practical and clinical implications, especially when involving participants who 
fall under the jurisdiction of the criminal justice system.
6.4 CONCLUSION
The work presented in this thesis was aimed at the question whether rewards 
with sufficient subjective value would be able to reduce learning and decision- 
making deficits often observed in psychopathic offenders. Although not une-
quivocal, our results are promising with respect to facilitative effects of rewards 
for learning new stimulus-outcome associations. Regarding the updating of 
learned contingencies, it is unclear whether psychopathic offenders would ben-
efit from reward value, since they did not show a reversal-learning deficit in our 
study. However, irrespective of reward condition, they made less use of (par-
ticularly negative) feedback to guide future decisions during reversal learning, 
suggesting that subjective reward may specifically enhance the learning of new 
associations. Furthermore, psychopathic offenders did show increased risky 
decision making, but, possibly also due to task design, no effects of reward were 
observed. In sum, our data suggest that using rewards with sufficiently high 
subjective values may promote adaptive behaviour in psychopathic individuals, 
but further research is needed to investigate which mechanisms should be tar-
geted for behavioural change to occur. Ultimately, both society and offenders 
themselves would benefit from the stronger embedding of empirical findings 
into clinical forensic practice. This would facilitate the journey towards a future 
with personalised therapy programs that can better accommodate individual 






Alessandri, J., Darcheville, J. C., Delevoye-Turrell, 
Y., & Zentall, T. R. (2008). Preference for rewards 
that follow greater effort and greater delay. Learn-
ing and Behavior, 36(4), 352–358. https://doi.
org/10.3758/lb.36.4.352 
Alessi, S. M., & Petry, N. M. (2003). Pathological 
gambling severity is associated with impulsivity in 
a delay discounting procedure. Behavioural Pro-
cesses, 64(3), 345-354. https://doi.org/10.1016/
s0376-6357(03)00150-5 
American Psychiatric Association. (2000). Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
(4th ed., Text Revision). American Psychiatric As-
sociation. 
Arnett, P. A., Howland, E. W., Smith, S. S., & Newman, 
J. P. (1993, 1993/01). Autonomic responsivity during 
passive avoidance in incarcerated psychopaths. Per-
sonality and Individual Differences, 14(1), 173-184. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(93)90187-8 
Aronson, E., & Mills, J. (1959). The effect of sever-
ity of initiation on liking for a group. The Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, 59(2), 177-181. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047195 
B 
Barbaree, H. E. (2005). Psychopathy, treat-
ment behavior, and recidivism: An extended 
follow-up of Seto and Barbaree. Journal of Inter-
personal Violence, 20(9), 1115-1131. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0886260505278262 
Barkley, R. A., Edwards, G., Laneri, M., Fletcher, 
K., & Metevia, L. (2001). Executive functioning, 
temporal discounting, and sense of time in adoles-
cents with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) and oppositional defiant disorder (ODD). 
Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 29(6), 541-
556. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1012233310098 
Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Curtin, J. J., & Newman, 
J. P. (2015, 2015/01). Altering the cognitive-affec-
tive dysfunctions of psychopathic and external-
izing offender subtypes with cognitive remedia-
tion. Clinical Psychological Science, 3(1), 45-57. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/2167702614560744 
Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Wallace, J. F., MacCoon, 
D. G., Curtin, J. J., & Newman, J. P. (2010). Clarify-
ing the factors that undermine behavioral inhibi-
tion system functioning in psychopathy. Person-
ality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 
1(4), 203-217. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018950 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & An-
derson, S. W. (1994, 1994/04). Insensitivity to 
future consequences following damage to hu-
man prefrontal cortex. Cognition, 50(1-3), 7-15. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90018-3 
Benning, S. D., Patrick, C. J., Hicks, B. M., Blonigen, 
D. M., & Krueger, R. F. (2003). Factor structure of 
the psychopathic personality inventory: Validi-
ty and implications for clinical assessment. Psy-
chological Assessment, 15, 340-350. https://doi.
org/10.1037/1040-3590.15.3.340 
Berlin, H., Rolls, E., & Kischka, U. (2004). Impul-
sivity, time perception, emotion and reinforce-
ment sensitivity in patients with orbitofrontal cor-
References
132 |
tex lesions. Brain, 127(5), 1108-1126. https://doi.
org/10.1093/brain/awh135 
Berridge, K. C., & Robinson, T. E. (2003, Sep). 
Parsing reward. Trends in Neurosciences, 
26(9), 507-513. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0166-
2236(03)00233-9 
Beszterczey, S., Nestor, P. G., Shirai, A., & Hard-
ing, S. (2013). Neuropsychology of decision mak-
ing and psychopathy in high-risk ex-offenders. 
Neuropsychology, 27(4), 491-497. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0033162 
Bickel, W. K., & Marsch, L. A. (2001). Toward a beK-
havioral economic understanding of drug depen-
dence: delay discounting processes. Addiction, 
96(1), 73-86. https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1360-
0443.2001.961736.x 
Birbaumer, N., Veit, R., Lotze, M., Erb, M., 
Hermann, C., Grodd, W., & Flor, H. (2005, 
2005/07/01). Deficient fear conditioning in psy-
chopathy. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62(7), 
799. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.62.7.799 
Bissonette, G. B., & Roesch, M. R. (2016). Neurope-
hysiology of reward-guided behavior: Correlates 
related to predictions, value, motivation, errors, 
attention, and action. Current Topics in Behav-
ioral Neurosciences, 27, 199-230. https://doi.
org/10.1007/7854_2015_382 
Blair, R. J. R. (2004). The roles of orbital frontal 
cortex in the modulation of antisocial behavior. 
Brain and Cognition, 55(1), 198-208. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S0278-2626(03)00276-8 
Blair, R. J. R. (2005, 2005/09). Applying a cog-
nitive neuroscience perspective to the disor-
der of psychopathy. Development and Psycho-
pathology, 17(03). https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0954579405050418 
Blair, R. J. R. (2007). The amygdala and ventrome-
dial prefrontal cortex in morality and psychopa-
thy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 11(9), 387-392. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2007.07.003 
Blair, R. J. R. (2013, 2013/11/01). The neurobiol-
ogy of psychopathic traits in youths. Nature Re-
views Neuroscience, 14(11), 786-799. https://doi.
org/10.1038/nrn3577 
Blair, R. J. R., & Mitchell, D. G. V. (2009). Psychop-
athy, attention and emotion. Psychological Med-
icine, 29(4), 543-555. https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0033291708003991 
Blair, R. J. R., Mitchell, D. G. V., Leonard, A., Bud-
hani, S., Peschardt, K. S., & Newman, C. (2004, 
2004/10). Passive avoidance learning in individ-
uals with psychopathy: modulation by reward 
but not by punishment. Personality and Individ-
ual Differences, 37(6), 1179-1192. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.12.001 
Boccardi, M., Frisoni, G. B., Hare, R. D., Cavedo, 
E., Najt, P., Pievani, M., Rasser, P. E., Laakso, M. 
P., Aronen, H. J., Repo-Tiihonen, E., Vaurio, O., 
Thompson, P. M., & Tiihonen, J. (2011, 2011/08). 
Cortex and amygdala morphology in psychop-
athy. Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 
193(2), 85-92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscy.-
chresns.2010.12.013 
Bonta, J., & Andrews, D. A. (2007). Risk-need-re-
sponsivity model for offender assessment and re-
habilitation (User Report 2007–06). Public Safety 
Canada. 
Bornovalova, M. A., Cashman-Rolls, A., O'Don-
nell, J. M., Ettinger, K., Richards, J. B., deWit, H., & 
Lejuez, C. W. (2009, Sep). Risk taking differenc-
es on a behavioral task as a function of potential 
reward/loss magnitude and individual differences 
in impulsivity and sensation seeking. Pharmacol-
ogy, Biochemistry and Behavior, 93(3), 258-262. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pbb.2008.10.023 
Boulanger, C., Habib, M., & Lancon, C. (2008). 
Impaired making-decision and empathy disorder 
in psychopathy. European Psychiatry, 23, S92. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eurpsy.2008.01.707 
Brazil, I. A. (2015). Considering new insights into 
antisociality and psychopathy. The Lancet Psy-
chiatry, 2(2), 115-116. https://doi.org/10.1016/
S2215-0366(14)00125-4 
Brazil, I. A., de Bruijn, E. R. A., Bulten, B. H., von Bor-
ries, A. K. L., van Lankveld, J. J. D. M., Buitelaar, J. K., & 
| 133
Verkes, R. J. (2009, 2009/01/15/). Early and late com9-
ponents of error monitoring in violent offenders with 
psychopathy. Biological Psychiatry, 65(2), 137-143. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2008.08.011 
Brazil, I. A., Maes, J. H. R., Scheper, I., Bulten, B. 
H., Kessels, R. P. C., Verkes, R., & de Bruijn, E. R. 
A. (2013, 2013/06/01). Reversal deficits in indie-
viduals with psychopathy in explicit but not im-
plicit learning conditions. Journal of Psychiatry 
& Neuroscience, 38(4), E13-E20. https://doi.
org/10.1503/jpn.120152 
Brazil, I. A., Mathys, C. D., Popma, A., Hoppenbro-
uwers, S. S., & Cohn, M. D. (2017). Representa-
tional uncertainty in the brain during threat con-
ditioning and the link with psychopathic traits. 
Biological Psychiatry: Cognitive Neuroscience 
and Neuroimaging, 2(8), 689-695. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.bpsc.2017.04.005 
Brazil, I. A., van Dongen, J. D. M., Maes, J. H. R., 
Mars, R. B., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2018a). 
Classification and treatment of antisocial indi-
viduals: From behavior to biocognition. Neuro-
science & Biobehavioral Reviews, 91, 259-277. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neu-biorev.2016.10.010 
Brazil, I. A., van Dongen, J. D. M., Maes, J. H. R., 
Mars, R. B., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2018b). 
Classification and treatment of antisocial indi-
viduals: From behavior to biocognition. Neuro-
science and Biobehavioral Reviews, 91, 259-277. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.010 
Brazil, I. A., van Dongen, J. D. M., Maes, J. H. R., 
Mars, R. B., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (in press). 
Classification and treatment of antisocial indi-
viduals: from behavior to biocognition. Neuro-
science and Biobehavioral Reviews. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2016.10.010 
Brazil, I. A., Verkes, R. J., Brouns, B. H. J., Buitelaar, J. 
K., Bulten, B. H., & de Bruijn, E. R. A. (2012). Differ-
entiating Psychopathy from General Antisociality 
Using the P3 as a Psychophysiological Correlate of 
Attentional Allocation. PLoS ONE, 7(11), e50339. 
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0050339 
Broom, I. W. (2011). The relationship between psy-
chopathy and performance on a modified version 
of the Iowa Gambling Task in offender and under-
graduate student samples [Doctoral dissertation, 
Carleton University Ottawa, 
Büchel, C., & Dolan, R. J. (2000, 2000/04/01). 
Classical fear conditioning in functional neuroi-
maging. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
10(2), 219-223. https://doi.org/10.1016/s0959-
4388(00)00078-7 
Buckholtz, J. W., Karmarkar, U., Ye, S., Brennan, 
G. M., & Baskin-Sommers, A. (2017). Blunted am-
biguity aversion during cost-benefit decisions in 
antisocial individuals. Scientific Reports, 7(1), 1-9. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-017-02149-6 
Buckholtz, J. W., Treadway, M. T., Cowan, R. L., 
Woodward, N. D., Benning, S. D., Li, R., Ansari, 
M. S., Baldwin, R. M., Schwartzman, A. N., Shel-
by, Smith, C. E., Cole, D., Kessler, R. M., & Zald, D. 
H. (2010). Mesolimbic dopamine reward system 
hypersensitivity in individuals with psychopath-
ic traits. Nature Neuroscience, 13(4), 419-421. 
https://doi.org/10.1038/nn.2510 
Budhani, S., Richell, R. A., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). 
Impaired reversal but intact acquisition: Prob-
abilistic response reversal deficits in adult in-
dividuals with psychopathy. Journal of Abnor-
mal Psychology, 115(3), 552-558. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0021-843x.115.3.552 
Buehler, R. E., Patterson, G. R., & Furniss, J. M. 
(1966, Aug). The reinforcement of behavior in in-
stitutional settings. Behaviour Research & Thera-
py, 4(3), 157-167. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-
7967(66)90002-7 
Buelow, M. T., & Suhr, J. A. (2009). Construct va-
lidity of the Iowa gambling task. Neuropsycholo-
gy Review, 19, 102-114. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11065-009-9083-4 
Carlsmith, K. M. (2006, 2006/07/01/). The roles 
of retribution and utility in determining punish-
ment. Journal of Experimental Social Psychol-




Cleckley, H. (1941). The mask of sanity. Mosby. 
Cleckley, H. (1976). The mask of sanity (5th ed.). 
Mosby. 
Cohen, J. (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the 
Behavioral Sciences (2nd ed.). Erlbaum. 
Collison, K. L., Miller, J. D., & Lynam, D. R. (2020). 
Examining the factor structure and validity of the 
Triarchic Model of Psychopathy across measures. 
Personality Disorders: Theory, Research, and 
Treatment, Advance online publication. https://
doi.org/10.1037/per0000394. https://doi.
org/10.1037/per0000394 
Cooke, D. J., & Michie, C. (1999). Psychopathy 
across cultures: North America and Scotland com-
pared. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 108(1), 58-
68. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.108.1.58 
Cooke, D. J., Michie, C., Hart, S. D., & Clark, D. 
(2005, 2005/07/01/). Searching for the pan-cul-
tural core of psychopathic personality disorder. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 39(2), 283-
295. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.01.004 
Copestake, S., Gray, N., & Snowden, R. (2011, 
04/01). A comparison of a self-report measure of 
psychopathy with the psychopathy checklist-re-
vised in a UK sample of offenders. The Journal of 
Forensic Psychiatry & Psychology, 22, 169-182. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14789949.2010.545134 
Craig, M. C., Catani, M., Deeley, Q., Latham, R., 
Daly, E., Kanaan, R., Picchioni, M., McGuire, P. K., 
Fahy, T., & Murphy, D. G. M. (2009, 2009/06/09). 
Altered connections on the road to psychopathy. 
Molecular Psychiatry, 14(10), 946-953. https://
doi.org/10.1038/mp.2009.40 
Crysel, L. C., Crosier, B. S., & Webster, G. D. 
(2013). The Dark Triad and risk behavior. Person-
ality and Individual Differences, 54(1), 35-40. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.07.029 
D 
Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., & Damasio, H. (1990). 
Individuals with sociopathic behavior caused 
by frontal damage fail to respond autonomical-
ly to social stimuli. Behavioural Brain Research, 
41(2), 81-94. https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-
4328(90)90144-4 
Dargis, M., Wolf, R. C., & Koenigs, M. (2017, 
2016/10/08). Reversal learning deficits in crimi-
nal offenders: Effects of psychopathy, substance 
use, and childhood maltreatment history. Journal 
of Psychopathology and Behavioral Assessment, 
39(2), 189-197. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10862-
016-9574-6 
Day, A., Bryan, J., Davey, L., & Casey, S. (2006, 
2006/10/01). The process of change in of-
fender rehabilitation programmes. Psycholo-
gy, Crime & Law, 12(5), 473-487. https://doi.
org/10.1080/10683160500151209 
De Brito, S. A., Viding, E., Kumari, V., Blackwood, 
N., & Hodgins, S. (2013, 2013/06/20). Cool 
and hot executive function impairments in vio-
lent offenders with antisocial personality disor-
der with and without psychopathy. PLoS ONE, 
8(6), e65566. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.
pone.0065566 
de Oliveira-Souza, R., Hare, R. D., Bramati, I. E., 
Garrido, G. J., Azevedo Ignácio, F., Tovar-Moll, 
F., & Moll, J. (2008, 2008/04). Psychopathy as a 
disorder of the moral brain: Fronto-temporo-lim-
bic grey matter reductions demonstrated by 
voxel-based morphometry. NeuroImage, 40(3), 
1202-1213. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroim6-
age.2007.12.054 
Dean, A. C., Altstein, L. L., Berman, M. E., Con-
stans, J. I., Sugar, C. A., & McCloskey, M. S. (2013). 
Secondary psychopathy, but not primary psy-
chopathy, is associated with risky decision-mak-
ing in noninstitutionalized young adults. Person-
ality and Individual Differences, 54(2), 272-277. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.09.009 
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A 
meta-analytic review of experiments examining 
the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic mo-
| 135
tivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627-668. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.6.627 
Derefinko, K. J. (2015). Psychopathy and low anxi-
ety: Meta-analytic evidence for the absence of in-
hibition, not affect. Journal of Personality, 83(6), 
693-709. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/
jopy.12124 
Dolan, M. (2012, 2011/12/06). The neuropsy-
chology of prefrontal function in antisocial per-
sonality disordered offenders with varying de-
grees of psychopathy. Psychological Medicine, 
42(08), 1715-1725. https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0033291711002686 
Dougherty, L. M., Abe, J. A., & Izard, C. E. (1996). 
Differential emotions theory and emotional devel-
opment in adulthood and later life. In C. Magai & S. 
H. McFadden (Eds.), Handbook of Emotion, Adult 
Development, and Aging (pp. 27-41). Academic 
Press. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/
B978-012464995-8/50003-0 
Douglas, K. S., Vincent, G. M., & Edens, J. F. (2018). 
Risk for criminal recidivism: The role of psychop-
athy. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psychopa-
thy (pp. 682–709)). The Guilford Press. 
E
Estrada, S., Tillem, S., Stuppy-Sullivan, A., & 
Baskin-Sommers, A. (2019). Specifying the con-
nection between reward processing and anti-
social psychopathology across development: 
Review, integration, and future directions. In J. 
Gruber (Ed.), The Oxford handbook of positive 
emotion and psychopathology. Oxford Uni-
versity Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxford/-
hb/9780190653200.013.21 
Everitt, B. J., Cardinal, R. N., Parkinson, J. A., & 
Robbins, T. W. (2003). Appetitive behavior: im-
pact of amygdala-dependent mechanisms of 
emotional learning. Annals of the New York Acad-
emy of Sciences, 985(1), 233-250. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1749-6632.2003.tb07085.x 
F 
Fairchild, G., Hawes, D. J., Frick, P. J., Copeland, 
W. E., Odgers, C. L., Franke, B., Freitag, C. M., & 
De Brito, S. A. (2019). Conduct disorder. Nature 
Reviews Disease Primers, 5(44), 1-25. https://doi.
org/10.1038/s41572-019-0095-y 
Fairchild, G., van Goozen, S. H., Stollery, S. J., Ait-
ken, M. R., Savage, J., Moore, S. C., & Goodyer, I. 
M. (2009). Decision making and executive func-
tion in male adolescents with early-onset or ad-
olescence-onset conduct disorder and control 
subjects. Biological Psychiatry, 66(2), 162-168. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.02.024 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Buchner, A., & Lang, A. G. 
(2009). Statistical power analyses using G*Pow-
er 3.1: Tests for correlation and regression analy-
ses. Behavior Research Methods, 41, 1149-1160. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/BRM.41.4.1149 
Feitsma, W. N., Popping, R., & Jansen, D. E. M. 
C. (2010). No-show at a forensic psychiatric out-
patient clinic: Risk factors and reasons. Inter-
national Journal of Offender Therapy and Com-
parative Criminology, 56(1), 96-112. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0306624x10389435 
Felson, R. B., Osgood, D. W., Cundiff, P. R., & 
Wiernik, C. (2018, 2019/08/01). Life in the Fast 
Lane: Drugs, Hedonistic Lifestyles, and Econom-
ic Crime. Crime & Delinquency, 65(9), 1292-1318. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128718800282 
Finger, E. C., Marsh, A. A., Blair, K. S., Reid, M. E., 
Sims, C., Ng, P., Pine, D. S., & Blair, R. J. R. (2011, 
2011/02). Disrupted reinforcement signaling in 
the orbitofrontal cortex and caudate in youths 
with conduct disorder or oppositional defiant 
disorder and a high level of psychopathic traits. 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 168(2), 152-162. 
https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.2010.10010129 
Fowles, D. C. (1980, 1980/03). The Three Arous-
al Model: Implications of Gray's two-factor learn-
ing theory for heart rate, electrodermal activity, 




Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive 
emotions? Review of General Psychology, 2(3), 300-
319. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.2.3.300 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive 
emotions in positive psychology: the broaden-
and-build theory of positive emotions. Amer-
ican Psychologist, 56, 218–226. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0003-066x.56.3.218 
Fredrickson, B. L. (2013). Positive emotions 
broaden and build. Advances in Experimental So-
cial Psychology, 47, 1-53. https://doi.org/10.1016/
B978-0-12-407236-7.00001-2 
Freeze, M. K., Burke, A., & Vorster, A. C. (2014). 
The role of parental style in the conduct disorders: 
A comparison between adolescent boys with and 
without conduct disorder. Journal of Child & Ado-
lescent Mental Health, 26(1), 63-73. 
French, S. A., & Gendreau, P. (2006). Reducing 
prison misconducts: What works! Criminal Jus-
tice and Behavior, 33(2), 185-218. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0093854805284406 
G
Gallagher, M., McMahan, R. W., & Schoenbaum, 
G. (1999). Orbitofrontal cortex and representation 
of incentive value in associative learning. Journal 
of Neuroscience, 19(15), 6610-6614. https://doi.
org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.19-15-06610.1999 
Gao, Y., Raine, A., & Schug, R. A. (2012, 2012/07). 
Somatic aphasia: Mismatch of body sensations 
with autonomic stress reactivity in psychopathy. 
Biological Psychology, 90(3), 228-233. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.03.015 
Gehring, W. J., & Willoughby, A. R. (2002). The me-
dial frontal cortex and the rapid processing of mon-
etary gains and losses. Science, 295(5563), 2279-
2282. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1066893 
Gendreau, P., Listwan, S. J., Kuhns, J. B., & Exum, M. 
L. (2014, Sep). Making prisoners accountable: are 
contingency management programs the answer? 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 41(9), 1079-1102. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0093854814540288 
Girard, T. A., Axelrod, B. N., Patel, R., & Craw-
ford, J. R. (2015). Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale–IV dyads for estimating global intelli-
gence. Assessment, 22(4), 441-448. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1073191114551551 
Glenn, A. L., Efferson, L. M., Iyer, R., & Graham, 
J. (2017). Values, goals, and motivations asso-
ciated with psychopathy. Journal of Social and 
Clinical Psychology, 36(2), 108-125 https://doi.
org/10.1521/jscp.2017.36.2.108 
Glenn, A. L., Han, H., Yang, Y., Raine, A., & Schug, R. 
A. (2017). Associations between psychopathic traits 
and brain activity during instructed false responding. 
Psychiatry Research: Neuroimaging, 266, 123-137. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pscychresns.2017.06.008 
Glenn, A. L., Johnson, A. K., & Raine, A. (2013). An-
tisocial personality disorder: a current review. Cur-
rent Psychiatry Reports, 15(12), 427. https://doi.
org/10.1007/s11920-013-0427-7 
Glenn, A. L., & Yang, Y. (2012). The potential role of 
the striatum in antisocial behavior and psychopa-
thy. Biological Psychiatry, 72(10), 817-822. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsych.2012.04.027 
Glimmerveen, J. C., Brazil, I. A., Bulten, B. H., & 
Maes, J. H. R. (2018). Uncovering naturalistic re-
wards and their subjective value in forensic psy-
chiatric patients. International Journal of Forensic 
Mental Health, 17(2), 154-166. https://doi.org/10.
1080/14999013.2018.1452081 
Gorenstein, E. E., & Newman, J. P. (1980). Disinhib-
itory psychopathology: A new perspective and a 
model for research. Psychological Review, 87, 301-
315. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.87.3.301 
Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general 
theory of crime. Stanford University Press. 
Gottfried, E. D., & Christopher, S. C. (2017). 
Mental disorders among criminal offenders: a 
review of the literature. Journal of Correction-
al Health Care, 23(3), 336-346. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1078345817716180
 
Gray, J. A. (1987). The psychology of fear and 
stress. Cambridge University Press. 
| 137
Gregory, S., Blair, R. J., Simmons, A., Kumari, V., 
Hodgins, S., & Blackwood, N. (2015). Punishment 
and psychopathy: a case-control functional MRI 
investigation of reinforcement learning in vio-
lent antisocial personality disordered men. The 
Lancet Psychiatry, 2(2), 153-160. https://doi.
org/10.1016/S2215-0366(14)00071-6 
Grillon, C. (2008, 2007/12/06). Models and 
mechanisms of anxiety: evidence from startle 
studies. Psychopharmacology, 199(3), 421-437. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00213-007-1019-1 
H 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, 
W. C. (1998). Multivariate Data Analysis. Pren-
tice-Hall. 
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, 
R. F. (2006). The feedback-related negativity re-
flects the binary evaluation of good versus bad 
outcomes. Biological Psychology, 71(2), 148-154. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2005.04.001 
Hajcak, G., Moser, J. S., Holroyd, C. B., & Simons, 
R. F. (2007). It's worse than you thought: The 
feedback negativity and violations of reward 
prediction in gambling tasks. Psychophysiology, 
44(6), 905-912. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-
8986.2007.00567.x 
Hamilton, R. B., & Newman, J. P. (2018). The re-
sponse modulation hypothesis: Formulation, de-
velopment, and implications for psychopathy. In 
C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psychopathy (pp. 
80-93). The Guilford Press. 
Hanson, R. K., & Morton-Bourgon, K. E. (2005). 
The  characteristics  of  persistent sexual of-
fenders: a meta-analysis of recidivism studies. 
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 
73, 1154-1163. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-
006x.73.6.1154 
Hare, R. D. (1965, 1965/03). Acquisition and gen-
eralization of a conditioned-fear response in psy-
chopathic and nonpsychopathic criminals. The 
Journal of Psychology, 59(2), 367-370. https://doi.
org/10.1080/00223980.1965.10544625 
Hare, R. D. (1980). A research scale for the as-
sessment of psychopathy in criminal populations. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 1, 111-119. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(80)90028-8 
Hare, R. D. (1985). Comparison of procedures for 
the assessment of psychopathy. Journal of Con-
sulting and Clinical Psychology, 53, 7–16. https://
doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.53.1.7 
Hare, R. D. (1991). The Hare Psychopathy Check-
list-Revised. Multi-Health Systems. 
Hare, R. D. (2003a). The Hare Psychopathy Check-
list-Revised, 2nd edition. Multi-Health Systems. 
Hare, R. D. (2003b). Manual for the Revised Psy-
chopathy Checklist (2nd ed.). Multi-Health Sys-
tems. 
Hare, R. D., Clark, D., Grann, M., & Thornton, D. 
(2000). Psychopathy and the predictive validity of 
the PCL-R: An international perspective. Behavioral 
Sciences and the Law, 18(5), 623-645. https://doi.
org/10.1002/1099-0798(200010)18:5<623::AID-
BSL409>3.0.CO;2-W 
Hare, R. D., Harpur, T. J., & Hemphill, J. F. (1989). 
Scoring pamphlet for the Self-Report Psychopa-
thy scale: SRP-II. Unpublished document, Simon 
Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada.
Hawes, S. W., Boccaccini, M. T., & Murrie, D. C. 
(2013). Psychopathy and the combination of psy-
chopathy and sexual deviance as predictors of 
sexual recidivism: Meta-analytic findings using 
the Psychopathy Checklist—Revised. Psycho-
logical Assessment, 25(1), 233-243. https://doi.
org/10.1037/a0030391 
Hemphill, J. F., Hare, R. D., & Wong, S. (1998, 06/06). 
Psychopathy and Recidivism: A Review. Legal and 
Criminological Psychology, 3, 139-170. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.2044-8333.1998.tb00355.x 
Hemphill, J. F., Templeman, R., Wong, S., & Hare, 
R. D. (1998). Psychopathy and crime: recidivism 
and behavior. In D. J. Cooke, A. E. Forth, & R. D. 
Hare (Eds.), Psychopathy: theory, research, and 
implications for society (pp. 375– 399). Kluwer 
Academic Publishing. 
138 |
Henrichs, J., Bogaerts, S., Sijtsema, J., & Klerx-van 
Mierlo, F. (2014). Intimate partner violence perpe-
trators in a forensic psychiatric outpatient setting: 
Criminal history, psychopathology, and victimiza-
tion. Journal of Interpersonal Violence, 30(12), 2109-
2128. https://doi.org/10.1177/0886260514552272 
Hildebrand, M., de Ruiter, C., & de Vogel, V. 
(2004, Jan). Psychopathy and sexual deviance 
in treated rapists: Association with sexual and 
nonsexual recidivism. Sexual Abuse: A Journal of 
Research and Treatment, 16(1), 1-24. https://doi.
org/10.1177/107906320401600101 
Holroyd, C. B., & Coles, M. G. (2002). The neural 
basis of human error processing: reinforcement 
learning, dopamine, and the error-related negativ-
ity. Psychological Review, 109(4), 679. https://doi.
org/10.1037//0033-295X.109.4.679 
Holroyd, C. B., Nieuwenhuis, S., Yeung, N., & 
Cohen, J. D. (2003). Errors in reward prediction 
are reflected in the event-related brain poten-
tial. Neuroreport, 14(18), 2481-2484. https://doi.
org/10.1097/00001756-200312190-00037 
Hoppenbrouwers, S. S., Bulten, B. H., & Brazil, 
I. A. (2016). Parsing fear: A reassessment of the 
evidence for fear deficits in psychopathy. Psy-
chological Bulletin, 142(6), 573-600. https://doi.
org/10.1037/bul0000040 
Hosking, J. G., Kastman, E. K., Dorfman, H. M., 
Samanez-Larkin, G. R., Baskin-Sommers, A., Kie-
hl, K. A., Newman, J. P., & Buckholtz, J. W. (2017). 
Disrupted prefrontal regulation of striatal subjec-
tive value signals in psychopathy. Neuron, 95(1), 
221-231. e224. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neug-
ron.2017.06.030 
Howells, K., & Day, A. (2007). Readiness for treat-
ment in high risk offenders with personality dis-
orders. Psychology Crime and Law, 13(1), 47-56. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10683160600869767 
Hughes, M. A., Dolan, M. C., Trueblood, J. S., & 
Stout, J. C. (2015, 2014/06/26). Psychopathic 
personality traits and Iowa Gambling Task perfor-
mance in incarcerated offenders. Psychiatry, Psy-
chology and Law, 22(1), 134-144. https://doi.org/
10.1080/13218719.2014.919689 
Hunt, G. M., & Azrin, N. H. (1973, Feb). A com-
munity-reinforcement approach to alcoholism. 
Behaviour Research & Therapy, 11(1), 91-104. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(73)90072-7 
Hunt, M. K., Hopko, D. R., Bare, R., Lejuez, C., & 
Robinson, E. (2005). Construct validity of the bal-
loon analog risk task (BART) associations with psy-
chopathy and impulsivity. Assessment, 12(4), 416-
428. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191105278740 
I 
IBM Corp. (2015). IBM SPSS Statistics for Win-
dows, Version 23.0. IBM Corp. 
Insel, T. R., & Cuthbert, B. N. (2015, 2015-05-01 




Jackson, K. M., & Trochim, W. M. K. (2002, Oct). 
Concept mapping as an alternative approach for 
the analysis of open-ended survey responses. Or-
ganizational Research Methods, 5(4), 307-336. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/109442802237114 
James, D. J., & Glaze, L. E. (2006). Mental health 
problems of prison and jail inmates. Bureau of 
Justice Statistics Special Report NCJ 213600. US 
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs. 
Jung, T.-P., Makeig, S., Westerfield, M., Townsend, 
J., Courchesne, E., & Sejnowski, T. J. (2000). Re-
moval of eye activity artifacts from visual event-re-
lated potentials in normal and clinical subjects. 
Clinical Neurophysiology, 111(10), 1745-1758. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s1388-2457(00)00386-2 
Jurjako, M., & Malatesti, L. (2016, 2016/07/03). 
Instrumental rationality in psychopathy: implica-
tions from learning tasks. Philosophical Psychol-




Kahn, R. E., Byrd, A. L., & Pardini, D. A. (2013, 
Apr). Callous-unemotional traits robustly pre-
dict future criminal offending in young men. Law 
and Human Behavior, 37(2), 87-97. https://doi.
org/10.1037/b0000003 
Kahneman, D., & Frederick, S. (2002). Represent-
ativeness revisited: Attribute substitution in intui-
tive judgment. In T. D. Gilovich, D. W. Griffin, & D. 
Kahneman (Eds.), Heuristics of intuitive judgment: 
Extensions and applications. Cambridge University 
Press. 
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1979). Prospect theo-
ry: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 
47(2), 263-292. https://doi.org/10.2307/1914185 
Kane, M., & Trochim, W. M. K. (2007). Concept 
mapping for planning and evaluation. Sage Publi-
cations. 
Kazdin, A. E. (2012). Behavior modification in ap-
plied settings (7th ed. ed.). Waveland Press. 
Kenrick, D. T., Griskevicius, V., Neuberg, S. L., 
& Schaller, M. (2010). Renovating the pyra-
mid of needs: Contemporary extensions built 
upon ancient foundations. Perspectives on 
Psychological Science, 5, 292-314. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1745691610369469 
Kiehl, K. A. (2006). A cognitive neuroscience 
perspective on psychopathy: Evidence for paral-
imbic system dysfunction. Psychiatry Research, 
142, 107-128. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psychres. 
2005.09.013 
Kiehl, K. A., & Hoffman, M. B. (2011). The crimi-
nal psychopath: History, neuroscience, treatment, 
and economics. Jurimetrics, 51(4), 355-397. 
Kirby, K. N., & Maraković, N. N. (1996). Delay-dis-
counting probabilistic rewards: Rates decrease 
as amounts increase. Psychonomic Bulletin & 
Review, 3(1), 100-104. https://doi.org/10.3758/
bf03210748 
Klein, E. D., Bhatt, R. S., & Zentall, T. R. (2005). 
Contrast and the justification of effort. Psycho-
nomic Bulletin & Review, 12(2), 335-339. https://
doi.org/10.3758/bf03196381 
Kochanska, G., Gross, J. N., Lin, M. H., & Nichols, 
K. E. (2002). Guilt in young children: Development, 
determinants, and relations with a broader system 
of standards. Child Development, 73(2), 461-482. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00418 
Koenigs, M., & Tranel, D. (2006). Pseudopsychop-
athy: A perspective from cognitive neuroscience. 
In D. H. Zald & S. L. Rauch (Eds.), The orbitofron-
tal cortex. Oxford University Press 
Kosson, D. S., Smith, S. S., & Newman, J. P. (1990). 
Evaluating the construct validity of psychopathy in 
Black and White male inmates: Three preliminary 
studies. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 99(3), 250-
259. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843x.99.3.250 
Krain, A. L., Wilson, A. M., Arbuckle, R., Castella-
nos, F. X., & Milham, M. P. (2006, 2006/08/01/). 
Distinct neural mechanisms of risk and ambiguity: 
A meta-analysis of decision-making. NeuroImage, 
32(1), 477-484. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroi.-
mage.2006.02.047 
Krieglmeyer, R., Deutsch, R., De Houwer, J., & De 
Raedt, R. (2010). Being moved: Valence activates 
approach-avoidance behavior independently of 
evaluation and approach-avoidance intentions. 
Psychological Science, 21(4), 607-613. https://
doi.org/10.1177/0956797610365131 
Kruskal, J. B. (1964). Multidimensional scaling 
by optimizing goodness of fit to a nonmetric hy-
pothesis. Psychometrika, 29(1), 1-27. https://doi.
org/10.1007/Bf02289565 
Kruskall, J., & Wish, M. (1978). Multidimensional 
scaling. Sage. 
Kuin, N., & Masthoff, E. (2016). Investigating the 
Relationship between Psychopathic Personality 
Traits and Decision Making Deficits in a Prison 




Lak, A., Stauffer, W. R., & Schultz, W. (2014). Do-
pamine prediction error responses integrate sub-
jective value from different reward dimensions. 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Scienc-
es, 111(6), 2343-2348. https://doi.org/10.1073/
PNAS.1321596111 
Lapierre, D., Braun, C. M. J., & Hodgins, S. (1995, 
1995/02). Ventral frontal deficits in psychopathy: 
Neuropsychological test findings. Neuropsycho-
logia, 33(2), 139-151. https://doi.org/10.1016/
0028-3932(94)00110-b 
Larson, C. L., Baskin-Sommers, A. R., Stout, D. M., 
Balderston, N. L., Curtin, J. J., Schultz, D. H., Kie-
hl, K. A., & Newman, J. P. (2013, 2013/05/28). The 
interplay of attention and emotion: top-down at-
tention modulates amygdala activation in psycho-
pathy. Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuro-
science, 13(4), 757-770. https://doi.org/10.3758/
s13415-013-0172-8 
LeDoux, J. (2007, 2007/10). The amygdala. Cur-
rent Biology, 17(20), R868-R874. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.cub.2007.08.005 
Leistico, A.-M. R., Salekin, R. T., DeCoster, J., & 
Rogers, R. (2008). A large-scale meta-analysis re-
lating the Hare measures of psychopathy to antiso-
cial conduct. Law and Human Behavior, 32(1), 28-
45. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10979-007-9096-6 
Lejuez, C. W., Aklin, W. M., Jones, H. A., Rich-
ards, J. B., Strong, D. R., Kahler, C. W., & Read, J. P. 
(2003). The balloon analogue risk task (BART) dif-
ferentiates smokers and nonsmokers. Experimen-
tal & Clinical Psychopharmacology, 11(1), 26-33. 
https://doi.org/10.1037//1064-1297.11.1.26 
Lejuez, C. W., Aklin, W. M., Zvolensky, M. J., & 
Pedulla, C. M. (2003, 2003/08). Evaluation of the 
Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) as a predictor 
of adolescent real-world risk-taking behaviours. 
Journal of Adolescence, 26(4), 475-479. https://
doi.org/10.1016/s0140-1971(03)00036-8 
Lejuez, C. W., Read, J. P., Kahler, C. W., Rich-
ards, J. B., Ramsey, S. E., Stuart, G. L., Strong, D. 
R., & Brown, R. A. (2002). Evaluation of a behav-
ioral measure of risk taking: The Balloon Ana-
logue Risk Task (BART). Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Applied, 8(2), 75-84. https://doi.
org/10.1037//1076-898x.8.2.75 
Levy, D. J., & Glimcher, P. W. (2012, 2012/12). 
The root of all value: a neural common curren-
cy for choice. Current Opinion in Neurobiology, 
22(6), 1027-1038. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
conb.2012.06.001 
Lichtenstein, S., & Slovic, P. (1971). Reversals of 
preference between bids and choices in gambling 
decisions. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 89, 
46-55. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0031207 
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Andrews, B. P. (1996). Devel-
opment and preliminary validation of a self-re-
port measure of psychopathic personality traits 
in noncriminal populations. Journal of Person-
ality Assessment, 66(3), 488–524. https://doi.
org/10.1207/s15327752jpa6603_3 
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Fowler, K. A. (2007). The self 
report assessment of psychopathy: Problems, pit-
falls, and promises. . In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook 
of psychopathy (pp. 107-132). The Guilford Press. 
Lilienfeld, S. O., & Widows, M. R. (2005). Psy-
chopathic Personality Inventory – Revised: Pro-
fessional Manual. Psychological Assessment Re-
sources. 
Ling, S., & Raine, A. (2018, 2018/03/16). The 
neuroscience of psychopathy and forensic im-
plications. Psychology, Crime & Law, 24(3), 
296-312. https://doi.org/10.1080/106831
6X.2017.1419243 
Lipsey, M. W., & Cullen, F. T. (2007, 2007/12/01). 
The Effectiveness of Correctional Rehabilitation: 
A Review of Systematic Reviews. Annual Review of 
Law and Social Science, 3(1), 297-320. https://doi.
org/10.1146/annurev.lawsocsci.3.081806.112833 
Loeber, R., Burke, J., & Pardini, D. A. (2009). 
Perspectives on oppositional defiant disorder, 
conduct disorder, and psychopathic features. 




Loeber, R., Burke, J. D., & Lahey, B. B. (2002). What 
are adolescent antecedents to antisocial personali-
ty disorder? Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health, 
12(1), 24-36. https://doi.org/10.1002/cbm.484 
Loehr, J. D., Kourtis, D., & Brazil, I. A. (2015). It's 
not just my fault: Neural correlates of feedback 
processing in solo and joint action. Biological 
Psychology, 111, 1-7. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bi6-
opsycho.2015.08.004 
Logue, A. W. (1988). Research on self-control: 
An integrating framework. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences, 11(4), 665-679. https://doi.org/10.1017/
s0140525x00053978 
Lösel, F., & Schmucker, M. (2004). Psychopathy, 
risk taking, and attention: a differentiated test 
of the somatic marker hypothesis. Journal of Ab-
normal Psychology, 113(4), 522-529. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0021-843x.113.4.522 
Lussier, J. P., Heil, S. H., Mongeon, J. A., Badger, G. J., 
& Higgins, S. T. (2006). A meta-analysis of voucher- 
based reinforcement therapy for substance use 
disorders. Addiction, 101(2), 192-203. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1360-0443.2006.01311.x 
Lykken, D. T. (1957). A study of anxiety in the so-
ciopathic personality. The Journal of Abnormal 
and Social Psychology, 55(1), 6-10. https://doi.
org/10.1037/h0047232 
Lykken, D. T. (1995). The antisocial personalities. 
Lawrence Earlbaum Associates. 
M 
Maes, J. H., Woyke, I. C., & Brazil, I. A. (2018). 
Psychopathy-related traits and decision-making 
under risk and ambiguity: An exploratory study. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 122, 190-
194. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.10.017 
Mahmut, M. K., Homewood, J., & Stevenson, R. J. 
(2008). The characteristics of non-criminals with 
high psychopathy traits: Are they similar to crim-
inal psychopaths? Journal of Research in Person-
ality, 42(3), 679-692. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jrp.2007.09.002 
Malterer, M. B., Lilienfeld, S. O., Neumann, C. S., 
& Newman, J. P. (2010). Concurrent validity of the 
Psychopathic Personality Inventory with offend-
erand community samples. Assessment, 17, 3-15. 
Marshall, W. L., Fernandez, Y. M., Serran, G. A., 
Mulloy, R., Thornton, D., Mann, R. E., & Ander-
son, D. (2003). Process variables in the treatment 
of sexual offenders. Aggression and Violent Be-
havior, 8(2), 205-234. https://doi.org/10.1016/
s1359-1789(01)00065-9 
Marshall, W. L., Serran, G., Moulden, H., Mulloy, 
R., Fernandez, Y. M., Mann, R., & Thornton, D. 
(2002). Therapist features in sexual offender 
treatment: their reliable identification and influ-
ence on behaviour change. Clinical Psychology 
and Psychotherapy, 9(6), 395-405. https://doi.
org/10.1002/cpp.335 
Maslow, A. H. (1943). A theory of human moti-
vation. Psychological Review, 50(4), 370-396. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/11305-004 
Mathôt, S., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). 
OpenSesame: An open-source, graphical expe-
riment builder for the social sciences. Behavior 
Research Methods, 44(2), 314-324. https://doi.
org/10.3758/s13428-011-0168-7 
McCabe, K. M., Hough, R. L., Yeh, M., Lucchini, S. 
E., & Hazen, A. (2005). The relation between vio-
lence exposure and conduct problems among ad-
olescents: A prospective study. American Journal 
of Orthopsychiatry, 75(4), 575-584. 
Medic, N., Ziauddeen, H., Vestergaard, M. D., Hen-
ning, E., Schultz, W., Farooqi, I. S., & Fletcher, P. C. 
(2014). Dopamine modulates the neural representa-
tion of subjective value of food in hungry subjects. 
Journal of Neuroscience, 34(50), 16856-16864. 
https://doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2051-14.2014 
Meyers, R. J., Roozen, H. G., & Smith, J. E. (2011). 
The Community Reinforcement Approach: An up-
date of the evidence. Alcohol Research & Health, 
33(4), 380-388. Retrieved from http://pubs.niaaa.
nih.gov/publications/arh334/380-388.htm 
Miendlarzewska, E. A., Bavelier, D., & Schwartz, 
S. (2016). Influence of reward motivation on hu-
142 |
man declarative memory. Neuroscience & Bi-
obehavioral Reviews, 61, 156-176. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2015.11.015 
Miranda Jr, R., MacKillop, J., Meyerson, L. A., Jus-
tus, A., & Lovallo, W. R. (2009). Influence of anti-
social and psychopathic traits on decision-making 
biases in alcoholics. Alcoholism: Clinical and Ex-
perimental Research, 33(5), 817-825. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1530-0277.2009.00901.x 
Mitchell, D. G. V., Colledge, E., Leonard, A., & Blair, 
R. J. R. (2002, 2002/01). Risky decisions and re-
sponse reversal: is there evidence of orbitofrontal 
cortex dysfunction in psychopathic individuals? 
Neuropsychologia, 40(12), 2013-2022. https://
doi.org/10.1016/s0028-3932(02)00056-8 
Mitchell, D. G. V., Fine, C., Richell, R. A., Newman, 
C., Lumsden, J., Blair, K. S., & Blair, R. J. R. (2006). 
Instrumental learning and relearning in individu-
als with psychopathy and in patients with lesions 
involving the amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex. 
Neuropsychology, 20(3), 280-289. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0894-4105.20.3.280 
Mitte, K., & Kämpfe, N. (2008). Personality and 
the four faces of positive affect: A multitrait-mul-
timethod analysis using self-and peer-report. Jour-
nal of Research in Personality, 42(5), 1370-1375. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.04.004 
Moffitt, T. E., order, i. a., Arseneault, L., Jaffee, S. 
R., Kim-Cohen, J., Koenen, K. C., Odgers, C. L., 
Slutske, W. S., & Viding, E. (2008). Research re-
view: DSM-V conduct disorder: Research needs 
for an evidence base. Journal of Child Psychology 
and Psychiatry, 49(1), 3-33. 
Moreira, D., Azeredo, A., & Barbosa, F. (2019, 
2019/07/01/). Neurobiological findings of the 
psychopathic personality in adults: One century 
of history. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 47, 
137-159. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
avb.2019.03.005 
Morgan, A. B., & Lilienfeld, S. O. (2000). A meta-ana-
lytic review of the relation between antisocial behav-
ior and neuropsychological measures of executive 
function. Clinical Psychology Review, 20(1), 113-136. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0272-7358(98)00096-8 
Morgan, J. E., Gray, N. S., & Snowden, R. J. (2011). 
The relationship between psychopathy and impul-
sivity: A multi-impulsivity measurement approach. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 51(4), 429-
434. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.03.043 
Motzkin, J. C., Newman, J. P., Kiehl, K. A., & Koe-
nigs, M. (2011, 2011/11/30). Reduced Prefrontal 
Connectivity in Psychopathy. Journal of Neu-
roscience, 31(48), 17348-17357. https://doi.
org/10.1523/jneurosci.4215-11.2011 
N 
National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health. 
(2010). Antisocial Personality Disorder: Treat-
ment, Management and Prevention. Psychological 
Society and Royal College of Psychiatrists. 
Nentjes, L., Meijer, E., Bernstein, D., Arntz, A., & 
Medendorp, W. (2013, 2013/10). Brief Commu-
nication: Investigating the Relationship Between 
Psychopathy and Interoceptive Awareness. Jour-
nal of Personality Disorders, 27(5), 617-624. 
https://doi.org/10.1521/pedi_2013_27_105 
Neumann, C. S., & Pardini, D. A. (2014). Factor 
Structure and construct Validity of the Self-Re-
port Psychopathy (SRP) Scale and the Youth Psy-
chopathic Traits Inventory (YPI) in young men. 
Journal of Personality Disorders, 28(3), 419–433. 
Newman, J. P., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2016, 
Dec). Smith and Lilienfeld's meta-analysis of the 
response modulation hypothesis: Important the-
oretical and quantitative clarifications. Psycho-
logical Bulletin, 142(12), 1384-1393. https://doi.
org/10.1037/bul0000056 
Newman, J. P., & Kosson, D. S. (1986, Aug). Pas-
sive-avoidance learning in psychopathic and 
nonpsychopathic offenders. Journal of Abnor-
mal Psychology, 95(3), 252-256. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0021-843x.95.3.252 
Newman, J. P., MacCoon, D. G., Vaughn, L. J., & Sa-
deh, N. (2005). Validating a Distinction Between 
Primary and Secondary Psychopathy With Meas-
ures of Gray's BIS and BAS Constructs. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 114(2), 319-323. https://
| 143
doi.org/10.1037/0021-843x.114.2.319 
Newman, J. P., Patterson, C. M., Howland, E. W., & 
Nichols, S. L. (1990, 1990/01). Passive avoidance 
in psychopaths: The effects of reward. Personal-
ity and Individual Differences, 11(11), 1101-1114. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(90)90021-i 
Newman, J. P., Patterson, C. M., & Kosson, D. S. 
(1987). Response perseveration in psychopaths. 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 96(2), 145-148. 
https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-843x.96.2.145 
Newman, J. P., & Schmitt, W. A. (1998). Pas-
sive avoidance in psychopathic offenders: A 
replication and extension. Journal of Abnor-
mal Psychology, 107(3), 527-532. https://doi.
org/10.1037//0021-843x.107.3.527 
Newman, J. P., Widom, C. S., & Nathan, S. (1985). 
Passive avoidance in syndromes of disinhibition: 
Psychopathy and extraversion. Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology, 48(5), 1316. https://
doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.48.5.1316 
O 
Ogilvie, J. M., Stewart, A. L., Chan, R. C., & Shum, D. 
H. (2011). Neuropsychological measures of execu-
tive function and antisocial behavior: A meta-anal-
ysis. Criminology, 49(4), 1063-1107. https://doi.
org/10.1111/j.1745-9125.2011.00252.x 
Ogloff, J. R. P., & Wong, S. (1990, 1990/06). Elec-
trodermal and Cardiovascular Evidence of a Cop-
ing Response in Psychopaths. Criminal Justice and 
Behavior, 17(2), 231-245. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0093854890017002006 
Ogloff, J. R. P., Wong, S., & Greenwood, A. (1990). 
Treating criminal psychopaths in a therapeutic 
community program. Behavioral Sciences and 
the Law, 8(2), 181-190. https://doi.org/10.1002/
bsl.2370080210 
Olver, M. E., & Wong, S. C. P. (2015). Short and 
long-term recidivism prediction of the PCL-R and 
the effects of age: A 24-year follow-up. . Person-
ality Disorders: Theory, Research, and Treatment, 
6, 97-105. https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000095 
P 
Padoa-Schioppa, C., & Cai, X. (2011). Orbitofron-
tal cortex and the computation of subjective val-
ue: consolidated concepts and new perspectives. 
Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 
1239, 130-137. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-
6632.2011.06262.x 
Pasion, R., Fernandes, C., Pereira, M. R., & Barbo-
sa, F. (2018, 2018/08/01/). Antisocial behaviour 
and psychopathy: Uncovering the externalizing 
link in the P3 modulation. Neuroscience & Bi-
obehavioral Reviews, 91, 170-186. https://doi.org/
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2017.03.012 
Patrick, C. J. (2006). Back to the Future: Cleckley 
as a Guide to the Next Generation of Psychopathy 
Research. In C. J. Patrick (Ed.), Handbook of psy-
chopathy (pp. 605–617). The Guilford Press. 
Patrick, C. J. (2010). Operationalizing the triarchic 
conceptualization of psychopathy: Preliminary 
description of brief scales for assessment of bold-
ness, meanness, and disinhibition. 
Patrick, C. J., & Drislane, L. E. (2015). Triarchic 
Model of Psychopathy: Origins, operationaliza-
tions, and observed linkages with personality and 
general psychopathology. Journal of Personality, 
83(6), 627-643. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12119 
Patrick, C. J., Fowles, D. C., & Krueger, R. F. (2009, 
2009/07/07). Triarchic conceptualization of 
psychopathy: Developmental origins of disinhi-
bition, boldness, and meanness. Development 
and Psychopathology, 21(03), 913. https://doi.
org/10.1017/s0954579409000492 
Patterson, C. M., Kosson, D. S., & Newman, J. 
P. (1987). Reaction to punishment, reflectivi-
ty, and passive avoidance learning in extraverts. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
52(3), 565-575. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-
3514.52.3.565 
Patterson, C. M., & Newman, J. P. (1993). Reflec-
tivity and learning from aversive events: Toward a 
psychological mechanism for the syndromes of dis-
inhibition. Psychological Review, 100(4), 716-736. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295x.100.4.716 
144 |
Paulhus, D. L., Neumann, C. S., & Hare, R. D. 
(2016). Manual of the Hare Self-Report Psychopa-
thy Scale. Multi-Health Systems. 
Payne, J. W. (2005). It is whether you win or lose: 
The importance of the overall probabilities of win-
ning or losing in risky choice. Journal of Risk and 
Uncertainty, 30(1), 5-19. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11166-005-5831-x 
Peters, J., & Büchel, C. (2010). Neural representa-
tions of subjective reward value. Behaviour-
al Brain Research, 213(2), 135-141. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.bbr.2010.04.031 
Petry, N. M. (2002). Discounting of delayed re-
wards in substance abusers: relationship to an-
tisocial personality disorder. Psychopharmacol-
ogy, 162(4), 425-432. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s00213-002-1115-1 
Petscher, E. S., Rey, C., & Bailey, J. S. (2009). A 
review of empirical support for differential rein-
forcement of alternative behavior. Research in De-
velopmental Disabilities, 30(3), 409-425. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.ridd.2008.08.008 
Pletti, C., Lotto, L., Buodo, G., & Sarlo, M. (2017). 
It's immoral, but I'd do it! Psychopathy traits af-
fect decision-making in sacrificial dilemmas 
and in everyday moral situations. British Jour-
nal of Psychology, 108(2), 351-368. https://doi.
org/10.1111/bjop.12205 
Posner, M. I., & Rothbart, M. K. (2007). Research 
on attention networks as a model for the integra-
tion of psychological science. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 58(1), 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.psych.58.110405.085516 
Pratt, T. C., & Cullen, F. T. (2000). The empirical 
status of Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory 




Raine, A. (2002). Biosocial studies of antisocial 
and violent behavior in children and adults: A 
review. Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 
30(4), 311-326. 
Rasmussen, K., Storsæter, O., & Levander, S. 
(1999). Personality disorders, psychopathy, and 
crime in a Norwegian prison population. Interna-
tional Journal of Law and Psychiatry, 22(1), 91–97. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0160-2527(98)00031-4 
Reynolds, B. (2006). A review of delay-dis-
counting research with humans: relations to 
drug use and gambling. Behavioural Pharmacol-
ogy, 17(8), 651-667. https://doi.org/10.1097/
fbp.0b013e3280115f99 
Rilling, J. K., Glenn, A. L., Jairam, M. R., Pagnoni, 
G., Goldsmith, D. R., Elfenbein, H. A., & Lilien-
feld, S. O. (2007, 2007/06). Neural correlates 
of social cooperation and non-cooperation as a 
function of psychopathy. Biological Psychiatry, 
61(11), 1260-1271. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.bi.-
opsych.2006.07.021 
Rinck, M., & Becker, E. S. (2007). Approach and 
avoidance in fear of spiders. Journal of Behavior 
Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 38(2), 105-
120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2006.10.001 
Rogers, R. D., Everitt, B. J., Baldacchino, A., Black-
shaw, A. J., Swainson, R., Wynne, K., Baker, N. B., 
Hunter, J., Carthy, T., Booker, E., London, M., Deak-
in, J. F. W., Sahakian, B. J., & Robbins, T. W. (1999). 
Dissociable deficits in the decision-making cogni-
tion of chronic amphetamine abusers, opiate abus-
ers, patients with focal damage to prefrontal cor-
tex, and tryptophan-depleted normal volunteers: 
evidence for monoaminergic mechanisms. Neu-
ropsychopharmacology, 20(4), 322-339. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0893-133X(98)00091-8 
Rogers, R. D., Tunbridge, E. M., Bhagwagar, Z., 
Drevets, W. C., Sahakian, B. J., & Carter, C. S. 
(2003). Tryptophan depletion alters the deci-
sion-making of healthy volunteers through altered 
processing of reward cues. Neuropsychopharma-
cology, 28(1), 153-162. https://doi.org/10.1038/
sj.npp.1300001 
Rosas, S. R., & Kane, M. (2012, May). Quality 
and rigor of the concept mapping methodol-
ogy: A pooled study analysis. Evaluation and 
Program Planning, 35(2), 236-245. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2011.10.003 
| 145
Rothemund, Y., Ziegler, S., Hermann, C., Gruess-
er, S. M., Foell, J., Patrick, C. J., & Flor, H. (2012, 
2012/04). Fear conditioning in psychopaths: 
Event-related potentials and peripheral measures. 
Biological Psychology, 90(1), 50-59. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.biopsycho.2012.02.011 
Roy, S., Vize, C., Uzieblo, K., Dongen, J. D. M. v., 
Miller, J. D., Lynam, D. R., Brazil, I. A., Yoon, D., 
Mokros, A., Gray, N. S., Snowden, R., & Neu-
mann, C. S. (2020). Triarchic or septarchic? Un-
covering the Triarchic Psychopathy Measure's 
(TriPM) structure. Personality Disorders: Theory, 
Research, and Treatment, Advance online publica-
tion. https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000392 
Ruggeri, K., Alí, S., Berge, M. L., Bertoldo, G., 
Bjørndal, L. D., Cortijos-Bernabeu, A., Davison, 
C., Demić, E., Esteban-Serna, C., Friedemann, M., 
Gibson, S. P., Jarke, H., Karakasheva, R., Khor-
rami, P. R., Kveder, J., Andersen, T. L., Lofthus, I. 
S., McGill, L., Nieto, A. E., Pérez, J., Quail, S. K., 
Rutherford, C., Tavera, F. L., Tomat, N., Reyn, C. 
V., Većkalov, B., Wang, K., Yosifova, A., Papa, F., 
Rubaltelli, E., Linden, S. v. d., & Folke, T. (2020, 
2020/06/01). Replicating patterns of prospect 
theory for decision under risk. Nature Human Be-
haviour, 4(6), 622-633. https://doi.org/10.1038/
s41562-020-0886-x 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determi-
nation theory and the facilitation of intrinsic 
motivation, social development, and well-being. 
American Psychologist, 55(1), 68-78. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0003-066x.55.1.68 
Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and 
human potentials: A review of research on hedo-
nic and eudaimonic well-being. Annual Review of 
Psychology, 52, 141-166. https://doi.org/10.1146/
annurev.psych.52.1.141 
S 
Salekin, R. T., Worley, C., & Grimes, R. D. (2010). 
Treatment of psychopathy: A review and brief in-
troduction to the mental model approach for psy-
chopathy. Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 28(2), 
235-266. https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.928 
San Martín, R. (2012). Event-related poten-
tial studies of outcome processing and feed-
back-guided learning. Frontiers in Human Neu-
roscience, 6, 304. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fnhum.2012.00304 
Schachter, S., & Latané, B. (1964). Crime, cogni-
tion, and the autonomic nervous system. Nebras-
ka Symposium on Motivation, 12, 221-273. 
Schmauk, F. J. (1970). Punishment, arousal, and 
avoidance learning in sociopaths. Journal of Ab-
normal Psychology, 76(3, Pt.1), 325-335. https://
doi.org/10.1037/h0030398 
Schmitt, W. A., Brinkley, C. A., & Newman, J. P. 
(1999). Testing Damasio's somatic marker hypoth-
esis with psychopathic individuals: Risk takers 
or risk averse? Journal of abnormal psychology, 
108(3), 538-543. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-
843x.108.3.538 
Schultz, D. H., Balderston, N. L., Baskin-Som-
mers, A. R., Larson, C. L., & Helmstetter, F. J. 
(2016). Psychopaths show enhanced amygda-
la activation during fear conditioning. Frontiers 
in Psychology, 7, 348. https://doi.org/10.3389/
fpsyg.2016.00348 
Schultz, W. (1998). Predictive reward signal 
of dopamine neurons. Journal of Neurophys-
iology, 80(1), 1-27. https://doi.org/10.1152/
jn.1998.80.1.1 
Secades-Villa, R., García-Fernández, G., Peña-
Suárez, E., García-Rodríguez, O., Sánchez-Hervás, 
E., & Fernández-Hermida, J. R. (2013). Contingen-
cy management is effective across cocaine-de-
pendent outpatients with different socioeconom-
ic status. Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment, 
44(3), 349–354. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
jsat.2012.08.018 
Skeem, J., Johansson, P., Andershed, H., Kerr, M., 
& Louden, J. E. (2007). Two subtypes of psycho-
pathic violent offenders that parallel primary and 
secondary variants. Journal of Abnormal Psycho-
logy, 116(2), 395-409. https://doi.org/10.1037/
0021-843x.116.2.395 
146 |
Slovic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. (1968). Importance of 
variance preferences in gambling decisions. Jour-
nal of Experimental Psychology, 78(4), 646-654. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0026647 
Snowden, R. J., Smith, C., & Gray, N. S. (2017). Risk 
taking and the triarchic model of psychopathy. 
Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsy-
chology, 39(10), 988-1001. https://doi.org/10.10
80/13803395.2017.1300236 
Sturrock, K., & Rocha, J. (2000). A multi-
dimensional scaling stress evaluation ta-
ble. Field Methods, 12(1), 49-60. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1525822x0001200104 
Sundram, F., Deeley, Q., Sarkar, S., Daly, E., 
Latham, R., Craig, M., Raczek, M., Fahy, T., Pic-
chioni, M., Barker, G. J., & Murphy, D. G. M. (2012, 
2012/02). White matter microstructural abnor-
malities in the frontal lobe of adults with antiso-
cial personality disorder. Cortex, 48(2), 216-229. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2011.06.005 
Swogger, M. T., Walsh, Z., Lejuez, C., & Ko-
sson, D. S. (2010). Psychopathy and risk tak-
ing among jailed inmates. Criminal Justice 
and Behavior, 37(4), 439-452. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0093854810361617 
T 
Takahashi, T., Takagishi, H., Nishinaka, H., Maki-
no, T., & Fukui, H. (2014). Neuroeconomics of psy-
chopathy: Risk taking in probability discounting 
of gain and loss predicts psychopathy. Neuroen-
docrinology Letters, 35(6), 510-517. 
Thornquist, M. H., & Zuckerman, M. (1995, 
1995/10). Psychopathy, passive-avoidance learn-
ing and basic dimensions of personality. Person-
ality and Individual Differences, 19(4), 525-534. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(95)00051-7 
Tiihonen, J., Rossi, R., Laakso, M. P., Hodgins, S., 
Testa, C., Perez, J., Repo-Tiihonen, E., Vaurio, O., 
Soininen, H., Aronen, H. J., Könönen, M., Thomp-
son, P. M., & Frisoni, G. B. (2008, 2008/08). Brain 
anatomy of persistent violent offenders: More 
rather than less. Psychiatry Research: Neuroim-
aging, 163(3), 201-212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.
pscychresns.2007.08.012 
Timmerman, I. G. H., & Emmelkamp, P. M. G. 
(2005, Oct). The effects of cognitive-behavioral 
treatment for forensic inpatients. Internation-
al Journal of Offender Therapy and Compara-
tive Criminology, 49(5), 590-606. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0306624X05277661 
Travis, J., Solomon, A. L., & Waul, M. (2001). From 
prison to home: The dimensions and consequenc-
es of prisoner reentry. Urban Institute. https://
doi.org/http://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/
ref/10.2105/AJPH.2004.056325 
Trochim, W. M. K. (1989). An introduction to con-
cept mapping for planning and evaluation. Evalu-
ation and Program Planning, 12, 1-16. https://doi.
org/10.1016/0149-7189(89)90016-5 
Trochim, W. M. K. (1993). The reliability of con-
cept mapping Annual Conference of the Amer-
ican Evaluation Association, Dallas, Texas. Re-
trieved from http://socialresearchmethods.net/
research/Reliable/reliable.htm
Tversky, A., & Gati, I. (1982). Similarity, sep-
arability, and the triangle inequality. Psycho-
logical Review, 89(2), 123-154. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0033-295x.89.2.123 
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of 
decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 
211(4481), 453-458. https://doi.org/10.1126/scii-
ence.7455683 
Tversky, A., Sattath, S., & Slovic, P. (1988). Con-
tingent weighting in judgment and choice. Psy-
chological Review, 95(3), 371-384. https://doi.
org/10.1037/0033-295x.95.3.371 
V 
van Ginneken, E. F. J. C., & Hayes, D. (2016, 
2017/02/01). ‘Just’ punishment? Offenders’ views 
on the meaning and severity of punishment. Cri-
minology & Criminal Justice, 17(1), 62-78. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1748895816654204 
| 147
Van Goozen, S. H. M., Matthys, W., Cohen-Kette-
nis, P. T., Buitelaar, J. K., & Van Engeland, H. (2000, 
2000/11/01/). Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal 
Axis and Autonomic Nervous System Activity in 
Disruptive Children and Matched Controls. Jour-
nal of the American Academy of Child & Adoles-
cent Psychiatry, 39(11), 1438-1445. https://doi.
org/10.1097/00004583-200011000-00019 
Van Vliet, I. M., Leroy, H., & Van Megen, H. J. M. 
(2000). De MINI-Internationaal neuropsychia-
trisch interview: een kort gestructureerd diagnos-
tisch interview voor DSM-IV en ICD-10 psychiatri-
sche stoornissen. LUMC. 
Vassileva, J., Petkova, P., Georgiev, S., Martin, 
E. M., Tersiyski, R., Raycheva, M., Velinov, V., & 
Marinov, P. (2007). Impaired decision-making 
in psychopathic heroin addicts. Drug and Alco-
hol Dependence, 86(2-3), 287-289. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.drugalcdep.2006.06.015 
Veit, R., Konicar, L., Klinzing, J. G., Barth, B., 
Yilmaz, Ö., & Birbaumer, N. (2013). Deficient 
fear conditioning in psychopathy as a functi-
on of interpersonal and affective disturbances. 
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7. https://doi.
org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00706 
Venkatraman, V., Payne, J. W., & Huettel, S. A. 
(2014). An overall probability of winning heuristic 
for complex risky decisions: Choice and eye fixa-
tion evidence. Organizational Behavior and Hu-
man Decision Processes, 125(2), 73-87. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2014.06.003 
Vermeij, A., Kempes, M. M., Cima, M. J., Mars, R. B., 
& Brazil, I. A. (2018). Affective traits of psychopac-
thy are linked to white-matter abnormalities in im-
pulsive male offenders. Neuropsychology, 32(6), 
735-745. https://doi.org/10.1037/neu0000448 
Viding, E., Blair, R. J. R., Moffitt, T. E., & Plomin, 
R. (2005). Evidence for substantial genetic risk for 
psychopathy in 7-year-olds. Journal of Child Psy-
chology and Psychiatry, 46(6), 592-597. 
Vitale, J. E., Maccoon, D. G., & Newman, J. 
P. (2011, 2011/04/26). Emotion Facilitation 
and Passive Avoidance Learning in Psycho-
pathic Female Offenders. Criminal Justice 
and Behavior, 38(7), 641-658. https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0093854811403590 
Von Borries, A. K. L., Brazil, I. A., Bulten, B. H., Bui-
telaar, J. K., Verkes, R. J., & de Bruijn, E. R. (2010, 
Sep). Neural correlates of error-related learning 
deficits in individuals with psychopathy. Psycho-
logical Medicine, 40(9), 1559-1568. https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0033291709992017 
Von Borries, A. K. L., Verkes, R. J., Bulten, B. H., Cools, 
R., & De Bruijn, E. R. A. (2013). Feedback-related ne -
gativity codes outcome valence, but not outcome 
expectancy, during reversal learning. Cognitive, Af-
fective, & Behavioral Neuroscience, 13(4), 737-746. 
https://doi.org/10.3758/s13415-013-0150-1 
W 
Ward, T. (2002). Good lives and the rehabilitation 
of offenders. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 
7(5), 513–528. https://doi.org/10.1016/s1359-
1789(01)00076-3 
Ward, T., & Gannon, T. A. (2006). Rehabilitation, 
etiology, and self-regulation: The comprehensive 
good lives model of treatment for sexual offend-
ers. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 11(1), 77-94. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2005.06.001 
Ward, T., Melser, J., & Yates, P. M. (2007). Recon-
structing the Risk–Need–Responsivity model: A 
theoretical elaboration and evaluation. Aggres-
sion and Violent Behavior, 12(2), 208-228. 
Waterman, A. S. (1993). Two conceptions of hap-
piness: Contrasts of personal expressiveness (eu-
daimonia) and hedonic enjoyment. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 64(4), 678-691. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.64.4.678 
Webb, L. R. (2003). Building constructive prison 
environments: The functional utility of applying be-
havior analysis in prisons. The Behavior Analyst To-
day, 4(1), 71–77. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0100008 
Wechsler, D. (2012a). WAIS-IV-NL Nederlandsta-
lige bewerking, afname- en scoringshandleiding. 
Pearson Assessment and Information B.V. 
148 |
Wechsler, D. (2012b). WAIS-IV-NL Nederland-
stalige bewerking, technische handleiding. Pear-
son Assessment and Information B.V. 
Weertman, A., Arntz, A., & Kerkhofs, M. L. M. 
(1996). Gestructureerd klinisch interview voor DSM-
-IV persoonlijkheidsstoornissen (SCID-II). Swets. 
Weller, R. E., Cook, E. W., Avsar, K. B., & Cox, J. E. 
(2008). Obese women show greater delay discount-
ing than healthy-weight women. Appetite, 51(3), 563-
569. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.appet.2008.04.010 
Wiebe, R. P. (2003). Reconciling psychopathy and 
low self-control. Justice Quarterly, 20(2), 297-336. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/07418820300095541 
Willis, G. M., Yates, P. M., Gannon, T. A., & Ward, 
T. (2012). How to integrate the Good Lives Model 
into treatment programs for sexual offending: An 
introduction and overview. Sexual Abuse: A Jour-
nal of Research and Treatment, 25(2), 123-142. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1079063212452618 
Wilson, H. A. (2014). Can antisocial personality 
disorder be treated? A meta-analysis examining the 
effectiveness of treatment in reducing recidivism 
for individuals diagnosed with ASPD. Internation-
al Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 13(1), 36-46. 
Wodahl, E. J., Garland, B., Culhane, S. E., & Mc-
Carty, W. P. (2011, Apr). Utilizing behavioral in-
terventions to improve supervision outcomes 
in community-based corrections. Criminal Jus-
tice and Behavior, 38(4), 386-405. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0093854810397866 
Wong, S. C. P., Gordon, A., & Gu, D. Q. (2007, May). 
Assessment and treatment of violence-prone fo-
rensic clients: An integrated approach. British 
Journal of Psychiatry, 190(49), S66-S74. https://
doi.org/10.1192/bjp.190.5.s66 
Y 
Yang, Y., Raine, A., Colletti, P., Toga, A. W., & Narr, K. 
L. (2010). Morphological alterations in the prefron-
tal cortex and the amygdala in unsuccessful psycho-
paths. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 119(3), 546-
554. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019611 
Yang, Y., Raine, A., Colletti, P., Toga, A. W., & Narr, 
K. L. (2011, 2011/02/01). Abnormal structural 
correlates of response perseveration in individu-
als with psychopathy. Journal of Neuropsychiatry, 
23(1), 107-110. https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.neu.-
ropsych.23.1.107 
Yeung, N., & Sanfey, A. G. (2004). Independent 
coding of reward magnitude and valence in the 






Waar denkt u aan bij het horen van de termen ‘psychopathie’ of ‘psychopaat’? 
In de media worden hiermee meestal koelbloedige moordenaars aangeduid die 
vaak ook sadistisch zijn en zonder enige vorm van mededogen te werk gaan. Ook 
in het dagelijks taalgebruik komen de termen nog wel eens voorbij, waarbij dan 
meestal iemand wordt bedoeld die weinig empathie toont en voornamelijk van-
uit eigenbelang handelt. Zoals bij zoveel termen die uit de psychiatrie afkomstig 
zijn en in populair taalgebruik zijn overgenomen, hebben deze ‘betekenissen’ 
wel enige raakvlakken met de daadwerkelijke stoornis, maar is de werkelijkheid 
genuanceerder en, bovendien, gevarieerder. Vast staat wel dat mensen met psy-
chopathie voor een substantieel deel van ernstige geweldsdelicten verantwoor-
delijk zijn en het aandeel van deze mensen binnen gevangenissen en andere 
onderdelen van het justitiële system is vele malen hoger dan in de samenleving 
als geheel.
Binnen de psychiatrie wordt psychopathie gedefinieerd als een constellatie 
van persoonlijkheids- en gedragskenmerken die in grofweg twee dimensies zijn 
te onderscheiden: tekorten in het sociaal-emotioneel functioneren, en een im-
pulsieve, antisociale levensstijl. De meningen over de precieze definitie van psy-
chopathie zijn echter nog steeds verdeeld, maar dat is ook te wijten aan het feit 
dat de stoornis zoveel uitingen kan hebben en er grote onderlinge verschillen zijn 
in het niveau waarop men binnen de samenleving functioneert. Dit proefschrift 
richt zich op een zeer specifieke groep personen met psychopathie, namelijk zij 
die ernstige (gewelds)delicten hebben gepleegd en in verband hiermee onder 
forensisch psychiatrische behandeling zijn. De definitie die hierbij gehanteerd 
wordt is dan ook dezelfde als gangbaar binnen het forensische systeem en 
is gebaseerd op het model van Robert Hare, die tevens een instrument heeft 
ontwikkeld om (de ernst van) psychopathie meetbaar te maken: de Psychopathy 
Checklist-Revised (PCL-R). De persoonlijkheidskenmerken die binnen het 
model van Hare worden gedefinieerd, hebben betrekking op emotionele en 
interpersoonlijke tekorten, zoals een beperkte emotionele belevingswereld, een 
oppervlakkige charme (‘gladheid’), pathologisch liegen, manipulatief gedrag, en 
een gebrek aan empathie en schuldgevoelens. Gedragskenmerken die binnen 
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dit model worden genoemd zijn onder andere impulsiviteit, een sterke behoefte 
aan prikkels, een gebrek aan lange-termijn doelen, reeds op jonge leeftijd aan-
wezige gedragsproblemen en aanrakingen met justitie, en een breed spectrum 
aan criminele activiteiten. Psychopathie vertoont overlap met de antisociale per-
soonlijkheidsstoornis, maar dat is met name op de gedragsdimensie, en minder 
op het persoonlijkheidsvlak. Bovendien is er bewijs dat de processen die ten 
grondslag liggen aan maladaptief gedrag bij psychopathie verschillen van die bij 
non-psychopathische antisociale persoonlijkheidsstructuren.
Naast de hierboven genoemde kenmerken van psychopathie, worden bij 
mensen met psychopathie vaak beperkingen gezien in cognitieve mechanis-
men die tevens betrokken zijn bij (sociaal) leren, zoals het leren van feedback 
en het voorspellen van aversieve uitkomsten (zoals straf) op basis van eerdere 
ervaringen. Juist doordat de stoornis zo gecompliceerd is en maatschappelijk 
veel teweegbrengt, is zowel fundamenteel als toegepast onderzoek nodig om 
interventies te kunnen ontwerpen die specifiek gericht zijn op psychopathische 
geweldplegers. Van belang hierbij is dat juridische systemen traditioneel over 
het algemeen gericht zijn op straffen, waarbij gevangenisstraf primair functio-
neert als vergelding van leed voor slachtoffers en maatschappij, ter bescherming 
van de samenleving, en ter ontmoediging van toekomstige delicten. Wanneer 
iemand echter na een periode van detentie terugkeert in de maatschappij, dient 
er mede daaraan voorafgaand voldoende aandacht te zijn voor rehabilitatie en 
gedragsverandering om te voorkomen dat iemand terugvalt in crimineel gedrag. 
Bij de gangbare interventies gericht op gedragsverandering, zowel in foren-
sische als non-forensische populaties, staat bekrachtiging van gewenst gedrag 
vaak centraal. Dit houdt in dat gewenst gedrag positieve consequenties voor het 
individu heeft (en hiermee beloond wordt), en dat ongewenst gedrag het missen 
van deze beloning (en hiermee indirect een negatieve consequentie) tot gevolg 
heeft. Gezien de grote individuele verschillen in behandelrespons, alsmede de 
lage behandelrespons en hoge recidivecijfers bij patiënten met psychopathie, 
is het van belang om bekrachtigers te vinden die voor individuele patiënten 
relevant zijn. Deze individu-gerichte benadering staat centraal in de studies die 
in dit proefschrift worden beschreven, waarbij ik mij heb gericht op individuele 
beloningsvoorkeuren en deze voorkeuren heb meegenomen bij mijn onderzoek 
naar hoe patiënten met psychopathie leren van feedback en beslissingen nemen 
op basis van voorspellende informatie. 
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijf ik een overzicht van de literatuur gericht op aversief 
conditioneren, instrumenteel leren en het omgaan met risico tijdens het nemen 
| 151
van beslissingen bij patiënten met psychopathie. Uit studies gericht op aversief 
conditioneren blijkt dat psychopathie geassocieerd is met een verminderde res-
pons op aversieve cues. In deze studies werd gebruik gemaakt van bijvoorbeeld 
(lichte) elektrische schokken, vervelende auditieve prikkels, of sociale afwijzing, 
waarbij patiënten met psychopathie minder goed in staat waren om van herhaal-
delijke aanrakingen met deze aversieve prikkels te leren dan een controlegroep. 
Zij bleven bijvoorbeeld langer dezelfde respons geven die tot deze aversieve 
uitkomst leidde, waardoor onderzoekers ook de link hebben gelegd met een ver-
minderde gevoeligheid voor straf en de hoge recidivecijfers binnen deze groep. 
Daarnaast blijkt uit de literatuur dat psychopathie geassocieerd is met beper-
kingen in passive avoidance learning. Bij passive avoidance learning leert iemand 
door middel van trial-and-error op welke stimuli gereageerd moet worden, en 
welke stimuli vermeden dienen te worden. Meestal is het dan zo dat reageren op 
de ‘correcte’ stimulus een beloning oplevert (bijvoorbeeld het verdienen van pun-
ten), en reageren op een ‘incorrecte’ stimulus heeft straf tot gevolg (bijvoorbeeld 
verlies van punten). Uit onderzoek blijkt dat patiënten met psychopathie vaker 
blijven reageren op incorrecte stimuli dan mensen zonder psychopathie wan-
neer er inderdaad sprake is van zowel beloning als straf binnen de taak. Wanneer 
er alleen sprake is van straf bij incorrecte responsen, maar geen beloning bij een 
correcte respons, presteren ze hetzelfde als mensen zonder psychopathie. Dit 
lijkt erop te wijzen dat er niet primair sprake is van een verstoorde verwerking 
van aversieve prikkels, maar dat de manier waarop beloning-gerelateerde infor-
matie wordt verwerkt hiermee sterk verband houdt.
Voorts blijkt uit de besproken studies dat patiënten met psychopathie tekor-
ten hebben in hun vermogen om geleerde contingenties te updaten, zoals bij 
reversal learning gevraagd wordt. Tijdens reversal learning worden eerst asso-
ciaties aangeleerd, waarbij het geven van een correcte respons wordt beloond, 
en het geven van een incorrecte respons wordt bestraft. Na enige tijd worden 
deze associaties omgedraaid, waarbij de voorheen beloonde respons voortaan 
wordt bestraft, en de voorheen bestrafte respons voortaan wordt beloond. Uit 
onderzoek blijkt dat patiënten met psychopathie moeite hebben om de eerst 
aangeleerde beloningsgerichte associatie te veranderen, waardoor ze een res-
pons blijven geven die uiteindelijk steeds straf oplevert.
De literatuur is minder eenduidig over de relatie tussen psychopathie en het 
nemen van risicovolle beslissingen. Hoewel veel studies wijzen op een verhoogde 
mate van risicovolle beslissingen bij patiënten met psychopathie in vergelijking 
met een gezonde controlegroep, zijn de bevindingen een stuk minder duidelijk 
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wanneer zij vergeleken worden met patiënten met een antisociale persoonlijk-
heidsstoornis. Dit suggereert dat verhoogd risicogedrag bij psychopathie pri-
mair gerelateerd is aan de gedragsmatige aspecten van de stoornis, en dat de 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken die aan de kern van psychopathie liggen, met name 
de kenmerken die betrekking hebben op de emotionele informatieverwerking, 
minder invloed hebben op risicogedrag. 
Een belangrijke factor die in veel van deze studies niet is meegenomen, is hoe 
de beloningen en straffen (die meestal de vorm hadden van te verdienen punten 
of kleine geldbedragen) subjectief werden gewaardeerd door de deelnemers aan 
deze onderzoeken. Er zijn echter ook nog geen studies gedaan naar welke soor-
ten beloningen als aantrekkelijk worden beschouwd door plegers van ernstige 
delicten, waaronder zij met psychopathie.
In hoofdstuk 3 wordt dit onderwerp benaderd met een exploratieve studie 
bij patiënten die onder forensisch-psychiatrische behandeling zijn. Zowel pa-
tiënten uit een gesloten (TBS) als ambulante behandelsetting hebben aan deze 
studie deelgenomen. Hierbij werd gebruik gemaakt van een combinatie van kwa-
litatieve en kwantitatieve onderzoeksmethoden, een techniek genaamd concept 
mapping. In focusgroepen met patiënten werden items gegenereerd die door 
henzelf als belonend werden ervaren. Daarna werden al deze items individueel 
door patiënten gewaardeerd en gesorteerd in groepjes van bij elkaar passende 
items. Op deze data werden uiteindelijk kwantitatieve analysemethoden toege-
past om tot een aantal hoofdcategorieën van beloningen, de dimensies waar-
langs ze variëren, en hun relatieve waarden te komen. 
We vonden dat beide groepen patiënten beloningen die meer inzet of moeite 
kosten als aantrekkelijker beoordeelden dan beloningen die weinig moeite kos-
ten. Beloningen die veel inzet kosten waren bijvoorbeeld beloningen gerelateerd 
aan autonomie, kwaliteit van sociaal functioneren, of persoonlijke ontwikkeling. 
Beloningen die weinig moeite kosten waren bijvoorbeeld gerelateerd aan midde-
lengebruik, materiële goederen, en ontspannende of juist stimulerende ervarin-
gen. Bij TBS-patiënten werden beloningen met name gewaardeerd wanneer deze 
betrekking hadden op hun directe omgeving, wat hiermee ook implicaties heeft 
voor de behandelfase (met meer of minder vrijheden) waarin een patiënt op dat 
moment verkeert. Bij ambulante patiënten werden beloningen met hogere waar-
den vaak geassocieerd met lagere niveaus van arousal (‘opwinding’). Ondanks 
dat deze bevindingen overeenkomen met de beloningsvoorkeuren van gezonde 
individuen, lijken ze enigszins contra intuïtief in vergelijking met het ‘snelle geld’ 
en de hedonistische doelen die vaak met crimineel gedrag geassocieerd zijn, 
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maar ook in vergelijking met wat is gevonden in relatie tot psychopathie in de 
algemene populatie. Sociaal wenselijke antwoorden en de gemengde samenstel-
ling van onze steekproeven met betrekking tot delict-type en psychopathologie 
hebben mogelijk bijgedragen aan deze discrepantie.
In hoofdstuk 4 en 5 zijn de bevindingen van deze studie gebruikt in twee 
experimentele taken die gericht zijn op instrumenteel leren en het nemen van 
risicovolle beslissingen. We waren specifiek geïnteresseerd in de vraag of de 
subjectieve waarde van ‘natuurlijke’ beloningen, die aangepast waren aan de 
subjectieve voorkeuren van iedere individuele deelnemer, meer invloed zouden 
hebben op de prestaties van patiënten met psychopathie in deze taken dan de 
meer gebruikelijke experimentele beloningen en straffen (zoals het verdienen 
van punten). We vergeleken in deze studies TBS-gestelden met psychopathie, 
TBS-gestelden zonder psychopathie, en een gezonde controlegroep. Hierbij be-
oordeelden de deelnemers eerst een aantal beloningen die ze met hun prestatie 
op de experimentele taken zouden kunnen verdienen. Ze voerden deze taken 
vervolgens onder drie verschillende condities uit: eenmaal voor alleen punten, 
eenmaal voor de door hen laagst gewaardeerde beloning, en eenmaal voor de 
hoogst gewaardeerde beloning. De te verdienen beloningen varieerden dus tus-
sen de deelnemers. 
In de studie die in hoofdstuk 4 is beschreven, voerden de deelnemers een 
taak uit waarmee zowel passive avoidance learning als reversal learning werd 
onderzocht. Hieruit bleek dat patiënten met psychopathie, vergeleken met de 
andere twee groepen, inderdaad tekorten laten zien in passive avoidance learn-
ing wanneer er in de taak alleen punten kunnen worden verdiend of verloren. 
Dit is in overeenstemming met wat er in de literatuur over psychopathie en 
passive avoidance learning wordt beschreven. Daarnaast waren ze in die condi-
tie minder goed in staat om positieve feedback te gebruiken voor toekomstige 
beslissingen. Er waren echter geen groepsverschillen in prestatie wanneer er 
‘echte’, natuurlijke beloningen op het spel stonden. Uit gemeten hersenactiviteit 
door middel van event-related potentials bleek dan ook dat negatieve feedback 
in alle groepen een sterkere respons in het brein tot gevolg had wanneer een 
beloning met hoge subjectieve waarde op het spel stond in vergelijking met de 
twee andere condities (lage subjectieve waarde en alleen punten). Met andere 
woorden: de subjectieve waarde die door de deelnemers aan de beloningen was 
toegekend, werd ook als zodanig door het brein vertaald. In deze studie werd 
ook onderzocht of verschillen in beloningswaarde invloed zouden hebben op 
de prestatie tijdens reversal learning. Er kwamen echter geen effecten van groep, 
noch van beloningswaarde naar voren. Wel was er hierbij een meer algemeen 
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tekort in het verwerken van negatieve feedback bij patiënten met psychopathie; 
zij waren minder goed in staat hun gedrag direct aan te passen op basis van 
negatieve feedback, al leidde dit dus niet tot een lager overall niveau van reversal 
learning dan bij de andere groepen.
In de studie die in hoofdstuk 5 is beschreven, deden dezelfde drie groepen 
deelnemers een taak gericht op het nemen van risicovolle beslissingen. Hierbij 
kregen ze steeds de keuze uit twee varianten van ‘het Rad van Fortuin’: een vei-
lige optie en een risicovolle optie. De veilige optie gaf altijd 50% kans op winst 
en verlies van hetzelfde lage aantal (10) punten, en had dan ook altijd een ex-
pected value van 0. Expected value wordt hier gedefinieerd wordt als de som 
van alle verwachte uitkomsten vermenigvuldigd met hun waarschijnlijkheden. 
De risicovolle optie varieerde in het aantal te winnen en te verliezen punten (20 
vs. 80), alsmede in de waarschijnlijkheid van de twee uitkomsten (75% vs. 25%). 
De expected value van de risicovolle optie varieerde hierdoor van zeer negatief 
tot zeer positief. Uit deze studie kwamen geen effecten naar voren van subjec-
tieve beloningswaarde op het nemen van risicovolle beslissingen. Wel vonden 
we dat alle patiënten, maar met name die met psychopathie, meer risicovolle 
beslissingen namen dan mensen uit de gezonde controlegroep wanneer er in 
de risicovolle optie een hoog aantal punten te behalen was. Patiënten met psy-
chopathie namen ook meer risicovolle beslissingen dan mensen uit de gezonde 
controlegroep wanneer er binnen de risicovolle optie een relatief laag aantal 
punten te behalen viel. Deze neiging van de patiënten om hun beslissingen te 
baseren op de beschikbaarheid van puntenwinst was onafhankelijk van de waar-
schijnlijkheid van deze uitkomsten. 
Deze resultaten wijzen op zowel verhoogd beloning-zoekend gedrag als een 
verminderde gevoeligheid voor straf in onze steekproef van patiënten. Daarnaast 
leidden grote winsten met lage waarschijnlijkheid ook tot een verhoogde mate 
van risicovolle beslissingen in patiënten met psychopathie in vergelijking met 
patiënten zonder psychopathie wanneer de expected values van de twee opties 
relatief gelijk waren en de opties daardoor lastig in een oogopslag te vergelij-
ken waren. Wanneer we de centrale onderzoeksvragen in ogenschouw nemen, 
suggereren deze bevindingen dat patiënten met psychopathie geleid worden 
door het vooruitzicht van aantrekkelijke korte-termijn uitkomsten, ongeacht de 
ermee geassocieerde risico’s, terwijl langere-termijn beloningen weinig effect op 
risicovolle beslissingen lijken te hebben. 
Samengevat kan uit dit proefschrift geconcludeerd worden dat het gebruik 
van subjectieve beloningen het leren van nieuwe associaties bij patiënten met 
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psychopathie kan verbeteren, en daarmee het leren van nieuwe responsen, maar 
dit werd niet gevonden voor het aanpassen van deze eenmaal geleerde associa-
ties. Verder lijken patiënten met psychopathie geneigd om risicovolle beslissin-
gen te nemen en hierbij primair gestuurd te worden door uitkomsten op de korte 
termijn, waarbij kans-gerelateerde predictieve informatie en langere-termijn 
uitkomsten (zoals beloningen voor de algehele prestatie) een beperkte rol lijken 
te spelen. Deze bevindingen wijzen erop dat het gebruik van beloningen met 
voldoende subjectieve waarde adaptief gedrag in mensen met psychopathie zou 
kunnen faciliteren, maar er is meer onderzoek nodig naar de mechanismen die 
het sterkst betrokken zijn bij zulke gedragsverandering. Vervolgstudies naar de 
invloed van subjectieve beloningen op gedragsadaptatie bij psychopathie zou-
den zich dan meer specifiek op deze mechanismen kunnen richten. Uiteindelijk 
zouden zowel de maatschappij als patiënten zelf profiteren van een sterkere 
inbedding van empirische bevindingen in de klinische forensische praktijk, 
waarmee een toekomst met verder ontwikkelde gepersonaliseerde therapie-
programma’s, gericht op duurzame positieve gedragsverandering en rekening 
houdend met individuele verschillen, dichterbij zou kunnen komen.
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Dit proefschrift gaat over de subjectieve waarde van beloningen, waarbij 
centraal staat dat wat voor de één erg belonend is, voor de ander juist weinig 
waarde kan hebben. Maar hierbij geldt ook dat wat op een bepaald moment 
van iemands leven erg waardevol en motiverend kan zijn, in een andere periode 
naar de achtergrond kan verschuiven. Juist dit karakteriseert ook de periode 
dat dit proefschrift tot stand kwam. Een aantal major life events zijn de revue 
gepasseerd; sommige mooi en verrijkend, maar andere had ik kunnen missen 
als kiespijn, waaronder het verlies van dierbaren en een chronische ziekte die 
ineens op mijn pad is gekomen. Naast het hele proces van promoveren, heb ik 
ook een nieuwe persoonlijke balans moeten vinden, waarbij mijn hoofd soms 
meer wil dan mijn lichaam toestaat. Dit is relativerend: ik ben de subjectieve 
beloning nog meer in de kleine grootse dingen gaan vinden. Maar het was ook 
niet altijd makkelijk om mijn droom om te promoveren, die ik al zo lang had, 
met deze nieuwe uitdagingen te volbrengen. Dat dit straks (als het goed is…) 
toch is gelukt, is mede te danken aan mensen die op verschillende manieren 
hebben bijgedragen aan de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift: inhoudelijk, 
faciliterend, motiverend…of alle drie!
Aller-allereerst gaat mijn dank uit naar mijn promotor en copromotoren. 
Roy, ik ben ontzettend dankbaar dat jij mijn promotor bent. De dagelijkse in- 
houdelijke begeleiding lag voornamelijk bij Roald en Inti, maar je hebt op de 
achtergrond zo veel mogelijk gemaakt, juist in de perioden dat het lastig was en 
ik zelf het overzicht kwijt begon te raken. Dankjewel voor alles! Jammer dat die 
laatste barbecue in je prachtige tuin me (door Covid) door de neus is geboord. Ik 
zou er nog één keer bij zijn voor ik zou promoveren, maar het leek me toch niet 
zo’n goed idee om daarop te gaan wachten.
Roald en Inti, Team Wonder, ik zou een volledig dankwoord aan jullie twee kun-
nen wijden (nee, dat ga ik niet doen). Ik wens alle promovendi een team als jullie 
aan hun zijde. Inhoudelijk en qua persoonlijkheid zo verschillend, maar daardoor 
een perfecte aanvulling op elkaar. Allebei enorm sterk op je eigen expertisege-
bied, en daarnaast twee ontzettend fijne, gezellige en warme mensen om mee 
samen te werken (en op reis te gaan!).
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Roald, als ik aan jou denk, denk ik aan snelheid (zowel in je denken, je werk 
(feedback op een manuscript vaak na een dag) als in je looptempo), ordelijkheid 
(behalve die ene shockerende bureaulade waar ik per ongeluk op stuitte), maar 
bovenal je humor en betrokkenheid. Ik kijk met heel veel plezier terug op onze 
congressen, waarbij Washington DC met de overdaad aan pilaren op de één of 
andere manier het meest met jou verbonden blijft. Ik dank je voor alle inhoude-
lijke sparringmomenten maar ook voor je begrip en geduld. 
Inti, ik vind het toch wel speciaal dat ik jouw eerste aio mocht zijn, en dat terwijl 
je aan het begin van het traject nog niet eens gepromoveerd was! Bedankt voor 
je relaxedheid, je enorme relativeringsvermogen en dat je me zo vaak de weg 
hebt kunnen wijzen. Wat in mijn hoofd krom was, wist jij vaak weer recht te re-
deneren (en dan klopte het ook echt)… echt een fijne skill om te hebben, lijkt mij. 
Het was ook tof dat we persoonlijke gebeurtenissen konden delen die bij onze 
levensfase horen, zoals kinderen en verhuizingen (!), en alle vreugde en stress 
die daarbij hoort. Maar bovenal het samen schaamteloos toe-eigenen van extra 
toetjes in het vliegtuig (en sowieso alles wat met lekker eten te maken heeft).
Members of the manuscript committee, professor Roshan Cools, professor Jan 
Buitelaar and dr. Arielle-Baskin-Sommers, thank you for your willingness, time 
and effort to read and judge my manuscript.
Dan zijn er nog een aantal andere mensen zonder wie het onderzoek gewoon 
niet mogelijk was geweest. Erik, jij staat hierbij bovenaan. Dataverzameling bin-
nen deze populaties en in deze settings is pittig, en ik ben ervan overtuigd dat 
de dataverzameling zonder jou nooit tot stand was gekomen: bedankt voor alle 
mogelijkheden binnen de kliniek en bij Kairos, het helpen om alle neuzen dezelf-
de kant op te krijgen, maar ook voor het inhoudelijk meedenken en het kritisch 
meelezen. En natuurlijk de gezellige kerstborrels met symbolische kerstcadeau-
tjes en de bijbehorende bijzondere verhalen! Hierbij denk ik meteen aan de fijne 
(ex-)collega’s van de Pompe die ik nu al zo lang niet meer heb gezien: Gonnie 
(met stip, dankjewel voor álles!), Meike, Sandra, Danique, Yvonne, Suzanne, en 
anderen die in die tijd gekomen en gegaan zijn. Ik vond de afdeling onderzoek 
klein maar erg fijn en ik heb het erg gewaardeerd zoveel samen te hebben kun-
nen delen, maar ook enorm veel samen te hebben kunnen lachen! 
Natuurlijk dank ik ook alle mensen die aan mijn onderzoek hebben deelgeno-
men, en alle medewerkers uit de kliniek en de poli’s die de rekrutering hebben 
gefaciliteerd, en die hebben bijgedragen aan het vormgeven en beschikbaar stel-
len van de beloningen die onze patiënten in het onderzoek konden verdienen. 
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Daarnaast moet ik ook echt de mensen noemen die op verschillende momenten 
met de dataverzameling hebben geholpen: Mareike, Inge, Barbarien en Loïs. 
Dankjulliewel! En ook al ben ik nog steeds trots dat ik zoveel zelf heb gepro-
grammeerd, zonder de hulp van Wilbert van Ham van TSG was het niet zo mooi 
geworden (en had het nog twee jaar langer geduurd). Veel dank daarvoor!
Dan zijn er nog een aantal NRP-collega’s die een belangrijke rol in dit proces 
hebben gespeeld. Allereerst lieve Saskia, ik weet niet hoe ik overkoepelend zou 
moeten beschrijven wat je hebt betekend. Lief en leed heb ik met je gedeeld (zo-
als waarschijnlijk de halve afdeling deed en doet), je had altijd een luisterend oor, 
wist dingen in no-time te fiksen of in elk geval de juiste persoon in te schakelen, 
en hield de rust erin als ik helemaal gestressed binnenstormde. Dankjewel voor 
alles. Karin, ook jij bedankt voor alle fijne gesprekken en de gezelligheid. Ook 
onze lunches met Roald en Saskia waren een fijne routine waarin alle huis-tuin-
-en-keukenperikelen de revue konden passeren. 
Verder mijn gezellige kamergenootjes Selma en Nikki. Selma, ik kon echt genie-
ten van je avonturentochten, dat je gewoon ging doen wat je wilde doen maar 
toch ook alles voor elkaar hebt gekregen! Nikki, bedankt voor alle fijne gesprek-
ken. Ik vind het ook nog steeds bijzonder hoe iemand die zo’n gestructureerde 
‘in control’-indruk maakt, in werkelijkheid zo enorm chaotisch kan zijn (nog veel 
erger dan ik)! En Josi, Samba-collega, ook jij bedankt voor alle gezelligheid, de 
leuke tijd in Antwerpen, en dat we samen onze ontzetting konden delen over 
wat Inti ons allemaal aandoet. 
Tja, dan zijn er nog een paar mensen die mij in den beginne hebben verwelkomd 
en waarmee ik hoop spoedig weer eens op een terras te kunnen gaan zitten: 
Evelien, Dirk, Bonnie, Zita, en Egbert. Buiten het feit dat het supergezellig was 
met jullie, hebben jullie zelf misschien geen idee hoe fijn jullie relativeringspraat-
jes voor mij zijn geweest als ik mij weer eens had laten imponeren door ‘wande-
lende computers’. Het enthousiasme dat ik bij onze borrels meekreeg van jullie 
verhalen over jullie klinische werk was aanstekelijk en heeft het vuurtje aange-
wakkerd waarmee ik uiteindelijk in Venray ben beland. En waar ik óók weer zulke 
fijne collega’s aantrof…
Want werkelijk, ik kan me geen werkplek herinneren waar me zo vaak de tranen 
over de wangen rolden van het lachen, en dan vooral met de (ex-)Neurootjes: 
Wouter (a.k.a. W.O. a.k.a Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek), Laureen, Ynès, Anja, 
Linde, Mareike, Carmen, Lotte, Hanneke, Renée en Loes. Ik mis jullie echt! Maar 
ook Ellen, Anke, Jos, en alle andere lieve collega’s; het was ontzettend fijn met 
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jullie samen te werken. Aanvankelijk lukte het verder schrijven aan mijn proef-
schrift niet zo goed, maar toen ik daar de structuur in gevonden had, was het 
eigenlijk een best goede combinatie. En ik heb het precies af kunnen ronden in 
de tijd dat ik bij jullie was.
En buiten collega’s zijn er ook nog eens allemaal fijne vrienden die in al die tijd 
zoveel ontspanning hebben gebracht. De meesten van jullie hebben eigenlijk niet 
echt een idee wat ik nou precies aan het doen was, maar dat was ook helemaal 
geen issue. We hebben andere dingen die ons binden, een verleden, iets met mu-
ziek, iets met bussen, iets met 23, iets met speakers, honden ook, en eten, veel 
lekker eten, gewoon pretentieloos genieten en gáááán!! Maar allereerst Maarten, 
dat jij er niet meer bent is nog steeds ongelooflijk en eigenlijk onverteerbaar. Er 
mist nog steeds een enorme pizza slice uit mijn inner circle. Lein, ik weet niet 
waar ik moet beginnen, jij bent zo’n pizza slice, en mijn nep-zus, en eh.. je kent 
me gewoon van binnen en van buiten, je bent een fijn vrolijk mens en ik kan echt 
niet zonder je. Jeroen, ook pizza slice, we hebben onze zilveren vriendschap in-
middels, thanks voor gewoon zijn wie je bent. R-J en Cath, jullie ook, zoveel dank 
voor jullie vriendschap, van op zijn kop in de bus tot boswandelingen met onmo-
gelijke peuters. Wat er nu allemaal gebeurt kan ik op dit moment nog niet echt 
bevatten. Lieve Cath, je bent een strijder en een topper!! Jorrit, we go way back, 
ik weet dat ik het bij jou niet hoef te benoemen, het zit vanbinnen, dus gewoon 
thanks. Jan10 en Nik, bedankt voor het delen van het gemis maar ook voor alle 
fijne momenten die daarop zijn gevolgd. Ik hoop nog vaak samen te gaan eten, 
drinken, kamperen, en dansen. Verder de Nijmeegse Vereniging en aanverwan-
ten, bedankt voor alle gezelligheid en het delen van de dingen des levens: Marije, 
Floor, Gina, Nuz, Maaike, Angela, Anthony, Aike, Bobo, Stijn, Giel, Eelco, David, 
en vast nog anderen die ik nu vergeet. Boke en Robin, superfijn dat we elkaar al 
zo lang kennen en er eigenlijk nog zo weinig veranderd lijkt sinds 20 jaar geleden 
(oké, beetje serieuzer dan). Wouter en Joppe, als de pleuris uitbreekt ga ik met 
jullie mee, dan weet ik zeker dat we het wel redden qua survival skills (al neem ik 
dan zelf wel duct tape mee om af en toe over Joppe’s mond te plakken).
Wonneke, dank voor je betrokkenheid en je interesse in alles, waaronder de 
promotieperikelen. Ik vind het super dat we nog contact hebben na al die jaren! 
Alec, Martijn, Pieter, 19 jaar geleden begonnen we samen met psychologie en we 
waren allemaal een beetje vreemde eenden in de bijt (oké, Pieter misschien niet 
echt, maar hij was wel de eerste en enige soort van (nep-corps)bal in mijn leven). 
Mooi hoe iedereen zijn eigen pad heeft gevolgd en het is toch ook best aardig 
gelukt contact te houden. Het afspreken schiet niet echt op, maar ik houd hoop!
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Marije, er was voor mij geen twijfel over dat jij mijn paranimf zou moeten zijn. 
Vroedvrouw, crisismanager, kapper, boer (willekeurige volgorde), maar bovenal 
fijn mens. We klikten bij de eerste knip. Bedankt voor alle momenten waarop 
je er was, groot, klein, naar, fijn. Je was erbij toen ik gebeld werd dat ik voor de 
promotieplek was aangenomen en je staat naast me bij mijn verdediging. Ik houd 
wel van cirkels.
Anja, gabber, één van mijn favoriete collega’s, toen ik eenmaal had bedacht dat 
ik jou als paranimf zou kunnen vragen, liet het me niet meer los. Je bent betrok-
ken, gepassioneerd en enthousiast, lief en grappig, en ook een tikje apart, al kan 
ik daar de vinger niet helemaal op leggen. Ik kan enorm genieten van je direct-
heid en weet zeker dat ik volop powerrrr voel als je naast me staat tijdens mijn 
verdediging!
Lieve schoonfamilie, ik had me geen andere kunnen wensen (behalve dan de 
verwarring met extra Wimmen). We hebben al veel meegemaakt samen, mooi 
en lelijk, en jullie hebben vanaf het begin meegeleefd met alles wat zich in mijn 
promotietraject heeft afgespeeld. Manja en Wim, jullie kennen het klappen van 
de zweep bij het doen van onderzoek. Naast de gezelligheid was het fijn die 
herkenning te hebben. En die heerlijke baksels natuurlijk! Marit en G-J, jullie zijn 
ook gewoon gezellige en relaxte mensen, altijd geïnteresseerd en er valt altijd 
veel te grinniken. Ik hoop dat we binnenkort weer vaker wat kunnen gaan doen 
met zijn allen. M-J, bedankt voor je gastvrijheid, je vrijgevigheid, je flexibiliteit als 
we ineens opvang nodig hadden, en natuurlijk voor het samen kunnen delen van 
de witte wijn. Jo heeft de start van mijn project net niet meer meegemaakt, maar 
nog wel dat ik zou gaan starten, wat ongelooflijk stom blijft dat toch. Ik ben blij 
voor je dat Wim nu aan je zijde is, echt een toppertje (behalve dus zijn naam…), 
jullie zijn echt een goede match.
Mam en Wi(lle)m, dank jullie wel voor alles, dat jullie altijd in mij geloofd heb-
ben, terwijl de omgeving daar vroeger toch anders over dacht (de mentor van de 
mavo die schreef dat hij havo “ab-so-luut NIET haalbaar” achtte; al had hij daar 
achteraf nog gelijk in ook, het lukte pas en werd pas leuk toen ik ging studeren). 
Het schoolsysteem waarin ik mij zo ongelukkig voelde, mijn persoonlijke zoek-
tocht en wilde haren die jullie heel wat kopzorgen hebben bezorgd… ook al was 
het niet altijd makkelijk, ik ben opgegroeid in een warm nest met veel liefde en 
zorg waar ik uiteindelijk altijd op kon terugvallen. En waar altijd heerlijk gekookt 
werd! Mam, ik kan heerlijk met je lachen en hoop dat het je steeds beter lukt om 
ook aan jezelf te denken! Wim en Cheyenna, fantastisch dat jullie elkaar gevon-
den hebben. Wim, hoe ouder we worden, hoe kleiner ons leeftijdsverschil wordt 
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(relatief dan he), en dat vind ik wel prettig. Het is fijn om iemand te hebben die 
dezelfde basis heeft, en ik vind het echt bijzonder hoe enorm verschillend wij 
zijn. Je bent een fijne lieve vent!
Pap(s) en Carin, bedankt voor alle goede gesprekken, de toffe vakanties, en jullie 
aanstekelijke bevlogenheid met eigenlijk best onwaarschijnlijke en uit de hand 
gelopen hobbies (hierbij doel ik natuurlijk op alles wat met de Balkan te maken 
heeft). Ik hoop dat het niet meer te lang duurt voor jullie weer naar Guça kun-
nen en dat ik later als ik groot ben ook nog zo actief en gepassioneerd zal zijn. 
Bedankt dat jullie me de bergen hebben laten zien, bedankt voor jullie betrok-
kenheid, voor het duizendmaal helpen met al die dingen die ik nu eigenlijk wel 
zelf kan (vooral sollicitatiebrieven en belastingaangiftes). Pap, je bent de snelste 
denker die ik ken, en dat is soms irritant (ook voor jezelf), maar het is vaak ook 
juist een verademing om niet alles uit te hoeven leggen. Ik dank je voor je open 
blik, goede vragen, en hoe je met je helicopterview helpt om de dingen waar ik 
tegenaan loop in perspectief kunnen zien. En heel belangrijk, Carin: de tandoori.
Lieve Basta, mijn eerste liefde, en Ziggie, mijn schaduw, zoals Lyra zegt:  Your 
dæmon en’t separate from you. It’s you. A part of you. You’re part of each other 
Maar ook Harrie, Frits, Appie, Zora en Pixie, bedankt voor alle knuffels en het 
vereenvoudigen van beloningswaarden tot wel- of niet-kwispelwaardig.
Lieve Mario, ik weet niet waar ik moet beginnen. De mensen die ons allebei al 
kenden vonden ons een onwaarschijnlijke combinatie, en dat zijn we misschien 
ook nog steeds wel, maar dat is waarschijnlijk juist het ding wat het hem doet. 
Bedankt voor álles. Zonder jou had dit proefschrift er niet gelegen; die balans 
waarover ik het in het begin van dit uit de hand gelopen dankwoord had, heb-
ben wij samen moeten vinden, en ik weet dat jij daar minstens zoveel voor hebt 
moeten aanpassen als ik. Dit proefschrift is dus ook op jouw conto. Bedankt 
voor alle praktische en huishoudelijke toestanden die je op je hebt genomen, 
voor je sociale intelligentie, je creativiteit, het dansen in de huiskamer en elders, 
en natuurlijk voor alle liefde! Maar boven alles, dank voor onze mooie kinderen, 
lieve Siska en Morris, wat een wonderen, wat een sterke, koppige, creatieve en 
gevoelige wezens. Volg jullie eigen pad, en met Siska’s woorden: “Het maakt he-





This research followed the applicable laws and ethical guidelines. Research Data 
Management was conducted according to the FAIR principles. The paragraphs 
below specify in detail how this was achieved.
ETHICS
This thesis is based on the results of human studies, which were conducted 
in accordance with the principles of the Declaration of Helsinki. The Ethical 
Committee of the faculty of Social Sciences (ECSS) has given a positive advice 
to conduct these studies to the Dean of the Faculty, who formally approved the 
conduct of these studies (Chapter 3: ECG2012-3008-044; Chapters 4 and 5: 
ECSW2016-2501-373). This research is supported by a VENI grant (451-15-014) 
from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO), awarded to 
Inti A. Brazil.
FINDABLE ACCESSIBLE
The table below details where the data and research documentation for the 
chapters reporting empirical findings can be found on the Donders Repository 
(DR). All data are archived as a Data Sharing Collection and remain available for 
at least 10 years after termination of the studies.







DSC = Data Sharing Collection; Informed consent was obtained on paper following the Centre pro-




The DSC contains the raw data in their original as well as their pre-processed 
form (on which the reported analyses have been conducted). The appropriate 
pre-processing and statistical analysis scripts are also provided. Results are 
reproducible by providing a description of the experimental setup (including 
experiment files), raw data, and analysis scripts. 
Privacy
The privacy of the participants in this thesis has been warranted using random 
individual subject codes. A pseudonymization key linked this random code 
with the personal data. This pseudonymization key was stored on a network 
drive that was only accessible to members of the project who needed access 
to it because of their role within the project. The pseudonymization key was 
stored separately from the research data. The pseudonymization keys have 
been destroyed after finalization of these projects. All data are not identifiable 
and shared without restrictions. 
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Donders Graduate School  
for Cognitive Neuroscience
For a successful research Institute, it is vital to train the next generation of young 
scientists. To achieve this goal, the Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and 
Behaviour established the Donders Graduate School for Cognitive Neuroscience 
(DGCN), which was officially recognised as a national graduate school in 2009. 
The Graduate School covers training at both Master’s and PhD level and provides 
an excellent educational context fully aligned with the research programme of 
the Donders Institute. 
The school successfully attracts highly talented national and international 
students in biology, physics, psycholinguistics, psychology, behavioral science, 
medicine and related disciplines. Selective admission and assessment centers 
guarantee the enrolment of the best and most motivated students.
The DGCN tracks the career of PhD graduates carefully. More than 50% 
of PhD alumni show a continuation in academia with postdoc positions at top 
institutes worldwide, e.g. Stanford University, University of Oxford, University 
of Cambridge, UCL London, MPI Leipzig, Hanyang University in South Korea, 
NTNU Norway, University of Illinois, North Western University, Northeastern 
University in Boston, ETH Zürich, University of Vienna etc.. Positions outside 
academia spread among the following sectors: specialists in a medical environ-
ment, mainly in genetics, geriatrics, psychiatry and neurology. Specialists in a 
psychological environment, e.g. as specialist in neuropsychology, psychological 
diagnostics or therapy. Positions in higher education as coordinators or lecturers. 
A smaller percentage enters business as research consultants, analysts or head 
of research and development. Fewer graduates  stay in a research environment 
as lab coordinators, technical support or policy advisors. Upcoming possibilities 
are positions in the IT sector and management position in pharmaceutical indus-
try. In general, the PhDs graduates almost invariably continue with high-quality 
positions that play an important role in our knowledge economy.
For more information on the DGCN as well as past and upcoming defenses 
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